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THE MODERN AMERICAN
LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
As the lines separating race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation move closer together; and as everyone it seems has 
adopted their own notions concerning diversity, what it means, 
or the lack thereof, it is easy to be lulled into thinking that we 
have said and done all that we can regarding the topic.            
However, one can quickly discover just how premature this way 
of thinking is by clicking to the website of your preferred news 
source or picking up a newspaper – national or local.               
Everywhere you turn, you can see old diversity issues           
masquerading as new ones, previously ignored facets of           
diversity resurfacing, truly novel diversity problems emerging, 
and diversity issues finally finding solutions. 
 In fact, it seems that in the past year, diversity issues have 
particularly found themselves in the spotlight of American        
culture.  From the Jena 6 protests in Louisiana, to the resurgence 
of noose incidents around the country, to the broad spectrum of 
presidential candidates, and the adoption of anti-immigrant        
ordinances across the nation, issues relating to underrepresented 
people have been a reoccurring theme in our country.  Thus, 
despite what some may think, and if the past is any indication, 
American discourse surrounding diversity is anything but over. 
Even the sometimes isolated environment of a law school 
reflects the nature of the larger conversation regarding diversity 
taking place in the nation today.  One particular incident at WCL 
embodies this reality. Recently, the Immigration Rights           
Coalition (“IRC”) at the school hosted a lunch-time panel on day 
laborers and day labor activists.  To publicize the event, the 
group hung signs around the school.  Later, signs placed in the 
elevators were defaced when the words “Undocumented Day 
Laborers” were crossed out and replaced with “Illegal Aliens.”  
As the IRC and other diversity organizations have petitioned the 
administration for an opportunity to address the incident at a 
town-hall style meeting, it is important for us also realize that 
incidences like these are exactly why a publication like The 
Modern American is so important. For it is by fostering         
meaningful dialogues in forums such as this publication that we 
as a legal community and society can dissect the complexities of 
diversity issues and find workable solutions. 
This is also why, as a publication, The Modern American
proudly continues to bring you quality articles and other writings 
on topics related to diversity and the law.  The Special Fall/
Summer 2007 Issue that you will find on the next few pages is 
no different.  In fact, we are pleased to provide an expanded 
issue that discusses topics ranging from equal treatment in      
athletic scheduling, to the application of anti-discrimination laws 
to ocean vessels.  This issue also contains a special insert of  
articles commemorating the Tenth Annual Hispanic Law      
Conference.  This year’s conference, entitled The Voice of the 
Latino/a Lawyer: Accomplishments and Challenges, took place 
on March 9th, 2007.  Given the conference theme, the articles in 
this issue commemorating the event come from some of the 
brightest scholarly and legal minds in the Latino community.  As 
always, The Modern American is proud to do our part by       
providing a forum for these authors. 
Finally, at The Modern American, we are undergoing a  
season of transition following the appointment of the new     
Executive Board.  Therefore, those of us who have gone before 
would like to wish the newest leaders of this publication the 
best.  We know they will preserve the vision of The Modern 
American, and will be as proud to continue the work that we 
have been so privileged to perform.  To our readers, we thank 
you for the opportunity to have brought you issues in the past 
year that have stimulated your mind and furthered the overall 
discussion of diversity and the law. 
We hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we         
enjoyed making it! 
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THE IRRATIONALITY OF A RATIONAL BASIS:
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
BY SAM CASTIC*
Three weeks after Quintin was born to Sherri Kokx and Johanna Bender, he had difficulty breathing.  Alarmed, his parents took him to see his doctor, who,                 
understanding the urgency of the situation, promptly called an 
ambulance.  When the paramedics arrived at the doctor’s   office, 
critical time slipped away as the forms the paramedics had to fill 
out did not recognize that a child could have two parents of the 
same sex.  Critical moments slipped by as the ambulance sat in 
the parking lot as the paramedics refused to accept that Johanna 
and Sherri were both Quintin’s parents.  The doctor’s urgent 
declarations that both women were Quintin’s parents did not 
hasten the paramedics’ actions as the infant Quintin awaited  
essential  medical attention.  The  paramedics could not         
understand that a child could have parents of the same sex. 
Quintin was eventually hospitalized for several days and        
fortunately survived, but the episode demonstrated to Sherri and 
Johanna the effect that the lack of legal protection can have on 
the families of same-sex couples and their children.1
Recent high court decisions in New 
York and Washington have upheld the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
rights and benefits of marriage.  In their 
decisions, each court essentially found 
that marriage statutes were created for 
the benefit of children.  The courts reasoned that the state interest 
in child welfare was furthered by restricting the benefits of      
marriage to opposite-sex couples, irrespective of whether the 
couples had children.  Assuming that the benefits and protections 
provided in marriage statutes serve a legitimate state purpose, 
this article examines the effects that  exclusionary provisions in 
those statutes visit directly upon the children of same-sex      
couples. That is, to the extent that  marriage rights enable      
couples to better rear their children, the children of same-sex 
children are disadvantaged.  Accordingly, I argues that it is 
wholly irrational to deny the children of same-sex couples the 
rights and privileges  purportedly created to benefit all children. 
In Section I of this article I address the exclusive nature of 
the rights and benefits extended by marriage.  The section        
examines how marriage statutes operate for the intended  benefit 
of children, and demonstrates how public and private law offer 
no equivalent protection to families headed by same-sex couples.  
Finally, the section will show how the  exclusive nature of    
marriage disadvantages children being reared by same-sex      
couples.  In Section II, I argue that it is irrational to use the sex 
of a child’s parents to determine the rights and privileges that 
will be extended to the child.  The section will examine how the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage primarily focuses 
on the couples, and how this focus is irrelevant to the actual  
fostering of child welfare.  The section will examine the recent 
New York, Washington, and New Jersey marriage decisions, and 
will argue that decisions in the former states misapplied the    
relevant rational basis tests in reaching their decisions.   
LEGAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS ARE EXTENDED
ONLY TO SOME COUPLES REARING CHILDREN
THE RATIONALE FOR MARRIAGE RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS
IS TO PROMOTE CHILD DEVELOPMENT
A key contemporary rationale for governmental extension of 
rights and benefits to couples that marry is that such protections 
promote child welfare.  This is the view that best justifies the 
extension of rights and benefits by the state, as a solely religious 
institution would lack a legitimate state interest for promotion, 
and a purely romantic relationship would logically include  
same-sex couples.  Importantly, proponents of state marriage 
laws embrace this perspective and reject describing marriage as 
the codification of a life-long romantic 
relationship.2 This child development 
rationale is grounded in the belief that by 
adding to the stability of the family unit, 
the children of married couples are better 
provided for, and have increased chances 
of developmental success. Under the rationale, the government 
extends rights and benefits to married couples acting on the   
notion that couples are better able to rear children than single 
individuals.  The belief is that the presence of two parents is 
most likely to result in a financially stable family unit equipped 
with the resources necessary to fulfill the obligations of child 
rearing.  Rights and benefits provided with marriage are tailored 
to support the family unit, correspondingly maximizing child 
welfare by providing children with the best family and household 
in which to be reared. The rights and benefits created in         
marriage laws can thus be seen as a set of inducements for      
couples with children to marry and stay together, which arguably 
ensures the optimal circumstances for the child’s development.3       
In addition to benefiting from an intuitively logical appeal, 
the two-parent model finds support in social science.  Social  
science data are uniformly in agreement that family structure 
affects child development and that the rights conditioned upon 
marital status help to benefit children.4 Both proponents and   
opponents of extending the rights of marriage the status of    
marriage  benefits the children that the couple rears.  However, 
there is no consensus on the degree to which it is the status of 
marriage as opposed to the presence of two parents that         
contributes to a child’s development.5  Maggie Gallagher’s        
survey of the social science data helpfully groups the benefits      
The paramedics could not
understand that a child could 
have parents of the same sex. 
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that a marital family structure offers to children into six        
categories: psychological adjustment, physical health and       
longevity, crime and delinquency, child abuse, education and 
socioeconomic attainment, and family formation.6  According to 
Gallagher, studies show that the psychological well-being of 
children reared by married parents is stronger, that divorce        
disrupts children’s mental development, and that youth suicide is 
correlated to divorce and being reared by single parents.7  As to 
physical health and longevity, infant mortality rates are          
significantly higher when the mother is unmarried, health        
problems increase for children reared by single parents, and the 
child’s life expectancy is reduced by divorce.8  With respect to 
crime and delinquency, boys reared by divorced or single      
parents are significantly more likely to become delinquent or 
engage in criminal behavior.  Teens in single  parent households 
are generally more attached to their peer groups and              
subsequently are more inclined to be delinquent.9  Child abuse is 
more prevalent in households with single mothers, and the   
presence of a mother’s boyfriend 
or a stepfather increases the     
likelihood that a child will be 
abused.10  Children in divorced or  
unmarried households do not 
perform as well in school, are 
more likely to be held back, and 
are less likely to go to college.11
Subsequent family formation by children reared by a divorced or 
unmarried parent are more likely to be characterized by divorce 
and unwanted pregnancy.12   
Gallagher’s survey of the data was employed to demonstrate 
that family structure is important to child development, and that 
extending the state rights and benefits of marriage to opposite-
sex couples is the best way of promoting the  formation and  
continuation of a family structure conducive to optimal child 
development.13 As Gallagher admits though, there is no social 
science consensus about the extent to which the data show that 
households with married parents are better settings for rearing 
children than are those with unmarried parents.14  While there is 
much consensus among social scientists that having two parents 
is generally better than having one, the consensus about the   
advantage that married parents offer seems to be limited to the 
benefits of the legal and social rights extended in marriage, and 
not the fact of having opposite-sex parents.15
EXISTING LAW DOES NOT UNIFORMLY EXTEND                
RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS TO SAME-SEX                             
COUPLES REARING CHILDREN
The government extends a wide array of legal rights and 
privileges to married couples  rearing children.  The rights and 
privileges given at the federal, state, and local levels benefit both 
the couple and the children they rear. These rights and privileges 
are extended regardless of whether the child is biologically    
related to either spouse.  The same rights and privileges are   
extended whether the child was naturally conceived or whether 
their life began with the assistance of artificial reproductive 
methods.  Thus, the goal is the fostering of a family unit        
irrespective of biology.   
Both federal and state governments guarantee rights that 
directly and indirectly benefit the children of opposite-sex     
married couples.  At the federal level, over 1,000 benefits, rights, 
and privileges are available to married couples.16  At the state 
level, the rights can be categorized into those that protect the 
spousal relationship, enforce spouses’           
obligations to one another, treat spouses as a 
single financial unit, and extend protections to 
the children of married couples.17  These rights 
are meant both to bind the couple together and 
to benefit the children they rear, and as marital 
rights, they are unavailable to the children of 
unmarried couples. Lewis A. Silverman       
enumerates the benefits extended legally and socially to married 
couples and their children, organizing them into the following 
categories: government benefits, tax benefits, immigration         
privileges, employer benefits, and other benefits.18 While a         
complete examination of these benefits is beyond the scope of 
this article, a brief summary reveals the extent and importance of 
the rights of marriage to couples rearing children.     
Tax benefits are extended to families at the federal and state 
levels.  The right to file federal taxes jointly often results in 
lower marginal tax rates for a married couple in addition to 
lower overall tax liability.19  Married couples are not taxed on 
benefits, such as health care, that are extended by their spouse’s   
employer, though any comparable benefits extended to          
employees in same-sex unions are.20  With regard to tax on a 
decedent’s estate, partners in a same-sex union do not qualify for 
the deduction extended to surviving spouses, which “in turn 
takes away financial resources the surviving parent would be 
able to spend on their child.”21
Immigration law also affords special status to married     
couples, permitting the couple to reside permanently in the   
country as long as spouse is a United States citizen. This      
privilege is not extended to parties to a same-sex union, which 
may result in the separation of a family unit when both parents 
are not United States citizens.  Importantly children have no   
independent status or means to preserve their family unit, which 
can lead to the child being separated from one of the legal      
parents who is not permitted to enter or remain in the country.22
Employer benefits are another realm in which the lack of 
studies show that the
psychological well-being of       
children reared by  married         
parents is stronger 
the advantage that married parents        
offer seems to be limited to the benefits of 
the legal and social rights extended in
marriage, and not the fact of having
opposite-sex parents 
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recognition of the same-sex union disadvantages the children of 
same-sex couples.  Employer-provided surviving family benefits 
are not generally extended to a surviving party of a same-sex 
relationship or any non-biological child that the couple reared.23
The practice of exclusion is found both in federal and state     
employment.24 Employer-provided health care commonly      
extended to spouses and children of the employee is not required 
to be given to the non-biological child of, or partner to, a same-
sex  union.  Employer grants of leave to care for one’s family 
member do not have to cover time away from work to care for a 
non-biological child or a same-sex partner.25  In addition, there 
are no national non-discrimination laws in employment,       
housing, or public accommodations that protect people in same-
sex relationships from discrimination on the basis of the sexual 
orientation or gender identity which   characterizes their family. 
Parties to such  relationships who serve in the military cannot 
cover their partner or non-biological child with cost of living 
allowances or death benefits should they die.26 The examples 
above show some of the ways in which employer benefits that 
are not extended on an equal basis to same and opposite-sex   
couples, thus resulting in less protection for children in families 
with same-sex unions.  In the absence of state and federal law 
mandating the contrary, the list could be broadened to include 
any employee benefit that adds to the  security of their family.  
The final category of rights and benefits from which same-
sex couples are excluded are tangible and intangible privileges.  
Not being recognized as a family under the law, a same-sex   
couple that decides to dissolve its relationship faces custody, 
visitation, and child support questions that are clearly answered 
for married couples.  Custody and visitation are not guaranteed, 
even for a well-qualified parent, if she or he is not the biological 
parent.  By not recognizing the relationship as a marriage, the 
law poses greater challenges for courts that seek to impose child 
support obligations on the parent who does not retain custody, 
especially if she or he is a non-biological parent. Non-
recognition also poses problems for families if one of the parties 
to a same-sex union dies wrongfully for the surviving adult, and 
child if not biological, will not have standing to bring a wrongful 
death action.27 Intangible benefits include   permitting the family 
to be recognized as a family unit within the cultural               
understanding of a family, which conceivably helps to reduce the 
stigma that has historically burdened the children of unmarried 
parents.28
The rights and privileges that are extended in marriage are 
only extended to couples that are legally married, a status that is 
reserved for a socially-sanctioned sexual union.29 Most of the 
rights emphasize the couple’s mutual obligations to each other 
and operate to bring social and legal recognition to the couple 
and children as a family unit.  In delineating which family units 
are recognized under the law, married hetero-sexual unions are 
the model, and non-marital arrangements, including families 
headed by same-sex couples, are deliberately excluded from   
recognition. Opposite-sex couples are the only relationship    
uniformly entitled to the status of marriage  under the law, and 
consequently, are the only relationship entitled to the rights and 
privileges extended in marriage.30 Though marriage is generally 
understood to be a sexual union, the opposite-sex marital        
relationship is entitled to privacy, and the sexual nature of the 
couple is free from inquiry from the government.31  Laws against      
consanguinity and polygamy implicitly recognize marriage as a 
sexual union, and restricting marriage to a sexual union model 
largely forecloses non-traditional or caretaking models of family 
from being legally recognized.32       
Supporters of the current delineation of legal recognition 
and exclusion among relationships claim that there are inherent 
differences in the nature of marital and non-marital relationships, 
and that the former is generally a stronger relationship than the 
latter.33 Some claim that marriage may also be viewed as a    
social good in and of itself, a perspective used to justify          
opposition to extending quasi-legal statuses to cohabitating    
couples who do not marry.34 Obviously, opposite-sex couples are 
free to partake in the legal benefits and obligations of marriage 
by choosing to get married, a choice that can be freely made    
irrespective of the circumstances of their relationship. In spite of 
the availability of marriage for opposite-sex couples, some state 
courts have permitted equitable theories and private contracts to 
approximate some of the obligations between unmarried  parties 
to a relationship, but the number of such states is small.35
Recognition of equitable theories and private contracts generally 
involve only obligations between the parties and not specific 
rights from the state to benefit their children.3 Within             
non-marital co-habitating relationships with children, biological 
parents may have rights under the law with respect to their     
biological child, but the law’s  recognition of such rights is by 
virtue of their biological tie to the child rather than the couple’s 
continued relationship. For cohabitating people with non-
biological children, most states permit second parent adoptions, 
but fewer states permit same-sex couples to secure their family 
through the process.37
Same-sex couples are prohibited from marrying in every 
state except for Massachusetts. Massachusetts only permits    
marriage where one of the parties is a resident of  Massachusetts, 
or where the couple resides in a state without a well-founded 
public policy opposed to same-sex marriage.38  Accordingly, few 
Custody and visitation are not guaranteed, 
even for a well-qualified parent, if she
or he is not the  biological parent. 
Same-sex couples are prohibited           




of the nation’s same-sex couples are able to marry in             
Massachusetts.  If a couple does marry in Massachusetts, or any 
other jurisdiction where same-sex  marriage becomes legal, the 
Defense of Marriage Act permits states and jurisdictions to    
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages or unions, and for federal 
purposes, same-sex unions are never legally recognized         
regardless of where they were preformed.39  As a result of the 
Defense of Marriage Act and the lack of state laws sanctioning 
same-sex unions, the rights and privileges of marriage are     
effectively denied to same-sex couples and their children 
throughout most of the country. 
Some states grant a range of the rights of marriage to same-
sex couples who enter into domestic partnerships or civil unions.  
Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and, beginning in 2008, New 
Hampshire, offer civil unions that extend nearly all of the state 
recognized rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.40
California, Hawaii, Maine, Washington, the District of             
Columbia, and, beginning in 2008, Oregon, permit domestic 
partnerships for same-sex couples, 
and extend differing numbers of the 
rights and benefits of marriage to 
same-sex couples.41 Ultimately, civil 
unions and domestic partnerships 
lack interstate recognition pursuant 
to the Defense of Marriage Act42,
and their effectiveness in offering the 
same degree of protection to family units headed by same-sex 
couples as state and federally           recognized marriages are 
clearly inferior.43
 A child born to or adopted by a married couple is generally 
presumed to be the child of the couple, and both parties to the 
couple are legally presumed to be the parents of the child.44
When both parties to a couple have parental rights with respect 
to their child, then they are considered to have a legal              
relationship with the child.  As same-sex couples cannot marry, 
they have no legal presumption supporting their parental rights 
and can only obtain such status if they reside in a jurisdiction 
where joint or second-parent adoption proceedings are  available 
to same-sex couples.  Joint adoption by the couple, or second-
parent adoption by the partner without parental rights are means 
of assuring that parties to a same-sex couple both have their   
parental rights preserved.45  Joint or second-parent adoption by a 
same-sex couple has been judicially permitted in many            
jurisdictions when it comports with the best interests of the child; 
however, it is not uniformly available.46  Parental status involves 
a number of legal rights and responsibilities, and benefits the 
child by bringing security to the parent-child relationship.47  The 
security of the parent-child relationship often becomes critical if 
the same-sex partner separates; in the absence of parental status, 
a same-sex partner who has jointly reared a child can see their 
relationship with the child eliminated without any legal          
recourse.48  Even where parental status is available to preserve 
the parent-child relationship, it cannot confer the legal benefits 
of marriage that are designed to benefit the child of the couple.49
Subsequently, the ability of a same-sex couple to obtain parental 
rights with respect to a child does not eliminate the disadvantage 
faced by the child. 
PRIVATE LAW IS NOT AN EQUIVALENT MEANS FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES TO SECURE RIGHTS
Some of the legal rights and benefits that opposite-sex     
couples enjoy can be secured for same-sex couples through    
private contract.  The private right to contract is, however, not an 
equivalent substitute for positive legal rights, such as marital and 
parental rights, which offer clear legal protection to families.  
Private contract can only address the obligations between the     
parties to the contract, and it has no authority to bind non-parties, 
such as the government. Accordingly, rights of inheritance, 
power of attorney, and medical decision-making authority, 
which pertain solely to the rights between the parties, can be 
granted through private contract.  However, rights such as tax-
filing status and liability, parental custody, health care coverage, 
or standing for wrongful death 
claims cannot be extended through 
private contract between the parties 
to a same-sex relationship.  Without 
the benefit of legal status, families 
headed by same-sex couples cannot 
obtain the positive rights that extend 
automatically with marriage.  
Where a couple does seek to secure rights through  contract, 
they will typically have no expertise in the legal requirements to 
do effectively and often need to hire an attorney. The time and 
expense of hiring an attorney is considerable for many couples,50
and it almost certainly means that many same-sex couples do not 
avail themselves to the protections of private law.  Even where 
couples believe that they have taken the precautions necessary to 
protect their family unit, their efforts can be challenged by         
disapproving relatives in ways that marriages cannot.51               
Unfortunately, such challenges often come at times of family 
emergency or death, when the family is most likely to need the 
protections, and when the lack of legal recognition for the family 
is most devastating.52
SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE REARING, AND WILL CONTINUE TO
REAR, CHILDREN
Irrespective of the merits of same-sex couples rearing     
children, same-sex couples are rearing children, and have been 
for years.  The 2000 Census reported that there were more than 
160,000 families with children headed by same-sex couples in 
the United States.53  This is a conservative figure, given the 
likely of underreporting of same-sex couples in the Census.54
Underreporting aside, the figure is almost certainly higher  today 
as the estimated number of same-sex headed households has 
increased, and a significant portion of gay and lesbian   people 
already are biological or adoptive parents.55  Moreover, nearly 
half of all gay or lesbian people desire to have children.56  In 
spite of the lack of legal recognition for their families, it is 
Without the benefit of legal status,
families headed by same-sex couples 
cannot obtain the positive rights that
extend automatically with marriage. 
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unlikely that there will be any decrease in the  number of same-
sex couples rearing children. 
While state law can, and often does, disadvantage same-sex 
couples that seek to become parents, once a child is a legal or 
biological child of one of the parents, the couple can generally 
rear the child as long as the legal parent is present.57  A ban on a 
legal parents’ cohabitating with someone of the same sex, and 
choosing to jointly assume parental roles, would likely violate 
the  federal Constitution as parenting is likened to a fundamental 
right.58  Though the Supreme Court’s constitutional protection of 
the parent-child relationship deals largely with biological         
relationships, but its rationale is applicable to all parent-child 
relationships once established, regardless of whether or not they 
are biological.59  Accordingly, the state would need a compelling 
interest to disrupt the parent-child relationship, which they 
would not be likely to demonstrate.  In 
spite of historical efforts preventing gay 
or lesbian parents from gaining or     
retaining custody of their child, courts 
are increasingly finding sexual                
orientation not to be determinative or 
even relevant to the determination of a 
child’s best interests.60  As same-sex couples continue to rear 
children, and as the parent-child relationship is constitutionally 
protected, the families they comprise exist without the rights and 
benefits of marriage. 
IT IS IRRATIONAL TO USE PARENTAL STATUS TO        
DETERMINE THE LEGAL RIGHTS FROM WHICH          
CHILDREN BENEFIT
 The preceding sections of this article has demonstrated the 
ways in which the law extends legal rights and benefits to      
families headed by opposite-sex couples that choose to get     
married.  The sections have also explored the ways in which 
similarly situated families headed by same-sex couples are 
largely excluded from the statutory schemes, as well as why  
private law offers no equivalent substitute for the comprehensive 
statutory scheme.  As the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage directly impacts the children they rear, the rationality of 
the system merits a closer evaluation to determine whether the 
rights purportedly created for the benefit of children are so      
tailored. 
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSION FOCUSES ON THE
STATUS OF THE COUPLES REARING THE CHILDREN
The justification for denying the families headed by same-
sex couples the protections offered to families headed by       
opposite-sex couples focuses on the nature of the relationship of 
the couple heading the family, overlooking the needs of the    
children they rear.61 Both proponents and opponents of          
extending rights to families headed by same-sex couples adhere 
to the focus on the couple, thus reinforcing the issue as being one 
of what is owed to the couple and not of what best serves the 
children reared by the couple. 
The proponents of extending rights and protections to same-
sex couples often frame the issue as one of  discrimination, 
which ultimately focuses on the couple.  Specifically, the denial 
of recognition is viewed in terms of discrimination against the 
same-sex couple, the parties to the same-sex couple, and homo-
sexual people in general, as evidenced by recent court decisions 
and public argument offered by proponents.62  To the extent that 
the plight of the children of same-sex couples is addressed, it is 
done as a secondary matter.  The framing of the issue as one of          
discrimination tends to overlook the effects on the children63 and 
reinforces the tactics of the opponents of recognizing same-sex 
families. 
Opponents of granting rights to families headed by same-sex 
couples can be motivated by a number of different reasons.    
Often rooted in the belief that sexual orientation is a choice, they 
may seek to deny legal   incentives that 
promote people acting on homosexual de-
sires, to codify  homophobic sentiments 
into law, or to protect child development by 
preventing children from being reared by 
same-sex couples.64  All of the aforemen-
tioned motivations directly reject the         
framing of the denial of rights to same-sex couples as             
discriminatory, but nevertheless focus on the nature of the               
relationship of the same-sex couple.65
Most major psychological and medical organizations   reject 
the notion that sexual orientation is mutable,66 and advocates of 
equal rights for gay and lesbian people vigorously oppose the 
notion.  Nonetheless, the lack of definitive scientific proof that 
sexual orientation is caused exclusively by biological or genetic 
factors keeps this debate alive.67  The support for the mutability 
perspective still holds influence for more than those dedicated to 
the cause of opposing recognition of rights for same-sex couples. 
For example, in the recent marriage decision by the Washington 
State Supreme Court, the plurality noted that there was not a 
sufficient showing to conclude that homosexuality is immutable, 
and that the “question is being researched and debated across the 
country.”68 Those who believe that sexual orientation is a choice 
may not want to permit children to be reared in families headed 
by same-sex couples, primarily out of concern with the influence 
that the parents’ homosexuality will have on the  children.69
Opposition to rights for gays and lesbians can also be 
the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage         
directly impacts the           
children they rear 
In spite of the lack of legal recognition              
for their families, it is unlikely that
there will be any decrease in the  number
of same-sex couples rearing children. 
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grounded in a policy theory of non-promotion. Professor       
William Eskridge refers to such an approach as the “no promo 
homo” approach to legislating.70  Related to the idea that homo-
sexuality is a choice, opponents of granting rights to same-sex 
couples’ families claim that their reasons are rooted in a desire 
not to promote behavior that they view as undesirable.  If the 
rights granted to couples are meant as incentives for the couples 
to stay together and rear their children, proponents of the “no 
promo homo” theory would argue that the same incentives 
should not be used to promote  homosexuality.  Advocates of the 
“no promo homo” theory would not frame the matter as one of   
discrimination, but rather, would 
view it as a matter of not extending 
“special rights” or refusing to    
create incentives for behavior with 
which they disagree. 
Some who oppose recognizing 
families headed by same-sex     
couples express concern with the 
best interest of the children that 
same-sex couples rear and claim 
that  inherent  differences between 
same and opposite-sex relationships lead to the latter being the 
ideal setting in which to rear children.71  George A. Rekers has 
argued that children fare less well when reared by same-sex        
couples because such relationships are less stable,  social stigma 
of homosexuality negatively affects them, and they do  not  have  
proper  male  and  female  role  models.72  Maggie Gallagher and 
Joshua K. Baker take a different approach, restating the social 
science consensus surrounding the benefit offered to children of 
married couples and claiming that most all of the social science 
conclusions supporting the fitness of same-sex parents are        
premised on studies which have methodological errors, or which 
do not provide direct evidence that married same-sex couples 
would be as competent as married opposite-sex couples at          
rearing children.73  The reasoning continues that since there is 
not sufficient evidence that same-sex couples would perform as 
well in marriage, same-sex couples should continue to be denied 
marriage rights.74
At first glance, these reasons for opposing rights for families 
headed by same-sex couples appears to legitimately consider the 
interests of the children without letting the status of the couple 
rearing the children unduly bias its judgment.  Unfortunately, a 
deeper examination shows that the perspective is cut from the 
same cloth.75  Such positions interpret social science data in a 
way contrary to the mainstream scientific and professional     
consensus in order to draw the conclusion that children will     
suffer if reared by a same-sex couple.76 George Rekers’         
argument is typical of this perspective.  Rekers’ assertion that 
same-sex couples are less stable than opposite-sex couples is 
premised on comparing couples that don’t have the right to 
marry with legally married opposite-sex couples, a setup which 
predetermines the result.77   While Rekers’ second assertion that 
children of same-sex couples may be prone to teasing on account 
of their parents’ relationship, social science data does not support 
finding any worse psychological consequences.78  Rekers’ third 
assertion is essentially what Maggie Gallagher’s work is          
concerned with — the belief that children need mothers and     
fathers.  This too is unsupported in the social science findings as 
it depends on a conflation of the well supported belief that two 
married parents matter, with the unfounded notion that were 
same-sex couples able to marry, they would be less competent 
than opposite-sex  couples at rearing children.79  In the end,    
social science offers strong support for the belief that having 
married parents benefits child development, and a notably               
uncontradicted, yet not long-
studied degree of support for the 
belief that same-sex couples are 
as good as opposite-sex couples 
at rearing children. Nonetheless, 
so long as same-sex couples    
parent, the proper question 
should focus not on whether the 
couples are as competent as  
opposite-sex couples, but 
whether continued denial of 
legal recognition of the family serves the child’s best interests. 
THE NATURE OF THE COUPLE REARING THE CHILDREN IS
IRRELEVANT TO RATIONALITY
One of the key contemporary justifications for marital laws 
is that marriage directly and indirectly benefits the children 
reared by the couple.  That the children of same-sex couples are 
excluded from these benefits makes it unquestionable that the 
marriage statutes are underinclusive, and that opposite-sex cou-
ples that are unable or unwilling to have children are able to 
marry makes the statutes overinclusive.  This underinclusivity 
and overinclusivity casts serious doubt on whether child welfare 
is the real legislative purpose of marriage laws, or merely a    
contemporary justification for maintaining an exclusive set of 
statutory benefits for opposite-sex couples.  If the goal were truly 
child welfare, the most direct way of accomplishing the goal 
would be permitting all couples that have children to marry.  
Such a policy would be easy to administer, and would            
acknowledge that all children are equally entitled to the rights 
and benefits purportedly created for child welfare.               
Unfortunately, such policy changes have not been forthcoming, 
and the reality is that there is a large class of children that are not 
able to have their development assisted by rights purportedly 
created for their benefit.  More than the promotion of child     
welfare, which necessarily would involve promoting the welfare 
of the children of same-sex couples, an overriding interest in 
preserving the exclusively opposite-sex nature of marriage is 
embedded in our laws. 
In failing to fully promote child welfare for all children, the 
law distinguishes between the children that will and will not 
benefit from the rights and privileges it    creates on the basis of 
the child’s parents.  In doing so, it visits a punishment on the      
so long as same-sex couples parent, the 
proper question should focus not on
whether the couples are as competent as
opposite-sex couples, but whether
continued denial of legal recognition of           
the family serves the child’s best interests. 
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children of same-sex couples by denying them the full scope of 
opportunity offered to the children of opposite-sex couples.  
Though irrelevant to the stated goal of child development, the 
classification rests on the sexual orientation of the child’s      
parents, and discriminates against them for something that they 
have no control over. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of illegitimacy offers an 
instructive parallel to the broader question of whether it is just to 
punish a child for the status or actions of their parents.  The 
Court has recognized that the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses are a barrier to statutes created to deter 
actions or behavior among adults while placing a significant part 
of the burden on children who bear no responsibility for the 
adults’ actions or behavior.  In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., the Court struck down a ban on compensation       
recovery rights for unacknowledged illegitimate children.80  The 
majority reasoned that “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual               
responsibility or wrongdoing.”81 Noting that laws dissuading 
non-marital sex were common, the Court concluded that 
“penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as an 
unjust - way of deterring the parent.”82 The development of the 
jurisprudence following Weber has found that classifications 
based on legitimacy are to be subjected to heightened scrutiny, 
and the Court has maintained the view that it is unjust to penalize 
children in order to deter the behavior of their parents.83
As with statutes that punished 
children for being born to and 
reared by families that did not 
benefit from socially constructed 
norms of legitimacy, statutes        
denying children of same-sex     
couples the benefits of legal rights 
created to  promote child   welfare 
similarly disadvantage children for 
the conduct of their parents.  The 
disadvantages created through the denial are equally unjust      
because the children burdened possess no choice in the structure 
of the family that rears them.  However, as long as the debate 
over extending rights to families headed by same-sex couples 
focuses on the couples, and not on the children they rear, this 
injustice will continue, and children will endure the                  
consequences.  Lewis A. Silverman argues that the focus on the 
adult relationship, and not on the independent claim that the   
children have to these rights, distorts the analysis that should be 
undertaken when considering whether families with children 
should be protected by the full scope of the law.84  By positing 
children as people protected by the Constitution and viewing 
their right to benefits as deriving from their dependent status, 
Silverman reasons that many of the arguments against            
recognizing families with same-sex parents are eliminated.85 The 
fact that courts are finding marriage rights to have been created 
for the benefit of children provides even more powerful support 
for viewing the question of extending such rights from the      
perspective of the child. By not focusing on the needs of the  
children and the ways in which the lack of rights and  protections 
for the family affects the children, children are being dis-
advantaged and will continue to be so long as they are denied the 
child welfare benefits for which marriage  statutes were            
purportedly created. 86
EXISTING LAW IS THOUGHT TO BE RATIONAL THROUGH A
MISAPPLICATION OF RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
The denial of the rights and benefits of marriage to the     
children of same-sex couples has been upheld as rational in two 
recent decisions of state high courts and it has been found to be 
irrational in one.  Though the decisions suffer from a misguided 
framing by focusing less on the logic of denying rights and    
responsibilities to families rearing children, and more on the 
claim same-sex couples have to the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, the courts upholding rationality consistently found the 
legitimate state interest in marriage to be about having and     
rearing children.  With children as the legislative purpose of 
marriage law, courts find a classification based on the couple 
rearing the children to be rational only by ignoring the actual 
presence and needs of the children  intentionally excluded by the 
classification drawn. Recent high court decisions in  Washington 
and New York  embody this emerging trend, as both courts, after 
employing variations of the traditional equal protection analysis, 
found that it is rational for states to extend benefits to families 
headed by opposite-sex couples 
while excluding families headed by 
same-sex couples. By contrast, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court found 
that it is irrational to exclude      
families headed by opposite-sex 
couples from the rights and benefits 
of marriage. The New Jersey       
decision demonstrates the central 
flaw of the Washington and New 
York applications of rational basis scrutiny; by failing to       
examine the rationality of how the classification, which focuses 
on the    parents, furthers the state’s interest in children, the New 
York and Washington courts did not meaningfully apply rational 
basis analysis. 
In Hernandez v. Robles, the New York Court of Appeals 
held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the state     
marriage laws was constitutional under both the New York       
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.87  The 
court found that neither state nor federal Due Process or Equal 
Protection clauses were violated by the exclusion of same-sex 
couples, as there was a legitimate state interest in promoting 
child welfare,88 and there were at least two rational bases upon 
which the legislature could limit marriage to opposite sex      
couples in order to protect child welfare: promoting familial     
stability and ensuring children are reared by a mother and       
father.89  The court noted that both bases were derived from the 
Though irrelevant to the stated goal         
of child development, the classification 
rests on the sexual orientation of the 
child’s parents, and discriminates             
against them for something that   
they have no control over. 
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“undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare 
of children.”90
The court reasoned that extending marriage to opposite-sex 
couples could rationally promote familial stability if the         
legislature believed that heterosexual couples, whose sexual  
union may result in unexpected child birth, require more        
incentives than same-sex couples to stay together and rear the 
children they bring into the world.91  Though admitting that 
same-sex couples often have children, the court reasoned that the 
planned nature of having children in same-sex relationships 
could inform the legislature’s belief that opposite-sex couples 
need the inducements provided by marriage more than same-sex         
couples.92  This rational basis thus implicitly recognizes some 
objective societal   benefit in having couples that reproduce enter 
into a marriage.  If this basis is unique from the goal of having a 
mother and father rear a child, which is the second rational  basis 
identified by the court, the societal good must be a recognition 
that two parents are better able to rear a child than one parent, 
and that the state is justified in creating incentives for parents to 
stay together. 
Additionally, the court found that it would have been       
rational for the legislature to believe that it is optimal for        
children to be reared by a mother and father, a notion which if 
unsupported by social science, could still be supported by “the 
common-sense premise that children will do best with a mother 
and father in the home.”93 The court essentially said that        
majoritarian societal preferences, as manifested in culture and 
tradition, are sufficient to merit the state effort at promoting 
child welfare by extending safeguards and legal protections to 
opposite-sex couples rearing children while denying the same 
protections to children reared by same-sex couples.  Based on 
the assumption that opposite-sex couples provide a better       
upbringing to children, the court concluded that the legislature is 
rational “to offer a special inducement, the legal recognition of 
marriage, to encourage the formation of opposite-sex  house-
holds.”94
In Hernandez, Chief Judge Kaye challenged the majority’s 
application of rational basis review.  Kaye noted that equal      
protection’s “rational-basis review requires both the existence of 
a legitimate interest and that the classification rationally advance 
that interest.” 95  To this end, the proper  framing of the question 
was “whether there exists a rational basis for excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage, and, in fact, whether the State's interests 
in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages are         
rationally furthered by the exclusion.”96  Kaye found that while 
child welfare was potentially promoted through the inducement 
of marriage for couples that have children, none of the state’s 
interests were furthered by excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage.97
The first rational basis pertains to promoting familial         
stability for couples that procreate.  As discussed previously, to 
the extent that child welfare is the goal, this amounts to little 
more than a state interest in promoting marriage for couples that 
have children, which is rooted in the belief that two parents are 
better equipped to rear a child than one parent. What the         
majority opinion overlooks is that the children of same-sex     
couples also benefit from having two parents,98 and thus are 
equally included in any state interest that aims to promote      
children having two legal parents.  Having two parents rearing a 
child, in general, increases the ability to provide for the child’s 
financial, emotional, and developmental needs.  This common 
sense belief is supported by the social science data on the issue, 
and is a key justification for why most all of the major           
professional organizations concerned with child development 
and welfare support extending comparable rights and benefits to 
families headed by same-sex couple that rear children.99
 The second rational basis found in Hernandez for advancing 
the state interest in child welfare was the interest in having a 
mother and father to rear the child.  The court found this rational 
basis to be rooted in intuition and common sense.  Like the first 
rational basis, the second justification is irrational to the extent 
that child welfare is the ultimate goal.  Indeed in contradiction to 
the data accumulated thus far which find no adverse               
consequences for children reared in families headed by same-sex 
couples100, the courts find it rational to allow tradition and          
societal preference to trump the needs of the children being 
reared by same-sex couples.  As same-sex couples already are 
rearing children, and will continue to do so, all the while being 
denied rights and protections for their families, the question is no 
longer one of whether such children ought to have an upbringing 
in accord with majoritarian notions of the ideal; rather, the        
question is whether such majoritarian ideals are a rational            
justification for punishing the children of same-sex couples by 
denying them rights and benefits aimed at ensuring child       
welfare. The answer with respect to the same-sex headed      
families that have formed is clearly no, unless we are to believe 
that the inducement lures homosexual people into opposite-sex     
marriages for the purposes of reproducing - hardly a healthy or 
stable relationship to rear children in.  Since the inducement does 
not operate with respect to homosexual people, and since       
children are being reared in homes headed by same-sex couples, 
the classification cannot be seen to further the state’s interest, but 
rather, can only be seen as a classification drawn to disadvantage 
homosexuals and families headed by same-sex couples.101
In Andersen v. King County, the Washington State Supreme 
Court held that the state’s Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 
which was passed to deny the ability of same-sex couples to 
marry, was constitutional under the Washington State            
Constitution.102  Applying a form of equal protection analysis103,
the court essentially found procreation, familial stability, and 
traditional nuclear families to be the three legitimate state        
interests promoted by the DOMA.104 The court reasoned that 
encouraging procreation was a legitimate governmental interest, 
and that couples that marry may be more likely to procreate.105
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is related to 
that interest because “no other relationship has the potential to 
create, without third party involvement, a child biologically    
related to both parents.”106  Relatedly, the court found that it was 
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rational to believe that encouraging marriage for couples that can 
naturally procreate would be preferable to having children reared 
by unmarried parents, an interest which conceivably seeks to 
protect the best interests of children.107  The court also found that 
it was a legitimate state interest to promote having children 
reared in a home headed by their opposite-sex parents,108  to the 
extent that the legislature believed that children thrive in house-
holds composed of a father, mother, and their biological         
children.109  Thus, the court believed that the legislature was  
rational to conclude that child welfare was fostered by the      
encouragement of rearing children in traditional nuclear families, 
and that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage      
furthered that interest. 
In Andersen, Justice Fairhurst’s dissent challenged the    
plurality’s application of the rational basis inquiry, noting that 
under Washington law, the “requirement that a classification 
have a rational basis dictates that the issue in [the] case be 
framed as whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil 
marriage is rationally related to a legitimate [state]  interest.”110
As the state’s DOMA was the only statute being challenged, the 
dissent argued that the focus on the rationality of extending 
rights and benefits to opposite-sex couples was immaterial to the 
inquiry, for “DOMA in no way affects the right of opposite-sex 
couples to marry – the only intent and effect of DOMA was to 
explicitly deny same-sex couples the right to marry.”111
Applying the dissent’s equal protection standard to the first 
state interest, that of promoting procreation, the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage would have to be deemed to be 
rationally related to the interest.  On this relationship the dissent 
noted that “there is no logical way that denying the right to marry 
to same-sex couples will encourage heterosexual couples to   
procreate with greater frequency.”112  Similarly, there seems to 
be no logical way of concluding that denying the right to marry 
to same-sex couples would discourage heterosexual couples 
from procreating.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ability of 
same-sex couple headed families accessing the institution of 
marriage at all relates to the willingness or ability of opposite-
sex couples to procreate. 
On the second state interest, that of ensuring that children 
born to opposite-sex couples are reared in the marital context, it 
is clear that the exclusion of same-sex couples in no way is   
related to this goal, and in fact, operates in direct contradiction to 
the goal.  The dissent noted that “denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry also will not encourage couples who have children 
to marry or to stay married for the benefit of their children.”113
More importantly, it defies logic to conclude that only the     
children of opposite-sex couples are the ones that deserve the 
benefits that marriage provides.  Children are being reared in 
families headed by same-sex couples, and there is no just basis 
upon which to conclude that the nature of their parents’         
relationship, or the circumstances of their birth should rule them 
ineligible for these state benefits. 
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also fails 
to bear a rational relationship to the third purported state interest 
in promoting traditional nuclear families.  The dissent concludes 
that “even if such a goal is valid, which seems unlikely, denying 
same-sex couples the right to marry has no hope of increasing 
such child rearing.”114  Again, excluding families headed by 
same-sex couples from marriage does not seem to provide any 
meaningful incentives for a homosexual person to choose to 
bring a child into an opposite-sex relationship - the incentive 
operates only with respect to heterosexuals who seek to            
reproduce, offering more benefits to them if they choose to 
marry and fewer if they do not.  
In Lewis v. Harris, the New Jersey Supreme Court         
unanimously found the state’s exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the rights and benefits of marriage to violate the New     
Jersey state constitution’s equal protection clause although the 
majority rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that there was a            
fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry under the New 
Jersey constitution’s liberty clause.115 The court’s equal          
protection standard differs in one important respect from New 
York and Washington’s standard — the New Jersey standard     
requires a heightened finding of a “substantial relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.”116  Additionally, the majority 
did not engage with the possibility that procreation and child 
rearing were justifications for the disparate treatment of same 
and opposite-sex couples. The Attorney General intentionally 
disavowed reliance on those arguments, and the State refused to 
advance it.117  The minority opinion addressed the procreation 
and child-rearing argument and noted that its credibility was 
undermined both by the increasing prevalence of same-sex    
couples rearing children and the fact that social science data did 
not support the notion that opposite-sex couples are better at 
rearing children.118  Seemingly, the only argument advanced by 
the State was uniformity with the laws of other states. But the 
court found this to be wholly inadequate in light of the severity 
of the deprivation of the rights involved and in light of the fact 
that same-sex couples were rearing children.119
In spite of the different standard of constitutional analysis, 
the Lewis court’s approach appropriately recognizes that any 
classification drawn must bear a rational relation to the purported 
state interest. In both Hernandez and Andersen the courts      
misapplied the rational basis standards by focusing on the      
rationality of extending rights to opposite-sex couples  rearing 
children and conflating the appropriateness of  providing rights 
and benefits to such families with the question of whether a    
classification drawn to deny those rights and benefits to same-
sex couples was related to the interest in child welfare. As the 
court noted in Lewis, “children have the same universal needs 
and wants, whether they are raised in a same-sex or opposite-sex 
family, yet under the current system they are treated               
differently.”120  Unfortunately, this is precisely what the courts in 
Hernandez and Andersen found to be rational. 
Even if it were rational to believe that same-sex couples are 
less capable than opposite-sex couples at rearing children, there 
would still be no rational furtherance of the goal of promoting 
child welfare by excluding families headed by same-sex couples 
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from the rights and benefits of marriage, because there always 
will be families headed by same-sex couples.  The exclusion 
would have to find its rationality in the belief that children see 
their welfare enhanced when their same-sex parents do not have 
the rights and benefits of marriage to secure their relationship 
and benefit their family.  Of course, this does nothing to enhance 
the child’s welfare, and accordingly, defies rationality. 
It is not mere under-inclusiveness which makes the          
justifications made by Hernandez and Andersen wrong, it is the 
belief that the denial of rights and benefits to families headed by 
same-sex couples is related, at all, to the goal of promoting child 
welfare.  Same-sex couples have children, rear children, and will 
continue to rear children irrespective of the additional rights and 
benefits the state creates for the couple and the children they 
rear.  With this being the reality of the society we live in, and 
with children bearing no responsibility for the actions or sexual 
orientation of their parents, “there is no rational basis for visiting 
on those children a flawed and unfair scheme directed at their 
parents.”121
CONCLUSION
With courts declaring that marriage statutes were enacted to 
benefit children, any meaningful evaluation of the exclusive  
nature of marriage statutes must account for the exclusion of the 
children of same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage.  
Such exclusion directly disadvantages children who are and who 
will continue to be reared by same-sex couples, and it does so 
solely on account of the status of the couples rearing the        
children. Drawing a classification based on the status of the      
couple parenting the child in no way furthers the state interest in 
child welfare, and accordingly, such exclusions cannot withstand 
an intellectually honest rational basis review. 
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In 1998, Communities for Equity, a non-profit organization comprised of female high school student-athletes in   Michigan and their parents, sued the Michigan High School 
Athletic Association (hereafter “MHSAA”). 1  Communities for 
Equity alleged that the MHSAA discriminated against female 
high school athletes by scheduling girls’ sports in different       
seasons than boys’ sports.2
After eight years of litigation, the Sixth Circuit, on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court, affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the MHSAA was (and still is) in violation of 
Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Michigan civil 
rights act known as the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.3  The 
Sixth Circuit also held that the federal statutory claim (the Title 
IX claim) did not preclude Communities for Equity’s equal       
protection claim under § 1983.4  The implication of this decision 
is that Communities for Equity will now have the full array of 
remedies, including injunctive   
relief, declaratory relief, and     
monetary damages, from the      
organization in violation and the 
individuals responsible for the dis-
criminatory treatment .  The  
MHSAA appealed the Sixth        
Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing 
that Title IX precluded Communities for Equity from also bring-
ing constitutional claims under § 1983.5  The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari,6 so the MHSAA will now be required to        
implement a previously approved compliance plan.  Different 
remedies are available under each of the two causes of action, so 
if Title IX were to preclude a plaintiff from bringing an equal 
protection claim under § 1983, that plaintiff may be denied ac-
cess to certain remedies. 
This case note analyzes whether a Title IX claim should 
preclude a constitutional claim brought under § 1983, an issue on 
which the circuits are split.  After the Sixth Circuit’s holding in 
Communities for Equity, three circuits agree that a Title IX claim 
does not preclude an equal protection claim under § 1983, while 
three circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.7  Part II sets 
out the facts and disposition of Communities for Equity v.  
Michigan High School Athletic Association.  Part III analyzes 
Title IX, § 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause, and the        
interaction between the three.  This section also contains an   
explanation of the cases and the legislative intent behind the   
preclusion of a § 1983 claim by a Title IX claim.  Part IV      
discusses the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and the reasons for the  
circuit split.  Finally, Part V concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning better comports with congressional intent, and furthers 
the important social goals embodied in Title IX and our federal 
constitution.  This case note asserts that future plaintiffs,        
defendants, and judges would benefit from a Supreme Court 
decision resolving the circuit split. 
COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY V. MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
A. PARTIES
Communities for Equity was formed due to a concern that 
discrimination by the MHSAA would impact the female athletes’ 
psychological well-being, as well as their ability to continue their 
athletic education in college. 8  The case was filed as a class     
action, with the class defined as all current and future female 
high school student-athletes in Michigan and their parents.9
The MHSAA is a non-profit organization in charge of high 
school sports in Michigan.  The MHSAA decides which sports to 
sanction; when to schedule 
games; how, when and where 
to  organize s ta tewide             
championship tournaments; 
and what rules the high 
schools must abide by.10
While not officially a state 
organization, the state of Michigan has essentially ceded control 
of its high school athletics to the MHSAA, and the majority of 
the tournaments are held in state-owned facilities or properties.11
In addition, public school administrators make up the majority of 
the MHSAA advisory committee.12  Therefore, the district court 
found that the MHSAA was a state actor for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and a recipient of federal funds for the 
purposes of Title IX.13
B. ASSERTED CLAIMS
Communities for Equity sought to establish an equal         
protection claim under § 1983, as well as claims under Title IX 
and the Michigan state Civil Rights Act.  The allegations were 
based on the fact that the MHSAA treats Michigan high school 
female athletes differently than their male counterparts.  Six of 
the fourteen sports offered for females in Michigan are played in 
their non-traditional seasons; whereas, all fourteen of the sports 
offered for males are played in their traditional seasons.  A 
“traditional” season is considered to be the season in which the 
sport is usually played and generally corresponds to when the 
sport is sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic            
Association (hereafter “NCAA”).14 For example, girls’           
basketball in Michigan is played in the fall instead of the winter, 
girls’ volleyball is played in the winter instead of the fall, and 
girls’ soccer is played in the spring instead of the fall.15  This 
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Non-traditional season scheduling         
subjects the female athletes to heightened 
risk of injury and reduces their changes of 
being recruited by college coaches. 
15
THE MODERN AMERICAN
schedule was originally adopted when Michigan introduced 
girls’ high school sports in the 1970s.16  The purpose was to 
ensure that the girls’ sports were not interfering with the boys’ 
sports.17
Non-traditional season scheduling subjects the female      
athletes to heightened risk of injury18 and reduces their chances 
of being recruited by college coaches.19 Gender-based           
discrimination can also influence females’ future career options 
and earning power, as well as their mental health.20
C. CASE DISPOSITION
While Communities for Equity originally alleged seven 
violations of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the     
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,21 all claims except for the non-
traditional season claim were settled prior to trial.22  In 2001, the 
Federal District Court in the Western District of Michigan held 
that the MHSAA’s current scheduling of high school girls’ 
sports in Michigan was in violation of Title IX, the Equal      
Protection Clause, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.23
The court ordered the MHSAA to submit a compliance plan 
within six months, outlining how the violations would be        
remedied.24  The first plan that the MHSAA submitted left “girls 
throughout the state in             
disadvantageous seasons in 
basketball, volleyball and          
soccer.”25  Having rejected the 
MHSAA’s plan, the court      
created three plans for the 
MHSAA and allowed them to 
choose which version they 
would rather implement.26  The 
MHSAA chose to switch girls’ 
basketball and girls’ volleyball 
to their traditional seasons; to 
switch two of the remaining 
four girls’ sports to their         
traditional season; and to switch two boys’ teams to their non-
traditional seasons.27  In the fall of 2007, the MHSAA is       
beginning to  implement the compliance plan and, after nine 
years of litigation, Michigan female athletes are finally seeing 
relief.28
The district court stayed its decision pending appeal.29  The 
MHSAA appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth        
Circuit Court of Appeals and lost.30  The MHSAA then appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that           
Communities for Equity’s equal protection claim under § 1983 
was subsumed by their Title IX claim.31  The Supreme Court 
declined to decide the case and remanded it to the Sixth Circuit 
to reconsider their holding in light of the Court’s recent holding 
in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.32  The MHSAA conceded 
that they were subject to Title IX for the purposes of the appeal 
and claimed that Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing 
the equal protection claim, even though the MHSAA adamantly 
argued that Title IX did not apply to them in the court below.33
In August 2006, the Sixth Circuit held that Title IX contained no 
comprehensive enforcement scheme indicating that Congress 
intended to preclude recovery under § 1983 for an equal        
protection claim.34
Most recently, in January 2007, the MHSAA appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court to resolve two issues, one of 
which was whether Title IX should have precluded the plaintiffs 
from bringing their equal protection claim under § 1983.35  The 
Court has denied certiorari36 and the MHSAA has run out of 
appeals.  All that is left now in Communities for Equity is the 
discussion surrounding the compliance plan accepted by the 
district court in 2002.37
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. TITLE IX 
Social scientists have established that the physical and  
emotional benefits of education and athletics are many: girls 
who participate in athletics have fewer instances of depression; 
they are less likely to become teen mothers; they are less likely 
to become obese; and they are more likely to graduate from high 
school and go to college.38  Despite these positive results, 
women are still discouraged 
from participating in athletics.39
Nationwide, male high school 
athletes receive 1.2 million more 
participation opportunities than 
female high school athletes.40 In 
some states, the difference       
between opportunities is only a 
few thousand; in other states, the 
high schools offer close to twice 
as many opportunities for male 
high school athletes as they offer 
for female high school athletes.41
Those women’s teams that are 
established often receive less funding, less attention, and less 
support than their male counterparts.42 Additionally, studies 
have found that 85% of females between the eighth and eleventh 
grades experience some form of sexual harassment.43
Congress’ recognition of the significant problems in         
education and athletics led them to enact Title IX of the          
Education Amendments of 1972.44  The legislative history      
indicates that the principle purpose of Title IX was to prevent 
federal funds from being used for discriminatory practices, 
which is why the only express remedy written into the statute is 
the removal of federal funding.45  A secondary purpose was to 
provide a  remedy for individuals affected by discriminatory 
practices.46 The Supreme Court reinforced this secondary      
purpose in 1979 when it decided Cannon v. University of      
Chicago, holding that there was a private right of action implicit 
in Title IX.47  Congress intended Title IX to apply to educational 
institutions, including high schools, as long as they received 
federal funding.48 At these institutions, discrimination in         
Social scientists have established that the 
physical and emotional benefits of       
education and athletics are many: girls 
who participate in athletics have fewer 
instances of depression; they are less 
likely to become teen mothers; they are 
less likely to become obese; and they are 
more likely to graduate from high school 
and go to college. 
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employment,49 admission programs,50 athletic programs,51
scholarship awards,52 sexual harassment,53 and retaliation are all 
covered by Title IX.54  If a policy or circumstance discriminates 
on the basis of sex or acts as a barrier to a female participating 
in educational or extracurricular activities, it would be a           
violation of Title IX. 
There are two procedural mechanisms for asserting a Title 
IX claim.  Written into the statute is an administrative           
procedure, whereby a Title IX complaint could be filed with the 
U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
(hereafter “OCR”).55  Pursuant to the statute, OCR then         
conducts an investigation to determine if federal funding should 
be removed from the institution.56  The Cannon Court held that 
there is an implied private right of action in Title IX, meaning 
that an individual plaintiff can bring a lawsuit against the institu-
tion alleged to be in violation.57  Using the Cort v. Ash58 factors, 
the Court in Cannon found that: (1) the plaintiff was a member 
of the class that Title IX was intended to protect; (2) the               
legislative history indicated Congress’ intent to create a private 
right of action for the person discriminated against on the basis 
of her sex; (3) the implication of a private right of action was 
consistent with the enforcement of Title IX; and (4) this was not 
an area of particular concern to the states.59
The question then is: what relief can a plaintiff bringing a 
Title IX claim receive?  The primary remedy for Title IX          
plaintiffs is the removal of federal funding from the institution 
found in violation.60  Removing federal funding, however, does 
not necessarily eliminate the discrimination.  As an alternative 
and preferred remedy, courts can order the institution to elimi-
nate the discrimination through a court-sanctioned compliance 
plan.61  The content of compliance plans can vary greatly - from 
equalizing funding, to establishing a new team, or moving a 
girls’ sport to its traditional sea-
son.62  The second problem with 
the defunding remedy is that it 
does not redress the harm that 
the discrimination has already 
done to the plaintiff.  Damages 
are not available for uninten-
tional violations of the statute.63
However, attorneys’ fees are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 
which allows recovery of attorneys’ fees in suits involving      
violations of plaintiffs’ civil rights.64
There are two significant limitations to the Title IX 
relief.  The first is that relief, whether or not it is     
defunding, elimination of the discrimination 
through a compliance plan, or monetary damages 
can be obtained only from an institution receiving 
federal funding.65 A particular individual who      
engaged in a discriminatory act cannot be sued 
under the statute.66 The second limitation is that, in 
order to pursue relief under Title IX, the plaintiff 
must show that “an appropriate person” at the        
institution had notice and an opportunity to remedy 
the situation. 67 An institution cannot be held liable 
for monetary damages for the actions of a rogue 
employee.68
B. SECTION 1983 AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Section 198369 is the primary means by which an individual 
can obtain damages from state officials for violations of federal 
statutory and constitutional law.70  Section 1983 was enacted by 
Congress in 1871, under section five of the Fourteenth          
Amendment, in order to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71  The purpose was to protect individual U.S.         
residents from discriminatory actions by state actors abusing 
their authority.72  Section 1983 can be used to enforce all federal 
constitutional and statutory provisions.73
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, “[n]o 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”74  The Fourteenth Amendment 
was enacted in 1868 to provide protection to African Americans 
but has since been expanded to cover discrimination against 
other impacted groups, such as women.75  Under section five, 
the prohibition on discrimination is applicable to the states.76
Under a § 1983 claim for a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is a state actor 
or is acting under color of state law.77  Included are private     
organizations using state funds or public facilities or engaging in 
activities of the state that the state has entrusted to the private 
organization.78  To establish an equal protection claim of sex 
discrimination, the plaintiff must show that the state actor has 
treated one sex differently from the other sex.79  The burden then 
shifts to the defendant to show that there is an important        
governmental objective behind the 
differential treatment, and that the 
means chosen are substantially 
related to the achievement of those 
objectives.80  A plaintiff using § 
1983 to bring a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment can       
receive injunctive, declaratory, 
and/or pecuniary relief.  Injunctive relief is allowed only when a 
plaintiff can show that there is a possibility that they will again 
be deprived of their constitutional or statutory rights in the        
future.  As with Title IX, successful plaintiffs are entitled to     
attorneys’ fees under § 1988 because there has been a violation 
of the plaintiff’s civil rights.81
C. TITLE IX AND § 1983 INTERACTION
Because Title IX was enacted with the purpose of            
eliminating discrimination82 and § 1983 was enacted to provide 
an enforcement mechanism for federal statutory and                
constitutional rights,83 a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title IX 
often has a concurrent constitutional or statutory claim under       
The primary remedy for Title IX       
plaintiffs is the removal of  
federal funding from the institution
found in violation. 
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§ 1983.  However, not every federal statute can be enforced 
through § 1983 because certain federal statutes have been      
written so as to preclude a § 1983 action for violation of the       
statute.84  This is the case when Congress has intended the    
statutory remedy to be exclusive, or when the enforcement 
scheme in the statute is so comprehensive that enforcement     
under § 1983 would be incompatible.85
1. § 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A                  
STATUTORY RIGHT
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Middlesex County  
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,86
holding that plaintiffs’ claims under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (hereafter “FWPCA”) and the Marine Protection, 
Research and        Sanctuaries Act 
of 1972 (hereafter “MPRSA”) 
precluded plaintiffs’ use of § 
1983 to obtain damages under 
those same statutes.87 Notably, 
the   plaintiffs first asked that the 
Court recognize an implied        
private right of action under both 
the FWPCA and the MPRSA.88
The Court declined to do so,     
reasoning that the “Acts            
contain[ed] unusually elaborate              
enforcement provisions,” which 
indicated that Congress did not 
intend “to authorize…additional judicial remedies for private 
citizens.”89
The Court then turned to the question of whether the          
plaintiffs could use § 1983 to collect damages for violations of 
the FWPCA and the MPRSA, because neither of the statutes 
provided a remedy authorizing monetary damages.90  Both of the 
statutes contained comprehensive remedial schemes, such as: 
provisions for civil suits brought by the government, civil or 
criminal penalties for violations, judicial review of the                 
government’s enforcement attempts and express citizen-suits 
which allow an individual to sue for injunctive relief.91 In          
analyzing “whether Congress had foreclosed private                 
enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself,”92 the Court 
focused on the  numerous specific statutory remedies in the 
FWPCA and the MPRSA. It particularly focused on the citizen-
suit provisions, as an indication that Congress “intended to        
supplant any remedy that otherwise would be  available under   
§ 1983.”93
More recently, in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,94 the 
Court followed National Sea Clammers and held that a plaintiff 
bringing a claim under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(hereafter “TCA”) could not use § 1983 to obtain monetary 
damages.95  Using a similar analysis, the Court asked “whether 
Congress meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by [the 
TCA] to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 
action.”96  The TCA provided for an individual to obtain judicial 
review of an unfavorable zoning decision.97 The Court          
recognized that in only two other instances had the “existence of 
more restrictive remedies...in the violated statute itself” led to 
the conclusion that § 1983 was unavailable to remedy violations 
of a statute.98  In his concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out 
that “only an exceptional case — such as one involving an          
unusually comprehensive and exclusive statutory scheme — will 
lead us to conclude that a given statute impliedly forecloses a     
§ 1983 remedy.”99  Stevens recognized that the Court normally 
presumes Congress intended to provide, not preclude, a remedy 
under § 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights.100
2. § 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A                         
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In slightly different circumstances, 
the Court in Smith v. Robinson101
held that where the constitutional 
claims pursuant to § 1983 were 
“virtually identical” to the statutory 
claims, the § 1983 claims were 
precluded.102 In Smith, the plaintiff 
was alleging violations of the         
Education of the Handicapped Act 
(hereafter “EHA”), as well as        
violations of the Equal Protection 
and Due  Process Clauses under § 
1983.103  As opposed to National 
Sea Clammers and Abrams, in 
Smith,   § 1983 was being used to enforce a constitutional right, 
rather than to obtain monetary damages under the federal statute 
in question. 
The Court again looked to the provisions of the statute itself 
and to Congressional intent to determine whether Congress   
intended EHA plaintiffs with constitutional rights to be able to 
pursue those claims outside of the remedies set out in the 
EHA.104  The EHA provides for an elaborate remedial process, 
beginning on the local level, with the parents making  numerous 
appeals before the School Committee and the Associate          
Commissioner of  Education.105 The procedural safeguards in 
place were designed to provide due process to the parents of a 
handicapped child when the State planned to make changes to 
their child’s education.106 EHA plaintiffs also have a right to 
judicial review of the State agency’s decisions.107  The Court felt 
strongly that Congress intended for remedies available under the 
EHA to be exclusive, because Congress indicated the                
importance of the “the parents and the local education agency 
work[ing] together to formulate an individualized plan for each 
handicapped child’s education.”108  In the end, the Court relied 
most heavily on its perception of Congress’ intent that the EHA 
be the exclusive remedy for a handicapped child being denied a 
free and appropriate public education.109  The Court determined 
that allowing a right of action under § 1983 to enforce the EHA 
would be “inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored 
scheme.”110
Because Title IX was enacted with      
the  purpose of eliminating
discrimination and § 1983 was enacted 
to provide an enforcement mechanism 
for federal statutory and constitutional 
rights, a   plaintiff  bringing a claim
under Title IX often has a concurrent  
constitutional or statutory claim
under § 1983.
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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN COMMUNITIES FOR
EQUITY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
       A. TITLE IX’S REMEDY IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE
The issue of whether Title IX precludes a plaintiff from also 
bringing a constitutional claim under § 1983 is important for 
several reasons.  One of the primary reasons is that § 1983 and 
Title IX apply to different defendants. Both individual               
defendants and institutions or organizations may be held liable 
for violations of a person’s constitutional and federal statutory 
rights under § 1983, as long as the defendant acted under color 
of state law.111  Title IX is a federal statute with a more limited 
scope and assigns liability only to “educational program[s]” or 
“activities receiving Federal financial assistance.”112 This is  
particularly important when the discrimination is a result of a 
particular individual’s actions, such as in a sexual harassment 
case. Discrimination resulting from an athletic or educational 
program usually involves an institutional problem, though            
occasionally there are particular individuals that have the power 
to remedy discriminatory treatment. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the primary question 
for the Sixth Circuit in Communities for Equity was whether or 
not Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing an equal         
protection claim under § 1983.113 First, the Sixth Circuit          
recognized that in both National Sea Clammers and Abrams, the 
plaintiffs brought a federal statutory claim and then used § 1983 
to assert those same federal statutory rights.114  The statutes in 
those cases did not authorize monetary damages, so the plaintiffs 
attempted to use § 1983 to obtain damages.  The Communities 
for Equity court said that allowing a § 1983 claim for damages 
would clearly “create an end-run around the substantive         
statutory remedies and contravene Congress’ intent.”115 The 
Sixth Circuit distinguished National Sea Clammers and Abrams
from the instant case because Communities for Equity was       
asserting a constitutional claim under § 1983, not using § 1983 
to obtain damages under Title IX.116
The court looked to Smith to provide the framework for its 
analysis.117  The first question was: “whether Congress intended 
to abandon the rights and remedies set forth in Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection jurisprudence when it enacted Title 
IX in 1972.”118 The second question was: whether Title IX       
provided a remedy comprehensive enough to be exclusive?119
The Sixth Circuit noted that these two questions were to be       
independently evaluated, and that if both were not met, then the 
statute would not preclude a constitutional claim under                
§1983.120 In other words, if one factor is clearly unsatisfied, then 
the other prong does not need to be discussed.121
The court chose to address the second prong first, and      
examined Congress’ intent when they were enacting Title IX in 
1972.122  In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in Lillard v. Shelby County 
Board of Education,123 held that Title IX does not preclude a 
plaintiff from using § 1983 to bring a substantive due process 
claim.124  Following Lillard, the court in Communities for Equity
distinguished the express remedies in Title IX from the          
comprehensive administrative and judicial remedies set out in 
the EHA.125  The only express remedy written into Title IX is a 
“procedure for the termination of federal financial support for 
institutions” in violation of Title IX.126  The court further          
recognized that if Title IX did not exist, Communities for Equity 
would still have a cause of action under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 127  This reasoning indicates that the two claims are     
separate, despite the fact that the claims arise from the same set 
of underlying facts. 
As with most other defendants who have challenged a    
plaintiff’s right to recover under both Title IX and § 1983, the 
MHSAA relies on the implied private right of action in its       
argument.128  The MHSAA argued that because a Title IX         
plaintiff has available to it the full range of remedies, Title IX is 
comprehensive enough to preclude recovery under § 1983.129
The Sixth Circuit did not agree with this position.130  Instead, the 
court used the implied private right of action as evidence of 
Congress’ intent not to limit a Title IX plaintiff’s claims to the 
express remedy in the statute itself.131
B. CIRCUITS THAT DISAGREE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, over the last       
seventeen years, have all held that a plaintiff bringing a claim 
under Title IX cannot also bring a claim under § 1983.132  The 
three courts have reached the same conclusion in four diverse 
cases but have all relied on the reasoning expressed by the      
Supreme Court in National Sea Clammers.133  The most             
discussed issue was whether or not Title IX provided a compre-
hensive remedy for plaintiffs. 
In 1990, the Third Circuit held that Pfeiffer, a student who 
was dismissed from the local chapter of the National Honor     
Society due to her pregnancy, could not bring both a Title IX 
and an equal protection claim under § 1983.134  The court relied 
on the district court’s reasoning on this issue and said, “[t]he Sea 
Clammers doctrine has been applied consistently in analogous 
cases.”135  Three years later, the Third Circuit again faced the 
question of whether a Title IX claim precluded a § 1983 
claim.136  This time, the district court had previously decided the 
constitutional claim, and the Third Circuit was analyzing the 
issue on appeal.137  The court relied on the previous decision in 
Pfeiffer, and “the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts 
should exercise restraint before reaching federal constitutional 
claims.”138  The court explained that the “Supreme Court has 
made clear that where a federal statute provides its own               
comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to          
foreclose a right of action under § 1983.”139  The court stated 
that it considered Title IX’s enforcement scheme to be                
comprehensive; thus, it precluded recovery under § 1983.140
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue in a case         
involving employment discrimination.141  Ultimately, the court 
held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative 
remedies under Title VII before resorting to sex discrimination 
claims under Title IX.142 On its way to that conclusion,        
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however, the court discussed whether the remedies provided by 
Title IX precluded the plaintiff from bringing an equal           
protection claim under § 1983, arising from the same set of 
facts.143  The Seventh Circuit read National Sea Clammers to 
indicate that when a statute and a constitutional provision 
“prohibit the same kind of conduct and provide compensatory 
and punitive damages as remedies for that conduct,” that type of 
overlap is “intolerable.”144  Based on the Third Circuit’s         
decisions in Pfeiffer and Williams, the court said a plaintiff      
specifically claiming intentional discrimination cannot allege 
that she has causes of action under both Title IX and the Equal      
Protection Clause through § 1983.145  The court decided that 
Congress did not intend for individual officials to remedy     
alleged instances of discrimination, but rather placed the burden 
squarely on the institution itself.146  To that end, the Seventh 
Circuit held that Congress did intend for the remedial scheme in 
Title IX to be exclusive. 147  Thus, the Title IX claim, if it were 
allowed in this case, would  subsume the § 1983 claim.148
Finally, the Second Circuit had an opportunity to decide this 
issue in 1998.149  The plaintiff brought a hostile environment  
sexual harassment claim against the school district, under both 
Title IX and § 1983.150 The court rejected the use of § 1983 to     
enforce the plaintiff’s Title IX rights and also rejected a            
constitutional rights exception to the  National Sea  Clammers   
doctrine.151  The Second Circuit stated that there was an intricate 
administrative enforcement scheme in Title IX, whereby an  
individual could file a complaint 
with OCR, which would then con-
duct an   investigation.152 The court 
also explained that the fact that the  
Supreme Court had found an    
implied private right of action for 
Title IX convinced the court that 
“the Title IX plaintiff has access to 
a full panoply of remedies.”153 The 
Second Circuit felt that the circuits 
that had found the private right of action to be outside the          
statutory enforcement scheme had read the remedies available 
too narrowly.154 In  rejecting a constitutional rights exception, 
the court relied on their previous reasoning and the analysis in 
Smith.155 When a statute contains a “sufficiently comprehensive 
enforcement scheme,” as the court believed Title IX did, the 
indication is that Congress intended to replace § 1983 as an 
available remedy.156  This means that if a plaintiff were asserting 
a violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, which did not 
overlap with her Title IX claim, she would not be allowed to 
bring both causes of action. 
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have spent little 
time discussing the issue.  The most popular reasoning was that 
because Title IX is considered to have an implied private right of 
action plaintiffs have access to all possible remedies. 157           
Therefore, Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to have access 
to a remedy under § 1983 as well.158  The Sixth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits have recognized that because the private right of 
action in Title IX is implied, Congress likely did not intend for 
the explicit remedies in Title IX to be exclusive.
C. CIRCUITS THAT SIDE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that a Title IX 
claim does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a concurrent 
constitutional claim under § 1983.159  These circuits have agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit that the Title IX remedial scheme is not 
comprehensive.  The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have read 
the Supreme Court’s decision in National Sea Clammers as a 
way of distinguishing federal statutes from each other.  The 
three circuits examined not only the explicit remedies provided 
in Title IX, but also the legislative history of Title IX. The courts 
concluded that Congress did not intend for the remedies            
provided in Title IX to be the exclusive remedies available to a 
plaintiff. 
In Crawford v. Davis,160 the plaintiff, suing under Title IX 
and the Equal Protection Clause, made an allegation of sexual 
harassment.161  The Eighth Circuit stated that “Sea Clammers in 
no way restricts a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress via § 1983 
for the violation of independently existing constitutional 
rights.”162  The court said this is true even if the constitutional 
right arises from the same set of facts as the Title IX rights.163
Although the Supreme Court found an implied private right of 
action in Title IX, the court saw the      removal of federal fund-
ing as the only express remedy.164 The court compared Title 
IX’s express remedy to the enforcement 
scheme in the  statutes in National Sea 
Clammers, which contained elaborate 
procedures including citizen suits and 
enforcement by government agencies.165
The Eighth Circuit felt that if Congress 
intended for Title IX to preclude a claim 
under § 1983, the enforcement scheme in 
Title IX would have been more elaborate, 
similar to the schemes in the statutes in 
National Sea Clammers.166
The Tenth Circuit was also dealing with a sexual                
harassment lawsuit when this issue arose.167  Similar to the 
Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 claims are not 
supplanted by the private right of action implicit in Title IX.168
Title IX plaintiffs who bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 
“do not circumvent Title IX procedures or gain access to                
remedies not available under Title IX.”169  It reasoned that Title 
IX plaintiffs have the whole panoply of remedies available to 
The most popular reasoning   
was that because Title IX is           
considered to have an implied  
private right of  action
plaintiffs have access to all
possible remedies 
a plaintiff specifically claiming
intentional discrimination cannot
allege that she has causes of action under 
both Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause through § 1983. 
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them,170 so bringing a concurrent constitutional claim through § 
1983 does not allow plaintiffs to get damages they otherwise 
would not be entitled to under Title IX.
D. OTHER COURTS RULINGS THAT SIDE WITH            
THE  SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Fifth Circuit has implied that, if squarely presented 
with the issue, it would likely hold that Title IX’s remedial 
scheme was not “sufficiently comprehensive to indicate... that 
Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 suits based upon rights 
created by Title IX.”171  The plaintiff’s claims in Lakoski v. 
James were employment discrimination claims, so the Fifth  
Circuit held that Title VII precluded all other claims, including 
the Title IX and constitutional claims brought under § 1983.172
Although the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of Title IX and § 1983 in 
this case was dicta, it gives us an idea of what to expect from 
that court. 
Lower federal courts in other circuits have also come to the 
similar conclusion that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both a Title 
IX claim and a constitutional claim under § 1983.173 Alston v. 
Virginia High School League174 involved an issue similar to the 
one presented in Communities for Equity.175 Plaintiffs              
contended that the Virginia High School League (hereafter 
“VHSL”) discriminated on the basis of sex because boys’ sports 
were uniformly scheduled across school classifications, but 
girls’ sports were not.176  The result was that if the size of the 
school required it to switch from one classification to another, 
some girls might be prevented from playing sports they            
previously played if two of their sports were in the same       
season.177  Just like the MHSAA, the VHSL challenged the 
plaintiff’s ability to bring both a Title IX claim and an equal 
protection claim. 178 However, the court rejected the                 
challenge.179  Instead, it recognized that “the National Sea   
Clammers doctrine ‘speaks only to whether federal statutory 
rights can be enforced both through the statute itself and through 
section 1983’; it does not ‘stand for the proposition that a federal 
statutory scheme can preempt independently existing                 
constitutional rights, which have contours distinct from the 
statutory claim.’”180
Finally, a district court in the First Circuit analogized Title 
IX to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.181  The court 
noted that in Cannon, the Supreme Court found that “the only 
difference between the two statutes is the ‘substitution of the 
word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color or      
national origin’ in ‘Title VI’.”182  The judge in Doe v. Old       
Rochester Regional School District spent a significant amount of 
his opinion discussing the possibility of Title IX prohibiting a 
concurrent § 1983 claim.183  The judge noted that the Supreme 
Court has held that § 1983 remedies are considered to be “an 
alternative and express cause of action under Title VI.” 184  Thus, 
he reasoned that § 1983 remedies would also be permissible 
under Title IX. 
The result of the preceding analysis is that, of the courts that 
have faced this issue, only three Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
held that Title IX  does preclude a constitutional claim under § 
1983.  Three circuits have expressly held that Title IX does not 
preclude a § 1983 claim, and lower courts in three other circuits 
have reached the same conclusion.  As the judge in Old           
Rochester mentioned, “[u]nfortunately... [no] subsequent      
Supreme Court decisions give a clear lead.”185  At the same time 
that the Old Rochester judge was issuing his opinion, his       
colleague in the same district was issuing the opposite holding in 
a companion case.186  The fact that two judges within the same 
district are coming to different conclusions speaks to the need of 
a decision from the First Circuit.  A decision from the Supreme 
Court would give the First Circuit, and all of the other circuits, 
guidance for future decisions.  A Supreme Court decision on this 
important issue would also prevent delays and provide guidance 
to plaintiffs and defendants who are alleging and defending Title 
IX claims. 
TITLE IX SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE A CONSTITUIONAL
CLAIM UNDER §1983
All of the federal circuit courts have recognized that the 
only enforcement mechanism expressly authorized by Title IX is 
the withdrawal of federal funds, and that the private right of   
action under Title IX is implied.  Where the courts disagree is 
whether those two remedies, taken together, are sufficiently 
comprehensive to bar the pursuit of a constitutional claim under 
§ 1983.187  Previously, when the Supreme Court has held that a 
federal statute precludes a plaintiff from also bringing a federal 
constitutional claim, it has reasoned that allowing both claims 
would allow the plaintiff to recover twice for the same right.188
The interaction between Title IX and the Equal Protection 
Clause does not present that problem.  While the claims under 
Title IX and § 1983 may generally arise from the same set of 
facts, a plaintiff asserting a constitutional right in addition to a 
federal statutory claim is asserting a different right. 
A. POSSIBLE SUPREME COURT RULING
Future plaintiffs will certainly bring Title IX suits that      
include equal protection claims, and the defendants will try to 
argue that the Title IX claim precludes an equal protection claim 
brought under § 1983.  This argument should fail for several 
reasons.  First, Title IX applies only to federally-funded         
institutions, so individuals cannot be held liable for                
discrimination under Title IX.  Depending on the type of claim, 
A Supreme Court decision on this          
important issue would also prevent delays 
and provide guidance to plaintiffs and         




this could hamper a plaintiff’s ability to remedy the alleged  
discrimination. Second, although a defendant is considered to be 
a state actor under the Equal  Protection Clause of the                 
Fourteenth Amendment, that does not necessarily mean that they 
are a recipient of federal funds.  Thus, allowing both avenues of 
recovery for a plaintiff could increase the likelihood that a        
defendant would be subject to liability for discriminatory          
treatment.   
If the Supreme Court adheres 
to the path set out in  National 
Sea Clammers, Abrams, and 
Smith, it seems likely that the 
Court would hold that Title IX 
does not preclude a constitutional 
claim under § 1983.  The Court 
has previously looked at the      
explicit language of the statute 
and the congressional intent at the 
time of enactment. As discussed above, the express language of 
Title IX provides for a very limited administrative remedy and 
no private right of action.  The fact that the Court has found an 
implied private right of action in Title IX should not affect its 
decision.  What is significant is that Congress took no action 
after the Court’s decision in Cannon to amend Title IX.  This 
failure to act indicated Congress’ intent to allow for additional 
remedies, outside of those explicitly stated in the statute. Based 
on precedent, and the holdings of the previous cases involving 
federal statutory claims and separate constitutional claims under 
§ 1983, if the Supreme Court decides the issue in a future case, it 
should find that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both a Title IX 
claim and a federal constitutional claim under § 1983. 
VI. CONCLUSION
While much of the discussion in this note has involved the 
legal issues surrounding Title IX and the Equal Protection 
Clause, what is equally important is that the purposes of anti-
discrimination laws are recognized.  Both Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibit females from being subjected to         
discriminatory treatment.  Because Communities for Equity
involves teenage females, the issue is more urgent.  It is hard to 
fully understand or know the damage that could be done to a 
female who is repeatedly discriminated against.  Additionally, 
females who are discriminated against in high school athletics 
are denied opportunities to participate in athletics in college.  
While the individual female 
cer ta in ly suffers  from                
discrimination, so too does her 
community, because that           
particular female is less likely 
to be an active participant in 
politics, in the economy, and 
in life in general. These      
con-sequences may sound 
drastic, but that does not make 
them less likely.  More importantly, less extreme consequences 
would be no more acceptable. 
Resolving the circuit split surrounding whether or not Title 
IX precludes a constitutional claim under § 1983, in accordance 
with the Sixth Circuit’s holding, will discourage future          
discrimination.  It will provide Title IX plaintiffs with an          
additional remedy when faced with discrimination.  It will also 
encourage educational institutions to be more careful in their 
treatment of females.  If the Supreme Court agrees with the 
Sixth Circuit, the institution as a whole and the individuals in 
charge of enforcing discriminatory policies will be liable for 
discriminatory treatment.  Finally, a resolution of this issue will 
also promote judicial economy.  Since the parties will not have 
to argue whether or not Title IX precludes a constitutional claim 
under § 1983 in future cases, plaintiffs and defendants will know 
which claims are allowed and will focus their efforts on proving 
or defending those claims. 
Resolving the circuit split surrounding   
whether or not Title IX precludes a   
constitutional claim under § 1983, in
accordance with the Sixth Circuit’s holding,  
will discourage future discrimination.   
* Leigh Ferrin is a third-year law student at Loyola Law School in Los          
Angeles.  She received her B.A. in Psychology from Pomona College.  Ms. 
Ferrin would like to thank her family and her future husband Carmen for their 
love and support, as well as Professor Lauren Willis for her constant             
encouragement. 
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Only in her mid-thirties, Ms. Kiran Ahuja, Executive Director of the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (NAPAWF), has had a long,       
distinguished public interest career as an attorney, an advocate 
for immigrant communities, and a mentor and advisor to        
countless law students and young activists.  I caught up with her 
for a little while to talk about growing up an Indian American 
woman in the South, the development of her personal racial and 
political identity, and the evolution of the Women’s Movement.
Thank you for speaking with me I have a lot of        
questions, but I’ll try to keep this short. Looking over your 
career so far, there are so many places I could start!  I guess 
I’ll start chronologically.  Northerners often assume things 
about the Deep South.  How was your experience growing up 
in Savannah, Georgia as a young immigrant woman of color, 
and how formative was it in your path towards social justice 
and civil rights?  
My Northern friends are so amused – that’s funny.  I think it 
did played a role because other young immigrants feel a sense of 
isolation and being the “one of only.”  What’s interesting in the 
South is that because you have such a predominantly African 
American population, you’re sort of navigating this Black/White 
dichotomy.  I have some very distinct memories of issues      
between friends who were black or white, and because I was 
brown, I moved between those groups pretty easily.  One      
incident is so vivid: sitting on the bus in the fifth grade in      
Louisiana – I’ve lived in different southern states – some of my 
black friends and white friends didn’t talk to each other, but they 
were fighting over who I should sit next to.   
Also I had a sense of really not appreciating my culture  
because there’s such pressure to assimilate and to try to be like 
my blond, blue-eyed friends, or change my name.  I think this 
happens with a lot of communities where you are very much a 
minority, where you have to choose whether you’re going to 
assimilate in the white community or the black community.  My 
sense of belonging was in the black community, going to the 
black churches, dating African American men.  Interestingly 
enough, I had a lot of support from my mom.  She really       
emboldened me to be who I wanted to be.   
It wasn’t until I went to Spelman College that I really 
started to understand that I was a person of color, that I        
identified with the minority communities in this country, and 
that I cared about what happens to them.  I think where most 
Indian Americans or other immigrants identify with their        
community first and then look to the larger community.  I had to 
look at myself as a person of color first to identify with the black 
community because there really was no progressive Indian or 
Asian community to be a part of.  So then I worked my way 
backwards to the Asian American community and the South 
Asian community. 
For a lot of people, they fall into working in a particular 
community, but your path seems like you’ve had to confront 
a lot of these questions as you’ve grown in the work. 
I’ve been challenged about why I don’t work in the South 
Asian community, and I think I’m the first South Asian         
Executive Director of a National pan-Asian organization.  For 
me, it’s a no-brainer because I was doing stuff that was related 
to the Asian American community.  If I had stayed in the South, 
that’s what I would be doing now.   
My parents ran a clinic in an inner city black community, 
and it was something that wasn’t really thought about.  It was 
just, this is our community, where work needs to be done, and 
we’re here.  These are our friends and our colleagues. 
That’s really interesting.  When going over the path 
you’ve taken, it was striking to me that you chose to go to 
Spellman College, an historically Black College.  Professor 
Frank Wu, when he was teaching law at Howard University, 
used to talk about being asked “what is like being the only 
Asian teaching at that historically black University” to 
which he’d respond, “if I was the only Asian at Yale or      
Harvard, a historically white institution, would you ask the 
same question?” You’ve already talked about your identity       
consciousness, but did going to Spellman College continue 
that path for you or did it present additional challenges or 
things for you to think about? 
It was definitely very influential.  I had my own trepidations 
about going to Spellman – it was my friends who challenged me 
when I said, “They know I’m not African American.”  They 
said, “what’s the difference?”  I remember getting asked that 
question all the time, and I agree with Frank Wu: I could be a 
minority student in a predominantly white institution,              
particularly in the South, or I could be a minority in a            
predominantly black college.  The experience there was so     
different.  I realized how much of a Eurocentric education I had 
received and how I hadn’t learned anything about the African 
American or the Asian American communities.  I thought this is 
the problem in our society and why our communities are so  
divided.  We never take that step to learn in an authentic way 
about other communities and all the treasures, accomplishments, 
and contributions that they’ve made.  I also had some amazing 
professors who challenged me and mentored me.   
I can’t say that I was so politically conscious.  I think a part 
of my choice to be at Spellman was about wanting to be where I 
felt comfortable and where I felt like I belonged.  The politics 
came later.  It was like I wanted to be in a place where I could 
feel comfortable and call home.  Looking back, it was an        
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Actually, I was at a Spellman Women of Color conference 
recently.  What was really great was that I was being honored by 
the Legacy of Leadership award by Spellman alum, and after I 
gave a little speech, some of the women came up to me and said, 
“we thought there was a mistake. We didn’t think you’d       
graduated from Spellman.” I think they told me that I’m     
probably the only Asian American that’s graduated from that 
school.  
A lot of people become lifetime government employees, 
but after doing a lot of good work at the Department of    
Justice, you moved on.  Was there anything about the      
experience that you want to talk about?
I think at the time that I came into DOJ, it was still with that 
idea that you had to have that civil rights experience and         
commitment.  That’s why people went to DOJ.  You still bump 
up against the slow pace of the Justice Department, with the 
career attorneys that are there.  In the Justice Department you 
have to be more methodical – making sure you have all your 
ducks in a row and that you have the evidence you need to make 
a strong case.  While that’s good, I felt like with all the school 
desegregation cases I was working on, it was a little frustrating      
because there was only so 
much I could do.  Now you 
look at re-segregation of 
the schools and in many 
ways you felt kind of pow-
erless: from the hopes and 
dreams of Brown, you’re wondering, “how am I  helping?”   
The NAPAWF community is quite different.  So you have 
to figure out where you want to be, whether it’s inside the      
system or outside.  I realized, for me, that I had to be outside the 
system where I could be more of an agitator and have more     
freedom in advocacy.   
Can you give me a brief history of NAPAWF?   
Initially, during the UN World Conference on Women in 
Beijing (1995) there was a caucus of Asian American activists 
that came together and asked, “Why does it take us going      
thousands and thousands of miles away from the U.S. to realize 
that we’re here, and that we’re doing really great work?”  They 
decided that we needed to have an organization in the U.S. that 
represented our community and was lead by us. 
So there was a founding gathering in L.A. in 1996, where 
they had over 150 Asian and Pacific Islander activists who came 
together, and they started strategizing and putting together       
platforms and committees about what this organization would 
look like.  And well… we just celebrated our ten-year anniver-
sary last year. 
The issue of intersectionalities of identity is a hot topic in 
legal academia right now.  As the director of a vibrant     
organization that sits on the crossroads between the 
women’s movement, the Asian American movement, and the 
immigrant rights’ movement, among others, how do issues of  
intersectionality play out for you and NAPAWF in a real 
way?
The intersectionalities piece is something that we definitely 
embrace.  We launched our reproductive justice education       
campaign with an agenda that includes really taking a look at 
what it means to be many things: an immigrant woman dealing 
with reproductive health issues; an immigrant woman in a      
situation of abuse dealing with reproductive health issues; an 
immigrant woman who’s been trafficked and is dealing with 
reproductive health challenges – whether it’s forced abortions or 
not getting the proper health care. 
That’s been a criticism of the women’s movement: you 
can’t parcel us into one aspect of who we are because all these 
things intersect, and that comes out in our work.  For example, 
with immigration reform, if you look at low-wage workers,     
especially in the garment industry or the domestic workers, 
many of them are immigrant women.  Many of them don’t have 
access to health care or child services, especially many of those 
who have been here beyond the five years when they can access 
federal benefits.  They are more likely to face abuse and          
exploitation by their employers.   
The work we do really faces that broad, holistic perspective 
to the lives of Asian immigrant women and what that means.  
That is why our Founding Sisters     
created a multi-issue organization.  
We’re the only national woman-of-
color organization with a progressive 
stance and a multi-issue focus.  It’s so 
important because you see so many 
organizations out there that are only working on immigrant 
rights or anti-violence work or anti-trafficking.  Even though 
those are very difficult to develop as programs on their own, 
we’re seeing that there are so many opportunities to bring them 
together.  So our anti-trafficking project director talks about the 
reproductive health issues of trafficking victims.  That’s just one 
example of how we try to make that real. 
There’s been a long ongoing dialog about the women’s 
movement and whether women of color are still                
marginalized in the greater movement?  In a recent post on 
Feministing.com, you wrote eloquently about leadership 
transition and bringing a younger generation of women into 
leadership of the movement – is there anything that you’d 
like to add here about NAPAWF and this younger            
generation of women who are very passionate but sometimes 
get shut out of leadership?
I feel that NAPAWF has been an essential stepping-stone 
for a lot of young API women who otherwise would have never 
been a part of the women’s movement.  I think that we’ve given 
them that space to learn about the issues, to be who they are, and 
to be in a safe space.  A few years ago, the Ford Foundation
pulled together all these women’s organizations from around the 
country and asked, “Is there still a women’s movement?”  Or are 
we just a bunch of organizations working on women’s issues?  
That’s the ultimate question because women in the movement 
are asked, “Where are the young people and where are the 
“I had to be outside the system where  
I could be more of an agitator and have          
more freedom in advocacy.”   
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women of color?” 
One study that was done by the Center for the Advancement 
of Women showed that there really is more of a desire by 
women of color for a movement than there is by white women, 
which to me suggests that women of color were not a part of the 
movement in the first place.  Also, young people see the issues 
much more broadly than individuals working in organizations. 
I think that NAPAWF is such a good example of this.  The 
Founding Sisters, who are more experienced leaders, have really 
just stepped aside and given us space.  You know, for someone 
like me, who is in her thirties, to lead the organization and to 
have everyone who working for me be basically 30 and under, is 
amazing.  I really try to be conscientious about putting them out 
there.  It’s not about me.  I think we have this skewed sense of 
what it means to be a leader – that you’re always doing the       
talking.  Frankly there’s so much more than that to leadership, 
and you have to make a commitment to be conscientious. 
Also with our chapters, the majority of the women are under 
30.  They have as part of their political identity their race or  
ethnicity, but not gender as much.  Here’s a space where they 
can learn about the issues, develop their advocacy skills, and 
feel empowered.  We use the term “Fierce Sisters” all the time to 
negate the stereotypes of Asian women.  We are fierce and we 
are powerful. 
Transition has become a really big priority for me, for our 
organization, and our movement related to developing            
leadership.  We have board members who feel strongly about it 
as well because we’ve seen what has happened to the women’s 
movement when it hasn’t been a priority.  We’re still going to 
face it; there are women’s organizations where they still just 
don’t get it - where my staff tells me that they go and still feel 
marginalized.  Now we’ve had more women of color in        
foundations who see the need for organizations like NAPAWF, 
for other women-of-color organizations, for other ethnic-specific 
organizations because they represent our communities. We can’t 
have others doing that because we know our communities.   
As a law student at the University of Georgia, you were 
very active with public interest student issues – and after 
working at DOJ for a number of years, you took a position 
that supported public interest students at WCL.  Were there 
common questions that you would get from students of color 
interested in exploring public interest careers?  Were they 
similar to what your classmates were confronting at that 
time? Were there significant differences or other               
observations you have from that time?
That’s a good question.  First, I think that WCL is a totally 
different breed.  I used to tell people that they were in such a 
great position with all these clinics and opportunities for public 
interest work, where that wasn’t the case for me at Georgia.  
When I was there, I and a few other students put together a      
public interest career fair because career services didn’t have the 
capacity.  I think now it’s more of a mainstay, but at that time it 
wasn’t there for us.  We had to create it.   
But some of the questions are very similar.  It’s much 
harder to find a job – you kind of have to search and go out on 
your own rather than the on-campus interviews that are ready 
and there and waiting for you.  So it really just takes a lot more 
effort.  You have to learn about the different organizations and 
how they do their hiring.   
The issue of debt, especially coming out of WCL versus 
coming out of a public university, is a huge issue.  Especially 
when, at WCL, there’s a big push around PILRAP, and trying to 
figure out a way that there can be more support systems in place 
in a University that really supports public interest.  But what are 
the programs that they have in place to allow students to really 
take advantage of this opportunity? 
You’ve been doing this work for a good amount of time 
and you’ve done some really interesting – and trailblazing – 
work in a lot of ways.  How have you kept your head – and 
your heart – in this work for so long?  How do you keep 
yourself motivated, and do you have any words for folks who 
are afraid of burnout or on the brink of burnout?
I’ve been a burnout victim in the past.  A belief in balance 
and in the fact that you can’t be the sacrificial lamb has helped 
me.  I keep saying that to myself: I’m one person and I can only 
do so much.  What sense does it make for me to be helping all of 
these people while running myself into the ground?  Be realistic. 
Have balance. Keep yourself healthy and productive so that you 
can actually stand the work.  Also, just don’t take yourself so 
seriously.  I feel like the stuff gets just so politically charged and 
people get so worked up.  And it’s not as if work isn’t important.  
It’s just that you have to put it in the larger context of what’s 
going on in your life and you can’t become so one-dimensional 
about work.  You have to have an outside life; you have to have 
other interests because in that sense, it helps to make you a       
better advocate. 
Also I think we should really promote policies and          
organizations that support that balance.  Two things I brought 
from the government to NAPAWF were having every other  
Friday off and really generous vacation time.  I do feel that there 
are various organizational cultures where you constantly have to 
produce, and it’s “outcome, outcome, outcome.”  There’s always 
got to be something going on at this frenzied kind of pace and 
that’s where the burnout comes.  If you want to keep people in, 
build their skills, and keep the consistency and longevity in the 
organization, you really have to do certain things.  It’s also a 
way of valuing people.  It’s not just about valuing the pie-in-the-
sky ideals of social justice, but you value the very people that 
are in front of your face who work with you day in and day out, 
and show up every day. 
* *Parag Khandhar is a third-year law student at the American University        
Washington College of Law.  Mr. Khandhar is also the Executive Editor of The
Modern American.
* See Ms. Ahuja’s biography on page 87.        
1 Available at http://feministing.com/archives/007040.html (last visited October 
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DON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR:
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES AS THE NEW JIM CROW
By Marisa Bono *
“We can, of course, little more than hypothesize how 
our racial passions first began to overtake us, how  
humankind’s obsession to embrace the similar and  
despise the different got stuck in our communal        
psyche....”
- Jerold M. Packard1
“They’re taking our jobs, our homes.  There’s un-      
employment partly because of the Hispanics.  The lady 
who took my job is Hispanic, and she’s bilingual.”
- Anonymous proponent of Ordinance 2903, a law 
passed in Farmers Branch Texas that prohibits            
undocumented immigrants from renting housing.2
“[T]he cruelty and humiliation of Jim Crow is a thing 
of the past.”
- President George W. Bush, in a speech delivered at 
 the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing 
Arts in Washington, D.C., on January 16, 2006. 3 
To the extent that the laws meant to perpetuate racial segregation in the post-Civil War South do not exist in America today, President George W. Bush was right 
when he delivered his Martin Luther King Jr. commemoration 
speech in 2006: Jim Crow is dead.4  However, many do not  
recognize that such laws have since been reincarnated in forms 
that are much less conspicuous and significantly more savvy and 
mature than their predecessors.5  Facially neutral, they operate 
without reference to the racial prejudice that stirred their rebirth, 
and for this reason they are difficult to identify.6  But as        
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once said of another     
subject matter similarly difficult to define, we know it when we 
see it.7
One pernicious manifestation has taken the form of anti-
immigrant ordinances that have swept through predominantly 
small and/or rural communities across the country since April 
2006.8  By utilizing such measures as English-only provisions,9
fines and criminal penalties for employers, landlords, and others 
who do business with undocumented immigrants,10 and barring 
undocumented immigrants from social services,11 local          
government officials are attempting to drive undocumented  
immigrants who are predominantly Latino out of their towns.  In 
the process, these laws create hostile living and working         
environments for Latino residents, relegating them to second-
class citizenship in their own communities, and creating a       
climate of fear and shame for the undocumented, the               
documented, and U.S. Citizens alike.  To date, approximately 
100 localities in 28 states have proposed some form of anti-
immigrant ordinance, all varying in language and scope.12  Of 
these, 40 ordinances have passed.13
This article will examine one face of the modern anti-
immigrant campaigns: restrictive housing ordinances that      
prohibit undocumented immigrants and their families from       
renting apartment housing within city limits. The public          
rationale offered by local government officials to justify these 
ordinances is the health, safety, and welfare of local               
constituents.14 Upon closer inspection, however, these              
ordinances are actually reminiscent of racial zoning laws passed 
during the Jim Crow era to maintain and reinforce racial          
stratification.15  Throughout the early twentieth century, cities all 
over the country enacted segregation ordinances to prevent the 
intermingling of the races.16  City officials labeled African-
American neighborhoods undesirable because “the shiftless, the 
improvident, the ignorant and the criminal carry their moral and 
economic condition with them wherever they go.”17
The similarities between the racial zoning ordinances of the 
Jim Crow era and the restrictive housing ordinances of today are 
disquieting.  First, this article provides an overview of racial 
zoning ordinances passed in the early twentieth century and the 
restrictive housing ordinances of today, as well as their          
justifications.  Second, after delving into the explanations     
offered by local government officials in passing restrictive  
housing ordinances, this article concludes that such laws are a 
reaction to the growing Latino population in the United States.  
It also asserts that, like racial zoning ordinances, restrictive 
housing ordinances are passed to maintain racial segregation and 
white dominance.18  Finally, this article suggests possible      
motives for these policies of segregation and warns against     
following their treacherous path. 
OVERVIEW OF RACIAL ZONING ORDINANCES AND     
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES
Before drawing any parallels between these two forms of 
discriminatory housing regulation, it is important to set the      
historical and social contexts in which they developed.  In large 
part, the characteristics of each are radically distinct and exist 
almost a century apart.  Immediate differences are evident, not 
only in the historical context, but in form as well.  For example, 
racial zoning was exclusive; while restrictive housing is        
expulsive.19  Racial zoning was an instance of de jure            
discrimination; whereas, restrictive housing is de facto,20 or so 
this article will argue.  Despite these differences, however, an 
overarching objective emerges: the segregation of races as a 
























































In the post-Civil War era, newly freed slaves enjoyed a brief 
period of time where they benefited from many of the rights 
enjoyed by the body politic: the right to vote, the right to own 
property, and the right to travel and associate freely.21  However, 
after Reconstruction ended in the late 1860s, and as the         
entrenched southern classes regained political power, any rights 
afforded African Americans were revoked or modified severely 
so as to render them ineffectual.22  A new system of federal and 
local laws was ushered in under Jim 
Crow, one in which “racism [was a] 
legal right and obligation.”23
Because the most obvious way to 
ensure the separation of the races was 
to force them to live in separate 
places, Jim Crow laws included      
severe restrictions on where African 
Americans could reside and travel.  
Racial zoning ordinances were largely a reaction to the mass 
migration of southern rural blacks fleeing to the North.24  In fact, 
studies from the time indicated that racial tension in the North 
was growing as the proportion of blacks in the area increased.25
In 1910, Baltimore, Maryland, passed an ordinance that zoned 
separate residential districts for blacks and whites.  Over the 
next six years, at least a dozen racial zoning ordinances were 
enacted to legally restrict members of particular races to certain 
areas of U.S. cities and towns.26  These local housing regulations 
took various forms: some segregated block by block, others  
created distinct racial districts, and “one, New Orleans 
[regulation] required new residents of a particular race to obtain 
the consent of the current residents if they were of a different 
race.”27  The purposes of the ordinances revolved largely around 
police power, or the right “‘to preserve social peace, protect  
racial purity, and safeguard property values.’”28
RESTICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES
Almost a hundred years after the first racial zoning           
ordinance was passed, restrictive housing ordinances have 
evolved amidst a heated national debate over federal             
immigration policy.  In 2004, an estimated 10.3 million           
immigrants living in the United States were undocumented, with 
81% of those individuals claiming Latin American countries of 
origin.29  By December of 2005, the United States Congress was 
considering a major overhaul of federal immigration law.30
From those deliberations came a punitive House bill, known as 
the Sensenbrenner Bill after its sponsor.  The bill made it a       
felony to have undocumented status and imposed felony         
criminal sanctions on individuals who provided aid or            
humanitarian assistance to undocumented immigrants.31 The 
passage of the Sensenbrenner bill immediately incited           
unprecedented mass demonstrations. Across the country,      
millions of people, both non-citizens and citizens, protested 
against what they perceived as anti-immigrant, racially hateful 
reforms to existing U.S. immigration laws.32  A second wave of 
protests followed in March when demonstrators sought an      
overhaul of enforcement-only measures and demanded                
comprehensive immigration reform that would give amnesty to 
undocumented immigrants, in addition to a pathway to legalized 
status.33
Opponents of amnesty provisions counter-protested with 
demonstrations, albeit on a much smaller scale.34  Indeed, in the 
years leading up to these events, anti-immigrant advocates who 
favored enforcement-only measures had already been engaged in 
enforcement-type activities of their own.35  Most notably, but 
not exclusively, a group calling  itself 
the Minutemen Project had been     
organizing armed civilian volunteers 
and stationing them along the U.S.-
Mexico border in order to track and 
detain undocumented immigrants.36  In 
June 2006, following the mass pro-
immigrant demonstrations in the 
spring, the Senate passed a bill that replaced the harsher        
measures of the Sensenbrenner Bill with relief for                
undocumented immigrants.37  Not long after, members and        
supporters of groups like the Minutemen Project began to press 
harder than ever for local solutions to what they insisted was the 
federal government’s failure to enforce immigration law.38
Prominent in their efforts to promote enforcement-only laws is a 
claim that Latinos who support comprehensive immigration  
reform are plotting a “Reconquista,” or that they “seek to          
reconquer this territory by taking the land away from the United 
States and returning it to Mexico.  The goal of the Reconquista 
is to ‘reconquer’ these ‘lost’ or ‘stolen’ territories for ‘La Raza’ - 
the race indigenous to Mexico.”39  When local government    
officials first began proposing restrictive housing ordinances in 
the summer of 2006, the Minutemen and their associates spoke  
publicly in their favor and also testified at city hearings.40
Thus far, at least 40 cities have proposed restrictive housing 
ordinances, of which 15 have passed.41  The ordinances made 
most visible to the public by the legal challenges they inspired 
are those that were passed in Hazelton, Pennsylvania;               
Escondido, California; and Farmers Branch, Texas.42
On September 8, 2006, Hazelton, Pennsylvania, a former 
coal-mining town about 45 miles northwest of Philadelphia, was 
the first locality to propose and pass an anti-immigrant               
ordinance that included housing restrictions.43  Entitled the         
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA), Ordinance 2006-18       
prohibited undocumented immigrants from renting property in 
the city, subjecting any property owner or tenant to fines of up to 
$250 a day and criminal penalties for a violation of the             
ordinance.44  In addition, each property owner was required to 
obtain and pay for an occupancy permit for each potential tenant 
that would be granted only upon a showing of “proof of legal 
citizenship.”45  Landlord property owners also faced suspension 
of their rental licenses for violating the ordinance.46
The restrictive housing ordinance passed by the City of  
Escondido, California, on October 16, 2008, was modeled 
The similarities between the racial      
zoning ordinances of the Jim Crow 
era and the restrictive housing        
ordinances of today are disquieting.  
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largely after the IIRA.47  The Escondido ordinance prohibited 
landlord property owners from renting an apartment to any 
“illegal alien” and placed the burden of verifying tenant legal 
status on landlords.48  Those who failed to comply with the        
ordinance would be subject to fines of up to $1,000 per day, up 
to six months in jail, and suspension of their business licenses.49
On November 13, 2006, Farmers Branch, Texas passed its 
own restrictive housing ordinance, months after it was initially 
proposed by city councilman Tim O’Hare.50  Although the 
Farmers Branch ordinance also threatened stiff financial and 
criminal penalties for landlords who rented to undocumented 
immigrants, it differed from those passed by Escondido and 
Hazleton in that it applied only to “existing leases.”51  Later  
versions of the ordinance also attempted to define “illegal 
alien.”52  The Farmers Branch city council repealed the             
ordinance and replaced it with an amended version that          
contained many of the same restrictions on immigrants’ access 
to housing as the first.  Farmers Branch voters approved the bal-
lot on May 22, 2007, and it was enjoined the same year by a 
federal court on June 19.53
JUSTIFICATIONS USED TO SUPPORT RACIAL ZONING AND
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES
Despite the many decades that separate them, racial zoning 
ordinances and restrictive housing ordinances share two key 
characteristics.  First, both occurred in the wake of sudden     
influxes of minority populations in a relatively short period of 
time.  In the case of zoning ordinances, the triggering demo-
graphic change was a mass migration of southern rural blacks to 
northern cities during the Jim Crow era.54  For restrictive hous-
ing ordinances, it was the exponential growth of Latino popula-
tions in smaller, predominantly white towns.55  In Farmers 
Branch, for example, the Latino population, including both      
native and foreign born, virtually doubled - from 20% to 37% - 
during the 1990s.56  Hazleton’s population of approximately 
30,000 is about 30% Latino, up from 5% in 2000.57  The Latino 
population of Escondido, a city of approximately 142,000, has 
nearly tripled since 1990, rising from 16% to 42%.58
The second point of comparison is the use of the police 
power to justify exclusionary policies.  As indicated above, in 
addition to the blatant and public fear of racial amalgamation,59
racial zoning ordinances were premised on the notion that they 
were necessary to protect the public welfare and preserve        
property values.60  Modern day localities have relied on the 
same rationales to justify restrictive housing ordinances.  For 
example, Mayor Louis Barletta, the main proponent of the 
Hazleton ordinance, has publicly stated that, though he is      
unaware how many undocumented immigrants currently reside 
in the city, he nonetheless blames them for contributing “to 
overcrowded classrooms and failing schools, subject[ing] our 
hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard 
quality of care, and destroy[ing] our neighborhoods and        
diminish[ing] our overall quality of life.”61  To date, the city has 
not provided any figures to support Barletta’s assertions. 
The same pattern of baseless justification occurred in     
Escondido.  The Escondido ordinance states that “crime        
committed by illegal aliens harm[sic] the health, safety, and 
welfare of legal residents in the city.”62  During the debate        
leading up to the passage of the ordinance, city councilmember 
Marie Waldron, the driving force behind the Escondido        
ordinance, warned without evidence that illegal immigrants  
exposed other town residents to a litany of potential harms  
ranging in severity: from loud music and graffiti, to child      
molestation and deadly diseases such as leprosy and                
tuberculosis.63 Similarly, the Farmers Branch ordinance         
purports to “promote the public health, safety, and general         
welfare of the citizens of the City of Farmers Branch.”64  More 
specifically, city councilmember Tim O’Hare, who first           
proposed the ordinance, argued that it was necessary to prevent 
increasing crime rates, declining local property values, and 
school underperformance.65  However, he failed to show how all 
of these “problems” were actually linked to undocumented       
immigrants, or that they were even occurring in the first place.66
Thus, support for the racial zoning ordinances of the past 
and restrictive ordinances of today relies on the demonization of 
rapidly increasing minority populations and the aggrandizing of 
the so-called “police power” supposedly needed to control them.  
This historical and geographic commonality is crucial to          
identifying how restrictive housing ordinances perpetuate racial 
segregation. 
USING EFFECT AND INTENT TO RECOGNIZE               
RACIAL BIAS
One may be inclined to take a strong position against, and 
perhaps even take a stronger offense to, the argument that      
restrictive housing ordinances are throwbacks to the racial        
zoning ordinances of a post-slavery era.  The most obvious        
argument against this comparison is that racial zoning              
ordinances specifically targeted African Americans; whereas, 
restrictive housing ordinances target undocumented immigrants, 
not Latinos as a racially defined class.67  This response,        
however, appears as little more than a smokescreen in light of 
the intent and effect of restrictive housing ordinances.
THE INTENT OF RESTICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES
A closer examination of the reasons set forth by public        
officials to justify targeting undocumented immigrants, reveals 
that they are not only unfounded, but do not distinguish between 
undocumented immigrants and Latinos in general.  Furthermore, 
localities do not avail themselves of alternative solutions that 
refrain from targeting subordinated groups of people. Put       
simply, in light of these considerations, the only conclusion a 
critical observer can reach is that these justifications are pretexts 
for racial exclusion. 
When Farmers Branch councilmember O’Hare stated      
publicly that it was necessary to protect property values,68 the 























































and problems related to health, safety, welfare, or declining 
property values.  Worse, Farmers Branch did not show that those 
problems even existed.69  Neither O’Hare nor other proponents 
of the ordinance pointed to any studies, reports, or statistics to 
support a correlation between immigration status and societal 
ills.  In fact, at the same time as the touted increase in the        
Farmers Branch Latino population, the total number of criminal 
offenses in Farmers Branch declined - from 1,413 in 2003 to 
1,306 in 2005.70  The Texas Educational Agency recently      
recognized schools in the Carrolton Farmers Branch School     
District for academic excellence in the 2004-2005 school year, 
an achievement those schools had not obtained in recently      
preceding years.71  Furthermore, O’Hare’s public comments did 
not distinguish between undocumented immigrants and Latinos.  
To explain fluctuations in property values, O'Hare reasoned that 
“what I would call less desirable people move into the  
neighborhoods, people who don’t value education, people who 
don't value taking care of their properties....”72  He claimed that 
retail operations cater to low-income and Spanish-speaking      
customers, leaving “no place for people with a good income to 
shop.”73  Yet, his statements again fail to discern between      
undocumented immigrants and Latinos in general.74
Similarly, the City of Escondido based its ordinance on 
findings that “the harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units in 
the City, and crime committed by illegal aliens, harm the health, 
safety and welfare of legal residents in the City.”75  Unlike the 
City of Farmers Branch, Escondido relied on a June 2006 study 
by the National Latino Research Center at California State         
University San Marcos (hereafter “NLRC study”) addressing 
housing conditions in the Mission Park area of Escondido.76
The NLRC study, however, found that the causes for              
substandard housing in Escondido were the high costs of          
housing and the unavailability of affordable subsidized housing 
in Escondido – not the presence 
of “illegal aliens.”77
In Hazleton, Mayor Ray      
Barletta insisted “that illegal         
immigration leads to higher crime 
rates, contributes to overcrowded 
classrooms and failing schools, 
subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to 
substandard quality of care, and destroys our neighborhoods and 
diminishes our overall quality of life.”78  Yet, he has also       
publicly admitted that he does not know how many “illegal 
aliens” live, work, or attend school in the city, or how many 
Hazleton crimes have been committed by “illegal immigrants,” 
legal residents, or citizens.79
Furthermore, according to statistics compiled by the           
Pennsylvania State Police Uniform Crime Reporting System, 
there has been a reduction of total arrests in Hazleton over the 
past five years, including a reduction in serious crimes such as 
rapes, robberies, homicides, and assaults.80  Under Hazleton’s 
violent crime index (VCI), undocumented immigrants           
committed no violent crime until 2006, when three such cases 
were reported out of 1,397.81  Barletta also claimed that         
Hazleton’s budget was “buckling under the strain of illegal     
immigrants,” but admitted that he was unaware how many      
undocumented workers contributed to the city’s budget by         
paying taxes.82  In 2000, Hazleton had a $1.2 million deficit, in 
stark contrast to the surplus it enjoys today.83  The town also saw 
its largest increase in property values last year.84  Its net assets 
are up 18%, and its bond rating is AAA.85
Amidst the baseless assertions about immigrants, legal       
alternatives exist that would more directly address the         
tribulations claimed by public officials.  For example, it is not 
clear why a city, without evidence showing the cause-and-effect 
between blight-like overcrowding and a certain class of              
residents, would not pursue remedies that did not target that 
group of residents.  Where concerns about property values arise, 
a city could enforce stricter penalties for landlords who were not 
keeping their buildings up to code.  Where the occurrence of 
crime is shown to be increasing, a city could fund community 
watch programs in appropriate areas, if not train and hire           
additional police officers.  There are myriad alternative solutions 
to these alleged societal woes.  Yet none are being utilized by 
cities that turn to restrictive housing ordinances. 
Thus municipalities with restrictive housing ordinances fail 
to show a connection between the presence of immigrant          
populations and alleged societal harms.  They also ignore less 
restrictive solutions that would more directly address those 
harms to the extent that they actually exist.  Moreover,          
municipalities that pass restrictive housing ordinances           
simultaneously incur overwhelming legal and economic costs 
that they are often unable to afford.  For example, after         
Riverside, New Jersey, passed a restrictive ordinance in the fall 
of 2006, thousands of Latinos fled the community, creating a 
forceful blow to the local economy. Local businesses          
floundered, and many were 
forced to close.86  By the 
time Riverside voted to     
rescind the ordinance a year 
later, it had already spent 
$82,000 in attorney’s fees 
fending off a legal challenge 
to its law.87  It is likely that Riverside would have spent many 
times that amount had it seen the challenge through to           
conclusion. 
Thus, the record of these cities reveals the intent behind the 
legal exclusion of the undocumented. In short, local              
governments’ willingness to engage in certain behavior -        
ignoring the variety of obvious legal solutions, willingly           
incurring staggering economic and legal costs, and                
simultaneously admitting to the nonexistence of evidence that 
links predominantly Latino undocumented immigrant           
populations to threatened safety or welfare – speaks for itself.  
The intent behind exclusionary ordinances is to use immigration 
status as a pretext for the racial exclusion of Latinos.
The intent behind exclusionary ordinances      
is to use immigration status as a pretext               
for the racial exclusion of Latinos. 
32













































     
THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING ORDINANCES
While restrictive housing ordinances do not explicitly        
segregate a distinct racial or ethnic class, as racial zoning        
ordinances once did, their practical effect demonstrates how 
immigration status is actually a proxy for the same type of racial 
targeting.  For example, restrictive housing ordinances apply to 
Latinos who have legal status.  Moreover, the proposal and      
debate of restrictive housing ordinances creates extraordinary 
racial tension and animus in the communities where they         
originate. Therefore, restrictive housing ordinances force     
documented and undocumented Latinos alike to choose between 
leaving their communities and families and breaking the law by 
continuing to work and attend school in a place where they have 
been categorized as outsiders. 
More specifically, Latinos suffer what this article will term 
“constructive exclusion.”  By excluding some family members 
and not others from renting housing, these ordinances                  
constructively force Latinos who have legal status, and even 
citizenship,88 to leave by imposing a choice between relocation 
and severing the familial unit.  For example, under Ordinance 
2892, the first ordinance 
passed by Farmers Branch, 
each potential tenant was 
required to show evidence of 
“eligible immigrations 
status” in order to live in a 
rented apartment.89 This 
wording created an explicit threat to mixed-status families, or 
those families in which one or more parents is a non-citizen and 
one or more child is a U.S. citizen.  Thus, hypothetically, where 
a family is comprised of one undocumented spouse, a spouse 
with legal permanent residence, and children with U.S. citizen-
ship by birth within the U.S., household heads are forced to 
choose between splitting apart and relocating their family      
altogether.  Even after the city repealed 2892 and replaced it 
with 2903, the city ordinance still prohibited certain categories 
of persons permitted by the federal government to live and work 
in the United States, such as student-visa holders and temporary 
workers, from renting housing.90
Ordinance language also excludes Latinos from renting 
housing by sanctioning racial stereotyping by potential land-
lords.  The Hazleton ordinance, which was closely modeled after 
the Escondido ordinance, approved the use of an individual’s 
“race, ethnicity, or national origin” as at least a partial basis for a 
complaint that they are undocumented.91  While the ordinance 
states that those factors may not be the sole basis for a               
complaint, it virtually sanctions race- and national origin-based 
targeting.  It also makes Latinos more vulnerable to false            
complaints that result in automatic criminal and financial            
penalties.  As the plaintiffs challenging the Hazleton Ordinance 
stated in their Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary 
Injunction, the use of race, ethnicity, and national origin as       
relevant considerations in enforcing the ordinance “threatens to 
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial 
[or ethnic] group and to incite racial [and ethnic] hostility... 
[and] to enforce racial and ethnic division.”92
In this way, restrictive housing ordinances, like that passed 
in Hazleton, relieve landlords of a sense of responsibility for 
racist practices.  Restrictive housing ordinances encourage, or at 
the very least allow, landlords to use racial profiling while 
“screening” potential tenants.93  As Latinos make up significant 
portions of the immigrant communities in cities that have passed 
restrictive housing ordinances, landlords are virtually forced to 
consider race, national origin, and English-speaking ability 
when entering into a lease agreement.  By making the 
“degradations of racism a legal duty rather than an act of        
individual free will,”94 these ordinances essentially clear the 
consciences of racially prejudiced Americans by relieving them 
of responsibility for racist practices. 
Furthermore, restrictive housing ordinances target Latinos, 
and not merely undocumented immigrants, in another more  
circuitous method: by creating animus-filled environments 
within the communities where they are proposed.  In each case 
where restrictive ordinances were proposed and debated, the 
local communities were immediately 
embroiled in heated, and often        
hateful, controversy.95  By painting 
undocumented immigrants as the 
cause of all their communal woes, 
without evidence to support the         
connection, and without any           
distinctions between immigrants and Latinos in general,96 city 
officials embolden local residents to act on misinformation, 
prejudice, and, worse, racial animus.  As a result, Latinos are 
forced to refrain from living, working, and attending school 
comfortably in their own environments.  For example, in         
Farmers Branch, Latino parents are apprehensive that their        
children will be removed from school, and students refrain from 
speaking Spanish with each other for fear of arrest.97 Relatives 
refrain from visiting for fear of harassment.98  As Jose Gomez of 
Farmers Branch, Texas, puts it: “If we’re of a certain color, 
they’re going to point their finger at us.”99
The public rhetoric surrounding the ordinances, which    
emphasizes protecting Americans from undesirable outsiders 
who speak a different language, is evidence of this effect.  For 
example, in Farmers Branch, one ordinance proponent outright 
blamed Latinos, not immigrants, for perceived public woes: 
“They’re taking our jobs, our homes.... There’s unemployment 
partly because of the Hispanics.  The lady that took my job is 
Hispanic, and she’s bilingual.”100 Another complaint tied the 
prevalence of the Spanish language to community ruination: 
“[F]or every two [retail shops] that went vacant, one would be 
filled by a Spanish-speaking business, then, you... saw what was 
once a really, really, really nice neighborhood start to              
decline.”101  In these ways, local residents are sending Latinos a 
clear message: you are welcome to work in our city and pay 
sales taxes here, but you can’t sleep here at night.  This          
“…There’s unemployment partly because      
of the Hispanics.  The lady that took























































sentiment not so vaguely echoes those from the thousands of all-
white “sundown” towns and suburbs across the West and North 
during the Jim Crow era. 102  At that time, not only African 
Americans, but Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans were 
warned not to let the sun set on them while within town limits.103
Accordingly, many Latinos who have legal status are        
prohibited from housing under restrictive housing ordinances, 
and many of those who are not will be driven out by racial          
targeting and animus.  These Latinos, in addition to               
undocumented immigrants who are employed and whose       
children are acclimated to local schools, are most likely move to 
nearby towns and suburbs.104  In this way, restrictive ordinances 
will have the palpable effect of removing a racial community 
from one city to a neighboring one.  In some cases, such as 
Farmers Branch, actual racial districts could potentially be            
created within the same city.105  Thus, restrictive housing       
ordinances initiate the first step towards the segregation sought 
by yesteryear's proponents of racial zoning laws. 
IDENTIFYING A MOTIVE TO SEGREGATE
Now that we have addressed the question of how restrictive 
housing ordinances operate to segregate Latinos, it is important 
to contemplate the motive behind these laws.  The “knee-jerk” 
explanation points to fear of racial amalgamation, the widely 
recognized driving force behind racial social control in the early 
1900s.106  Additionally, there are two more probing, possibly 
interlocking, explanations: race nuisance and fear of “the waking 
giant.”
The theory of race nuisance was raised by white plaintiffs 
during the Jim Crow era to support 
racial segregation.107  Typically, white 
landowners or municipal government 
officials articulated this concept to 
challenge the presence of black people 
in white neighborhoods. “Race         
nuisance” encapsulated the notion that 
by virtue of race alone, the African-
American presence created a nuisance 
that disrupted the quiet enjoyment of 
land for white property owners.108  This theory was also used to 
protest the presence of Mexicans in Texas.  In Worm v. Wood109
and Lancaster v. Harwood,110 for example, Texas appellate 
courts rejected the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctions prohibiting 
Mexicans and African Americans from residing nearby. 111  The 
plaintiffs based their arguments on the premise that the presence 
of these racial minorities would “greatly injure and practically 
destroy the social conditions of [the] neighborhood.”112
The notion of race nuisance has returned in the failure by 
proponents of restrictive housing ordinances to delineate       
between undocumented immigrants and Latinos when citing 
immigrants as the cause of public ailments.  By failing to link 
the presence of undocumented immigrants to nuisances such as 
declining property values, underperforming schools, and       
increasing crime rates, proponents of restrictive housing          
ordinances insinuate that Latinos are a “per se nuisance.”  They 
claim, in essence, that Latinos, as a class of people, create a  
nuisance by their very presence.  This implication arises from 
the reality that restrictive housing ordinances are often coupled 
with the passage of English-only laws, without justification as to 
how Spanish is harmful or detrimental to the community.113
Although no appellate courts between the end of Reconstruction 
and Brown v. Board of Education ever enshrined the concept of 
Mexican residents as a race nuisance,114 today’s proponents of 
restrictive housing ordinances are now reversing that judicial 
outcome by turning to legislation.  Indeed, some localities have 
already moved towards classifying immigrants as public         
nuisances outright.115
In addition to the race nuisance theory, proponents of      
restrictive housing ordinances may be motivated by the fear of a 
“waking giant.”  The proverbial “giant” being a growing minor-
ity population that is culturally different from the majority, less 
complacent about the subordination they encounter, and         
increasingly resistant to assimilation than in previous years.  The 
combination of these factors creates fear and resentment in older 
residents as they witness the change in their community.  While 
some older residents may leave, others stay behind, fighting to 
preserve their community as they once knew it.116
Already alarmed by the sheer growth of Latino populations, 
the white majority in small communities like Farmers Branch, 
Hazleton, and Escondido may be especially intimidated by the 
changing attitude within the Latino “majority-minority.”117  This 
attitude contrasts that of the late nineteenth-century, when many 
Mexican Americans began insisting that they were white in  
order to avoid “legal” forms of      
discrimination and classification.118
Mendez v. Westminster, a landmark 
school desegregation case involving 
Mexican-American students, con-
cretized the Latino embrace of as-
similation as the plaintiffs argued 
explicitly that race was not at issue 
in the case and that the “whiteness” 
of Mexican Americans carried great 
social value.119
This attitude prevailed well into the late 1960s, until the 
advent of the Chicano movement.120  The emergence of a non-
white identity has since been a key component in the Latino civil 
rights movement,121 and in fact, the assertion of a singular non-
white identity may have culminated in the mass immigrants' 
rights marches of 2006.122  With the emergence of this “non-
assimilationist” attitude, the Latino population is also projected 
to comprise a majority of the U.S. population within the next 
fifty years.123  These changes together have inspired allegations 
of increased competition for resources, jobs, housing, and         
education.124  Thus, the fear of the “waking giant” alludes, more 
than anything else, to the threatened financial and social        
superiority of the white majority.  The perceived peril hearkens 
back to the post-Reconstruction mass migration of African 
The plaintiffs based their   
arguments on the premise that the 
presence of these racial minorities 
would “greatly injure and practically 
destroy the social conditions of         
[the] neighborhood.” 
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Americans to the North, and their ensuing call for equal rights. 
CONCLUSION
In 1917, in Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court            
addressed the constitutionality of a Louisville, Kentucky racial 
zoning ordinance.125  Although the Court invalidated the          
ordinance, it did so in a limited holding that trumpeted the         
priority of white property rights more than it rejected racial 
housing segregation.126  Similarly, those courts that have       
enjoined restrictive housing ordinances, thus far, have done so 
on the basis of federal preemption, and not because of any       
discrimination based on suspect classification.127
However, notwithstanding other constitutional problems 
posed by restrictive housing ordinances – namely the threat of 
piecemeal immigration policy thrown together by localities in a 
field already preempted by the federal government128 – local 
governments should be vigilant of the racial impact of these 
ordinances.  Across the country, the slow tide of restrictive 
housing ordinances threatens to create segregated towns, where 
Latinos are welcomed community members in one, while unin-
vited guests in the next.129  During the Jim Crow era, de facto 
inequality followed separateness.130  In other words, “if Jim 
Crow placed a badge of inferiority on the black race, it provided 
license to devalue black interests as well.”131  As shown above, 
the controversy surrounding the proposal and passage of restric-
tive housing ordinances has already shown shades of a reemer-
gence of one of the most shameful chapters of this country’s 
history. 
In large part, it was the moral outrage over segregation and 
the second-class citizenship of African Americans that rang the 
death knell for de jure apartheid.  Lest they repeat an ugly past, 
local governments should utilize means other than restrictive 
housing ordinances to alleviate social tribulations, to the extent 
that they actually exist.  In the meantime, grounded in a social 
consciousness gleaned from the history of our country’s race 
relations before the Civil Rights Movement, we should speak 
out and act swiftly to prevent the actions of those who refuse to 
heed that unfortunate legacy. 
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REFLECTIONS OF A COMMUNITY LAWYER
By Luz E. Herrera*
In May 2002, I opened a law office in one of the most    underserved communities in Los Angeles County.  Many questioned the sanity of such a career path when evaluating 
my financial stability and the personal toll that such a career path 
can exact.  Given that I graduated from some of the best         
universities in the country, my friends, family, and strangers 
were even more perplexed at my choice.  I cannot say that my 
decision to build a law practice in Compton, California, has been 
easy.  However, time and time again, I found myself rejecting 
more secure and prestigious job offers and continued in what 
some of my law school friends call “the more difficult route.” 
This article recounts my brief, unrefined, and continuing 
journey as a novice attorney.   My story is not unique or new; 
however, the triumphs, challenges and defeats of community-
based private practitioners serving individuals’ everyday legal 
needs are largely undocumented.  By providing a personal     
account of my experiences as a solo practitioner, I hope to      
encourage others working with low-income and modest-means 
clients to share their experiences and demand more support from 
our law schools, our bar associations, and legal aid organizations 
to allow us to better serve our clients and sustain ourselves in the 
profession.  
MY PERCEPTION OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Growing up in the eastside communities of Los Angeles, I 
remember seeing signs for lawyers and bail bondsmen in my 
neighborhood.  My only connection to these services was      
overhearing conversations between my parents.  Once, I heard 
them lamenting that their small savings would again be depleted 
in order to post a bond for a family member who struggled with a 
drug and alcohol addiction.  Another time, I heard my mother 
warning my father to not get involved and reminding him that 
testifying on behalf of one of his co-workers in an employment 
discrimination lawsuit could cause him to lose his own job.  
From the tone of these conversations, even as a child, I           
understood the seriousness of these matters.  As immigrants, my 
parents attempted to distance themselves from any legal          
problems.  They would rather turn the other way or put up with 
mistreatment than to get involved in a legal dispute.  
Until my senior year in high school, my knowledge of      
attorneys, judges or courtrooms was limited to television           
depictions and classroom role-play simulations. Those           
educational experiences, and my ability to function in United 
States’ society with greater ease than my immigrant parents,       
predisposed me to be less weary than they were about the legal 
system. During my senior year in high school, at the Chicano/
Latino Youth Leadership Conference in Sacramento, I           
encountered an attorney for the first time.  Attorneys from the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(MALDEF) organized a voting rights and redistricting exercise 
for the conference. They explained political representation,     
leadership, education, distribution of resources and the ability to 
vote.  They described a legal system that created equal access to 
opportunity - a message that inspired me.  
In college my interest was further piqued when I learned 
how lawyers used litigation strategies to cement civil rights   
victories in the 1960s and 1970s.  Learning about this history 
helped me envision a role for myself in the legal profession.  I 
wanted to be a lawyer who used her legal training to open doors 
for others.  I believed that going to law school would prepare me 
to be an advocate for people who, like my family, my neighbors, 
and my friends, did not understand how to navigate government 
institutions.  At the time I applied for law school, the only lawyer 
I knew well was in his first year of practice.  He worked as a Los 
Angeles County district attorney, and he invited me to observe 
him in court.  As he gave me a tour of the courthouse, he talked 
about his job with great enthusiasm.  I remember walking into a 
holding cell adjacent to the courtroom where two working-class 
Latino immigrant men were on their knees praying for a merciful 
decision before being escorted to the courtroom.  The fear and 
apprehension I saw in their eyes was similar to what I sensed as a 
child listening to the adult conversations about lawyers and 
courts.  My friend explained that these men had been arrested for 
selling food without the proper permits and licenses.  His job 
was to prosecute those who broke the law.   
Because I thought I knew this district attorney’s politics, I 
was puzzled at why he enjoyed a job where it was his             
responsibility to prosecute men who I believed were honorable 
and hard-working.  He explained that his job was to uphold the 
law even if its application did not always seem fair.  As a district 
attorney, he had the power to make things very difficult for these 
men or give them an opportunity to rectify their mistake by       
paying a fine and educate them about their responsibilities when 
selling food to the public.  I understood his explanation, but I did 
not understand why these men were placed in a holding cell and 
treated like dangerous criminals.  I left the courthouse that day 
very disillusioned.  It was my first introduction to justice in a 
courtroom and the first time that I questioned whether I could be 
an attorney.
MY LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
First-year law school courses are supposed to teach students 
to think like lawyers.  However, I often felt disengaged from the 
theoretical discussions of rules that seemed to take me away 
from the context of my experiences, my world, my self and into 
a world of rational behaviors presented as apolitical, asexual and 
void of identity.  The first-year courses were teaching me to 























































changing, I was not all that pleased by what I was becoming.  
My discomfort in the law school classroom was due to my      
identity as a first-generation, working-class Chicana.  The idea 
that laws were neutral and that their application was fair did not 
ring true in my world of working-class individuals. Despite    
being a student leader in college, I found myself staying silent in 
much the same way my parents had when they were forced to 
deal with legal matters.  When I was forced to speak in class, I 
spoke with a fear similar to what I saw in those street vendors’ 
eyes - engaging in an unfamiliar process in a foreign system. 
During law school, I sought training that would help me to 
be a voting rights expert just like those first attorneys who      
motivated me.  Unfortunately, the only voting rights classes 
available were not in the university’s law school, but in the 
school of government.1  Very few of the discussions in my civil 
rights classes touched upon groups other than African        
Americans.  It seemed every professor and career counselor I 
talked with about my interest in working on behalf of the Latino 
community was supportive, but did not know how to direct me to 
resources that would help me develop my career path.  Some 
directed me to jobs at legal aid organizations or suggested I    
apply for government jobs - neither matched my ideas of      
community building.  While their intentions were good, I never 
felt fully understood or heard by my advisors.  It seemed that the 
only work that was valued as public interest was the work done 
by established non-profit organizations or government bodies.  I 
knew that impact litigation work that organizations like       
MALDEF engaged in was the type of work acknowledged as 
“public interest.”  So, I secured funding from a private donor that 
allowed me to work for a summer in MALDEF’s San Francisco 
office.
MY INTRODUCTION TO LAW PRACTICE
Working at MALDEF, I found some wonderful attorney-
mentors who understood and supported my passion for         
community.  While I enjoyed working on cases involving issues 
of voting rights, education, and immigration law, I realized that 
this type of work was not for me. As an intern, I spent most of 
my time doing legal research, and I did not have opportunities to 
meet clients.  By the end of my internship, it was evident that 
impact litigation was not my calling. I wanted more client       
interaction. I also questioned whether the current impact        
litigation strategies were the best route to community              
empowerment with courts becoming increasingly conservative 
and restrictions on attorney fees provisions making it more and 
more difficult to finance the litigation.  While I continued to  
respect and support the work of organizations like MALDEF, I 
did not see a role for myself at such institutions.  
Because I ruled out impact litigation following that summer 
internship, I decided to interview for jobs with big law firms 
where I believed I would be trained while making a salary that 
exceeded my expectations.  At the same time that I interviewed 
for law firm jobs, I participated in the clinical program at the 
Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School.2  There, I had the 
opportunity to engage in direct client service with low — and    
moderate — income individuals who were forming businesses,  
organizing nonprofit organizations, and negotiating real estate 
transactions.  Most of the clients I worked with attempted to use 
the legal system to forge their dreams of stability and self-
employment.  Working with these clients reaffirmed in me the 
importance of developing a sound economic strategy and a     
political agenda for underserved or underrepresented             
communities. This clinical work in community economic       
development and its accompanying coursework helped me     
understand that I wanted to facilitate community building.      
Unfortunately, employment opportunities in community         
development for graduating law students were few and far     
between.  In addition, large student loan payments and my     
father’s recent lay-off provided more justification for accepting 
employment at a corporate law firm.  I convinced myself that I 
could contribute financially to support the causes I believed in, 
hoping that making financial contributions and taking on pro 
bono matters would be enough to satisfy my desire to make a 
difference.  I accepted a job offer in the real estate department of 
a corporate law firm that promised to teach me skills that I could 
later translate to community economic development work.
ENTERING AND EXITING CORPORATE AMERICA
At least 90% of my classmates went to work at large firms 
upon graduating law school or directly out of post-graduate       
judicial clerkships.  At Harvard Law School, law firms courted 
us with expensive dinners, hospitality suites, activity-filled       
summer internships, promises of training and, of course, big 
salaries.  Even though I did not go to law school to get a job at a 
large law firm, I was convinced that it would be foolish to de-
cline a large law firm’s offer when I did not see a clear path for 
my passions.  I chose to work with a firm that took pride in their 
commitment to diversity and pro bono work.  I believed that I 
had a better chance of succeeding in corporate America if I 
worked at an institution that shared some of my values.  While I 
found the work interesting, I did not receive great training nor 
did I find mentors there.  The intellectual stimulation of the work 
was not enough to outweigh the absence of collegiality and      
personally fulfilling work.  The feeling that I did not belong with 
this firm was mutual, and I was encouraged to look for          
employment elsewhere.  Within two years of graduating law 
school I found myself without a job.  
FINDING MENTORS
Instead of looking for a new job, I set out to look for a      
mentor.  I interviewed for a few small law firms, a couple of 
public sector jobs, and an in-house position.  None of these    
employment opportunities felt right for me.  While I struggled to 
carve a career path that fit my values, I began to do some       
contract work for friends and non-profit organizations.  It was on 
one of my contract assignments that I unexpectedly found the 
mentor I sought.  Salvador Alva was part of a delegation that I 
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helped administer on a trip to Cuba.  When he learned that I was 
an attorney he offered me a job in his law office.  He had been in 
solo practice for over twenty years and had started his career as 
an attorney for California Rural Legal Assistance.  He handled 
mainly criminal, family, and personal injury cases, but at the 
time I met him his primary client 
was a neighboring municipality.  
About five weeks after our initial 
meeting, I began working with 
him on a range of legal matters.  
Before I knew it, I was interview-
ing clients, attending depositions, 
writing legal memoranda, and 
drafting city ordinances.  He in-
vited  questions and, whenever 
possible, he took time to have 
lunch with me to address my con-
cerns or confusion. Salvador         
interacted with his clients respect-
fully and professionally,        ex-
pressing genuine concern for their problems.  
Approximately two months after I began working with my 
mentor, I came upon a letter from John Ortega, an attorney in the 
city of Compton who was retiring and looking for someone to 
lease his small office space.  The letter expressed a concern that 
there were no Spanish-speaking attorneys in an area that greatly 
needed bilingual services.  At that time the only thing that I knew 
about Compton was that it had been devastated by years of drug 
dealing and gang warfare in the 1980s and 1990s.  I did not 
know that more than half of its population was Latino. When I 
brought the letter to Salvador’s attention, he explained that he 
had worked for this attorney in Compton at the start of his career 
and asked me to set up a time for us to visit.   
Driving to Compton with Salvador to meet Mr. Ortega         
rattled my sensitivities.  We passed a couple of communities 
before reaching Compton Boulevard, but none of them came 
close to being as underdeveloped and economically depressed as 
Compton seemed.  Deteriorated, boarded-up properties on the 
main boulevard and in residential areas were commonplace.  
Most of the occupied properties had metal bars on the windows 
and doors.  I was in disbelief that such a community existed in 
Los Angeles County.  We had a difficult time finding Mr.        
Ortega’s law office because it did not have signage.  We finally 
arrived at a storefront, situated across the street from a             
drycleaner and adjacent to one of many dollar discount stores in 
the city.  With the exception of a few fast food restaurants, some 
small family-owned business and a couple of donut shops, there 
was little indication that this was a city where an attorney could 
make a living.  
The 400-square-foot wood-paneled office was crammed 
with outdated law books; the windows and door had bars for 
additional security.  Mr. Ortega, a general practitioner who took 
just about every type of case, welcomed us and began to talk 
about Compton’s need for a Spanish-speaking attorney.  Mr. 
Ortega was unaware that we were just visiting to say hello.  He 
explained, “[s]ometimes, these people, all they need is a phone 
call.  When you make it for them, they are very appreciative.  
You can make a living here.”  He was asking for rental payments 
of $400 per month.  As Mr. Ortega spoke, a woman he               
introduced as Maria came to 
the door and asked whether we 
wanted to buy homemade      
tamales that day.  For each of 
us - three generations of        
Latino attorneys - the decision 
to buy food from a street       
vendor was quite simple. We 
did not wonder whether our 
health would be adversely 
affected by eating them or 
whether Maria was violating a 
local ordinance by going door-
to-door to sell home-prepared 
food in order to make a living.  
We simply bought them even if we were not hungry.  We did not 
discuss Maria or the purchase of the tamales, but I left knowing 
that Mr. Ortega and Salvador understood entrepreneurship and           
community needs the same way that I did.  
Subsequently, I had several conversations with Salvador 
about Ortega’s office space.  He explained that there was a great 
need for service in this area but to make a living there would 
require a lot of hard work and time that he did not have.  After 
giving it some thought, I asked if he would be offended if I tried 
to do it on my own.  He responded with a surprised smile and 
said, “Luz, if that is what you want to do, you have my support.  
I know you can do it.”  My gut told me he was right.  
TAKING MATTERS INTO MY OWN HANDS
Soon after our initial visit, I returned to Compton to explore 
the possibility of taking over John Ortega’s office space.  Ortega 
was stunned when I told him, “If you rent me the space for $350 
a month, I will set up my law office in Compton.”  He was          
excited that a Harvard-trained attorney would agree to practice 
law there and even more impressed that a female would be         
willing to take on such a project, given the city’s reputation.  He 
immediately agreed to lower rent and said I could keep his old 
books, some of his office supplies and I could even borrow his 
desk until I bought my own.  Most importantly, he allowed me to 
keep the same phone number that had been associated with his 
law office for about 30 years.  In anticipation of opening my  
office, I continued to work with Salvador Alva and used my 
earnings to buy some office equipment.   
 Many people have asked why I turned down more lucrative 
or traditional job offers to set up a solo law practice in Compton.  
For me it is simple.  I went to law school because I wanted to 
represent individuals like Maria and the street vendors that        
district attorneys prosecute.  They are the working poor.  They 
are entrepreneurial immigrants.  They are those individuals who 
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struggle to make full rental and mortgage payments on time.  
Establishing my own practice allowed me the opportunity to fuel 
the fire that burned in my belly.  I followed my instincts and 
went forward with what felt right.  When I decided to venture out 
on my own, I did not have a business plan.  I had never litigated 
in a courtroom.  However, I knew how to read, write and        
advocate in ways that my neighbors, my friends, and my       
relatives did not.  I wanted to use my education to directly      
contribute to the community that applauded each of my           
educational accomplishments as if they had been their own.  
 My decision to open an office in Compton was absolutely 
selfish in that it provided a vehicle for my idealism.  I also saw 
this risk as an investment in myself.  I recaptured the courage I 
had once traded for diplomas from elite institutions and rejected 
the notion that only the financially privileged can work on behalf 
of the poor.  The fact that I was only three years out of law 
school and did not have much experience concerned me, but it 
did not paralyze me.  When I considered that I learned much 
more in the six months I worked with Salvador Alva than I had 
after almost two years at a corporate law firm, my insecurities 
diminished.  I learned that we become 
good at doing what we do through 
practice, study and reflection.  I did not 
know how it was all going to work, but 
I knew that there were thousands of 
individuals  in  my immediate                 
surroundings who did not possess the 
privilege of a law degree and bar     
admission. I knew that given the needs 
of Compton and the larger community, I would not starve.  My 
potential clients inspired me to take a chance on myself. 
John Ortega sent letters to a number of people announcing 
his retirement and my arrival to Compton.  He organized a      
retirement picnic with former clients, his family and friends 
where he introduced me to the community.  With the exception 
of one or two colleagues, the invitees were working-class men 
and women from Compton and the surrounding communities 
who attended to show their appreciation for Mr. Ortega’s many 
years of service to the community.  
PRACTICING LAW IN COMPTON
Media images usually depict only part of a community’s 
reality; such is the case with Compton, California.  Rap culture, 
the news media and a tumultuous history with drugs and        
violence continue to plague this particular city in Los Angeles 
County.  The 2000 Census offers this reality of Compton: 56.8% 
of its population was Hispanic/Latino and 40.3% was Black/
African American.  The same census revealed that 31.4% of 
Compton’s residents were foreign-born, 55.2% spoke a language 
other than English in their homes and 38.5% were under the age 
of 18.  Less than six percent of Compton’s population had a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, and 28% lived below the federal 
poverty line.  The reality for me as one of the few professionals 
in the city, and as the only Spanish speaking attorney in private 
practice, is that I feel pulled in many directions because my   
advocacy skills, my contacts and my legal training are needed 
there.  My role has positioned me to serve as a resource for local 
businesses, nonprofit organizations, churches, and residents.   
As an attorney in solo practice my work is defined by my 
clients’ legal needs; it varies from securing their parental rights, 
protecting their economic rights and helping them understand 
their responsibilities. At other times my role involves            
community legal education, strategic planning or participating in 
discussions with community members to develop a collective 
vision for the neighborhood where we live and work.  I advocate 
for the rights of individuals, small businesses, and non-profits in 
Compton and in other communities of Los Angeles County, as 
well.  I do not classify my practice or my work as “cause  
lawyering” or under any of the classifications created by        
academics.  For me, and other attorneys working in underserved 
communities, our roles are so fluid and our clients’ needs are so 
diverse that we practice in different ways depending on the       
client, the community and the problem. Our work and our      
clients’ lives are complex and messy.  Effective community-
based lawyers and advocates  understand 
that legal problems are multi-faceted and 
often require interventions from the      
larger community, non-legal institutions, 
and non-lawyers. Most of my clients’ 
legal needs are rooted in more systemic 
problems. However, when a client is 
about to lose their home or their parental 
rights, the long-term designs of a social 
movement seem irrelevant. 
MY CLIENTS
  While some of my clients are poor and working-class 
retail clerks, waitresses, and janitors, some of them are also      
college graduates, homeowners, and teachers whose legal         
problems cannot be addressed by self-help remedies or legal  
hotlines.  My clients are generally not destitute, but they live 
paycheck-to-paycheck.  They represent the working poor and the 
middle class.  An illness or loss of employment for a few months 
would cause financial havoc to most of my clients.3 The          
majority of them reside in the southeastern communities of Los 
Angeles County, but I have a handful of clients who live in 
neighboring counties and a couple who live several hundred 
miles away.  The fact that someone 400 miles away would hire 
me is a reflection of the lack of affordable legal services that 
exists throughout the state of California.4
 My first two clients were prime examples of individuals 
who do not have the means or connections to obtain subsidized 
or market-rate legal services and could not navigate the legal 
system without the assistance of an attorney. The first client was 
living in her mother’s house and was mildly developmentally 
challenged.  While her mother was in hospice care, she faced 
eviction by her brother.  My client had only a part-time job and 
no other family members to provide housing. The second client 
I wanted to use my education to     
directly contribute to the
community that applauded each of 
my educational accomplishments
as if they had been their own.
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was an immigrant and father of five who lived in a two-bedroom 
apartment with his children, his wife, and his brother-in-law.  He 
was the victim of a fraudulent real estate transaction that left him 
with the responsibility of a mortgage but without the benefit of 
occupancy in the home.  He had limited English competency and 
was not knowledgeable about the legal process in 
the United States. Both of these cases required 
that I appear before several courts and learn      
several substantive areas of law.  These cases 
required me to go to probate court, a family law 
court, bankruptcy court and to engage in general 
civil litigation. The complexity of these first two 
cases was an indication of the difficulty and      
complexity of problems that awaited me. Many of the clients that 
came to my door were clients whom others had turned away  
because they did not qualify for publicly funded services,      
because they lacked the funds or because the language barriers 
were too difficult to overcome.  
CHALLENGES OF SOLO PRACTICE
 Although there is information available on the challenges 
faced by solo practitioners,5 I was not prepared for the journey 
that I embarked on, as I had relatively little experience and no 
business plan.  My decision to open my law office was not     
motivated by financial considerations, but by a personal thirst to 
create a practice that fit my belief system.  Based on my clinical 
work in law school and my prior work experience, I knew 
enough to set up a client trust account and draft a basic retainer 
agreement.  I also was prudent enough to search for affordable 
legal malpractice insurance.  I read publications published by the 
American Bar Association and the California State Bar for        
individuals starting law firms.6  The advice contained in those 
books was relevant and helpful, but the sources were also not 
written with my clients’ needs in mind and tended to assume that 
attorneys who start their practice have more financial resources 
and experience than I had.  I was plunging into a world of     
unknowns; it was daunting.  Shortly, financial concerns became 
paramount.  I needed to buy books and enroll in continuing legal 
education courses to prepare myself.  These needs along with the 
technology necessary to run a law office brought start-up costs 
and anxiety to levels I had not expected.    
 In the first two years on my own, I invested my profits in 
training myself and getting involved with several organizations 
to market my services.  Most of my clients were referrals from 
other attorneys, community leaders, school friends, and former 
clients.  Getting clients through the door did not prove too      
difficult for me.  In the geographic areas where I practice, the 
number of clients with legal problems is larger than the attorneys 
who can address them.  My language skills and flexible payment 
plans filled a need in the community. I adopted practices utilized 
by corporate law firms and honed my organizational abilities to 
develop systems that allowed me to manage my clients.          
Developing  intake questionnaires and retainer agreements took 
much work, even though there were samples available through 
bar associations, my malpractice insurance carrier and my        
mentor.  But learning how to charge clients and developing a 
billing system proved most challenging.  
 Like other community lawyers, I continued to represent  
clients who I knew could not afford to pay me.  Without a           
business plan, sufficient 
support staff or a mastery of 
the business side of law, I 
embarked on my own pro 
bono work - mostly work 
for which I never billed or 
was never paid for. The 
problems with billing 
plagued the viability of my practice for some time. While I found 
attorneys able to offer advice about marketing, client manage-
ment, and their expertise on substantive and procedural law, it 
was much more difficult to get advice on the viability of a       
practice.  It was also difficult to find bookkeepers trained to 
manage billing for small law practices.  It took a couple of years 
to develop a system for billing and find individuals I could      
employ to meet my business needs.  With a billing system in 
place, I found that most clients, particularly the ones with the 
most modest means, pay when billed.   
 Over four years, operating a law practice in an underserved 
community has had many financial and emotional drawbacks.  
To make ends meet, I lived with my parents, limited my social 
engagements, and forwent luxuries. In the first two years         
whatever money I earned went back into my business or my   
frugal living expenses. It became difficult to keep up with my 
friends and colleagues as the discrepancy in our financial means 
kept widening. Even though I believed in what I was doing, it 
was an emotional struggle that I finally won when I stopped 
comparing my financial status to that of my classmates and       
understood that the value of my work could not be measured by 
the digits behind the dollar sign.   
 The emotional costs of solo practice can be high.  There are 
numerous demands on one’s time, money, and skills. Clients 
expect and warrant excellence.  Family and friends expect and 
warrant time. Professional circles require development.        
Community partners require investment. A solo practitioner  
cannot hide behind a large corporation, a junior associate or        
business partners to carry the load when she is not feeling up to 
par.  When you are your own boss running your own business, 
there is constant scrutiny about your performance, your         
appearance, your commitments and your future.  The loneliness 
and isolation that accompany those demands are inherent in the 
job.   
FACILITATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OTHERS
 Since venturing out on my own, I have received calls from 
peers, paralegals, law students, and prospective law students who 
are interested in my career path and want to discuss career      
options.  After many meetings and conversations, it has become 
evident to me that many lawyers are looking for alternative     
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options in practicing law.  Even attorneys who are happy with 
their salaries often feel unfulfilled or trapped in their current job 
environments.  There are fellowships that allow attorneys to set 
up their own legal projects.  These programs are usually granted 
only to recent law school graduates and are usually adhesive to 
existing public interest organizations. Often they limit lawyers 
who have an entrepreneurial spirit by placing restrictions on   
salaries and viewing public service through a strictly nonprofit 
model.  At the same time, lawyers who turn to government as a 
way to serve the public and secure a comfortable salary with 
benefits often find themselves with systemic restrictions that 
inhibit their creativity and ability to affect community change.  
 It is not easy to find individuals who are willing to make a 
full-time commitment to providing legal services to low and 
moderate-income individuals.  Although many have cheered my 
efforts, there are only a handful of people who are willing to take 
a chance on themselves and on such communities.  For those 
attorneys who are looking for work that combines direct service 
and social impact but 
are unsatisfied with a 
low-salary job at a 
legal aid organization, 
the alternatives are not 
apparent.  
 Before meeting 
Salvador Alva and 
John Ortega, I had not 
planned on opening up 
my own practice.  The 
career counseling that my Ivy League institution offered did not 
include becoming a solo practitioner in a low-income community 
as a viable option for its graduates. Salvador Alva exposed me to 
constant client contact.  John Ortega’s referrals forced me to step 
into the  courtroom. Other attorneys I have met during this        
journey have guided me through such challenges as bankruptcy 
adversary proceedings and preparing my first trial. I was           
fortunate that I found these individuals and that I was not shy 
about asking for help.  However, going out on your own can be 
overwhelming.  
STRENGTHENING THE NETWORK
 In April 2006, I took advantage of an invitation to return to 
the Legal Services Center at Harvard Law School as a clinical 
instructor. This opportunity was possible because I found       
another Spanish-speaking attorney who understood my client 
base and was willing to sublease my office space to start her own 
practice.  During my time away, I had the opportunity to reflect 
on my work and to learn about the work of other solo             
practitioners in community-based practices throughout the       
country. By talking with other solo practitioners, reading        
interviews with them, and surveying the small body of literature 
about them, I came to understand that there is a deep need for a 
greater system of support for solo practitioners. Most solo       
practitioners whose law practices serve the daily legal needs of 
their communities find their work fulfilling.  However, it comes 
with a price as they are frequently overworked, underpaid, and 
unrecognized.  
 There is a need for greater support systems for attorneys in 
private practice who serve the needs of working-class clients.  
Monthly publications, occasional seminars, and discounts on 
legal software are some of the benefits that bar associations offer 
their members, but they do not address the everyday needs of 
lawyers running their businesses in working-class neighbor-
hoods.  Discounted legal software still requires a significant  
investment of time, money, and personnel. The occasional bar 
seminar is often accompanied by a significant fee and held      
during inconvenient time frames.  The legal profession owes a 
greater commitment to attorneys who practice on their own and 
work to address the needs of individuals, families, and small 
businesses in communities across the United States.  
 Access to affordable health care for these attorneys and their 
employees, student loan assistance programs, technology       
assistance programs, tax deductions for 
attorneys who work in underserved areas, 
training arrangements with large law firms, 
coordinated bookkeeping services, greater 
integration of telephonic appearances,   
paying client referrals from legal services 
organizations - these are just some        
initiatives that could improve the lives and 
livelihood of solo practitioners. To improve 
access to and delivery of legal services in 
our country it will be necessary for the bar, 
courts and law schools to address and remedy the discrepancy of 
resources and support systems available to attorneys in private 
practice who represent the legal needs of the average American.  
CONCLUSION
 I returned to Compton in June 2007 with some apprehension 
but even more conviction. I had the unique opportunity to      
continue to re-envision my law practice or to change direction.  I 
felt torn between (a) engaging full time in re-building my        
practice and (b) focusing on finding resources to develop a 
model infrastructure for a community law practice incubator.  
My own experience with legal education and the conversations I 
continue to have with pre-law and law students, and new           
attorneys, reveal that the legal profession is lacking structured 
experiences and opportunities that encourage idealism. 
 My law practice is now a small operation that is nestled  
between teaching law students and helping build Community 
Lawyers, Inc.7  My desire to increase access to affordable and 
quality legal services is coupled with my commitment to help 
prepare a new generation of attorneys to make a difference in 
their communities.  I envision developing post-graduate or law 
school clinical programs that prepare new attorneys to make a 
good living without gouging consumers of legal services.        
Providing more hands-on training to those entering the legal  
profession, strengthening the network of existing community-
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based lawyers in private practice, and connecting them with the 
other sectors of the profession will greatly benefit clients by  
increasing the quality and availability of affordable legal services 
and by developing a pipeline of attorneys who understand and 
serve the needs of underserved neighborhoods. My space in 
Compton will continue to be an incubator for entrepreneurial and 
community-minded lawyers who strive to use their degrees to 
make a difference for the families and individuals that inspired 
them to become attorneys.   
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Lawyers and policy experts within the Latino community need to foster cultural responsibility for immigration reform by participating in the policy dialogue.         
Although Latino lawyers do not represent the broad American 
population, they do represent American communities that have 
been discriminated against because of their cultural and racial 
heritage.  It is important to uphold 
the diverse cultural identities of 
Latinos while asserting policies 
that will not only benefit Latino 
communities but also conciliate 
past  discrimination.  
One important country in the 
Western Hemisphere that has developed a more forward-
thinking immigration strategy is  Argentina. Like the United 
States, Argentina experienced  massive European immigration at 
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unlike 
the United States, however, it has developed a more open     
approach toward its bordering  nations and natural trading     
partners. Argentina’s strategy to develop a more balanced and 
race-neutral federal immigration policy has resulted in a more 
humane and economically sound approach to immigration    
reform in comparison to the United States. In order to fully        
compare the two countries’ immigration policies, it is important 
to summarize the historical development of U.S. immigration 
policy. 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT                     
IMMIGRATION POLICIES
The U.S.-Mexico immigration relationship began after the 
Mexican Revolution, in response to the disarray of the post-
revolutionary years. In an attempt to establish stability after 
years of war, many Mexican migrants moved up to the North, 
hoping to establish themselves economically. At the same time, 
many American employers ran recruitment campaigns to acquire 
cheap, dispensable labor.1
In addition to significant economic “pull-factors,”2 Mexican 
migrants were also drawn to the United States by the change in 
American immigration policies.  During this time in the U.S., 
public fear evolved in response to the Eastern and Southern 
Europeans, the Chinese, and the Japanese.  This fear was not 
only expressed on the streets by racial violence and segregation, 
but also conveyed in immigration legislation.  The immigration 
laws of this era imposed significant restrictions on the type of 
immigrants that were able to come to the United States.3 This 
racialized hatred focused on select minorities opened space in 
the American    economy for an alternative source of low-skilled 
labor: Mexican immigrants.  Although the need for labor ceased 
during the Great Depression, recruitment was revived during 
World War II.4
In 1942 the United States negotiated a treaty with the   
Mexican government in an attempt to fill labor shortages created 
by the draft.  The Bracero Program 
was implemented to supply the 
United States with temporary         
agricultural workers. Although the 
initial intent of the Bracero Program 
was to supply labor to the United 
States during the war, the program 
was so advantageous for American employers that it continued 
until 1964.5
Under the Bracero Program, nearly five million Mexican 
migrants came to the United States.6  Under the program, the 
Department of Labor would certify an American employer’s 
estimation of labor needs and then make a request to the      
Mexican government, which in response transferred the            
migrants to the United States.  Once the workers arrived, the 
Department of Labor placed them with private American       
employers.7
The Bracero Program established migratory patterns for 
both documented and undocumented immigrants.  Although the 
Bracero Program established a legal avenue for Mexican       
immigrants to come to the United States, it also created many 
pull-factors to encourage those who did not qualify under the 
program requirements to come as well. The United States was 
aware that its recruitment activities promoted Mexicans’ belief 
that the United States was the land of opportunity, which enticed 
many migrants to enter illegally or without inspection. 8
Despite the necessity of low-wage workers during this era, 
Mexican immigrants lacked basic rights.  They had the ability to 
participate economically in the United States, but were unable to 
participate politically.9 This political disenfranchisement in   
addition to the blatant racism created an incredibly hostile     
environment for these immigrants. In this environment 
“Operation Wetback” was spawned. 10  In response to public 
concerns over loose border policies and the frenzy caused by the 
increasing employment of Mexican immigrants, Operation   
Wetback deported over one million Mexicans, including many 
documented Mexicans, under the supervision of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service.11  Federal strategies, such as border 
patrol profiling, employed in the 1950s to target Mexican       
immigrants, are still used today and have been protected under 
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the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.12     
CURRENT U.S. IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
Given the primacy of popular opinion in determining     
federal immigration policy in the United States, it is not        
surprising that the racialized tone and anti- immigrant rhetoric of 
the past has prevailed in the formulation of policies during the 
last two Administrations.  The Bush Administration has placed 
the immigration problem at the forefront of its policy concerns.  
In response to the presence of an estimated 12 million             
undocumented immigrants in the United States, President Bush 
has attempted to create a solution that not only resolves the       
national political divide but also pacifies international trade  
partners. The solution proposed is another guest worker          
program.13
On June 7, 2007, the Senate quashed the program, and the 
prospects of comprehensive immigration reform, by a fifteen-
vote margin.14 The outcome resulted in an overwhelming 
amount of criticism from core Republican voters and liberal 
Democrats. 15 Despite support from President Bush, Democratic 
leaders of the Senate, and some prominent senators from both 
parties, the bipartisan plan never came to life.16
One of the most problematic aspects of the bill was a       
proposal that would shift policy preferences away from the    
naturalization of applicants with family ties in the United States 
toward the employment of immigrants with advanced skills, 
college degrees and English-speaking ability.17  Supporters of 
this proposal claim that immigrants would still be able to bring 
close family members into the country. 18 However, opponents 
of the proposal argue that countless families would be split apart 
in exchange for a very selective admissions process based on 
classist and racist preferences.19
Another problematic issue with the proposed legislation was 
the guest-worker proposal. Despite a desperate struggle from 
both sides of the Senate and a cut of the initial proposal of 
400,000 two-year guest worker visas into half, there wasn’t 
enough cumulative support to satisfy the political expectations 
of the entire electorate. 20  This political crisis raises concerns for 
policy analysts, such as the Immigration Policy Center, which 
cites the Bureau of Labor’s recent findings and concludes that 
not only would a guest worker program be desirable but also 
necessary to sustain current economic growth21:
A key component of the immigration reform bill now 
being debated in Congress is a new temporary worker 
program that, ostensibly, would replace the current 
stream of undocumented migration with a regulated 
flow of less-skilled immigrant workers. However… 
the temporary worker provisions of the legislation, as 
they now stand... would not respond to the growing 
demand for less-skilled workers to fill permanent 
jobs in high-growth industries like construction. In 
fact, the temporary program taking shape in the          
Senate would have the effect of cycling less-skilled 
immigrant workers in and out of the lowest rungs of 
the U.S. labor force without creating any longer-term 
investment in the workers or the industries in which 
they are employed….An alternative program that 
allows workers to apply for permanent status would 
better address industry’s need for a larger and more 
settled less-skilled workforce and would more likely          
discourage undocumented immigration in the       
future.22
 Given the current political tenor and the historical record 
on immigration policy, the U.S. appears inclined to continue to 
subordinate basic human rights issues and hamper strategies to 
integrate immigration with the needs of the economic sector. 
Although a comprehensive immigration reform plan has yet 
to be approved, the Bush Administration has managed to subdue 
the immigration problem by increasing physical deterrents to 
illegal migration through an enhanced border-enforcement       
system.  On October 26, 2006, George Bush signed the Secure 
Fence Act.23 During the inauguration of this bill, the president 
declared, “This bill will help protect the American people. This 
bill will make our borders more secure. It is an important step 
towards immigration reform.”24 This measure reflected the   
Republican House leaders’ attempt to fulfill their promise to 
‘crack down’ on immigration.25
The Secure Fence Act authorizes a 700-mile border that 
would stretch around the town of Tecate, California, and build 
an expansion between Calexico, California, and Douglas,      
Arizona.  In addition, the bill provides funding for more sensors, 
satellites, radars, lighting, cameras, and other diction devices for 
the 2,000-mile U.S-Mexico border.26 The scope of the            
immigration protection and enforcement budget for the 2007 
fiscal year is estimated at $21.3 billion dollars, not including the 
two to nine billion-dollar estimated cost of building the fence.27
Until the underlying political motivation for immigration 
policy changes, U.S. immigration policy will further alienate 
low-wage, largely Mexican immigrants from mainstream U.S. 
society and continue the growing racial and economic divide of 
Mexican immigrants vis-à-vis the majority of the U.S.          
population.28  The proposed wall on the US-Mexico border       
illustrates, both symbolically and politically, the moral dilemma 
that U.S. policymakers face with regard to immigration policy 
relative to other countries in the Western Hemisphere.  As stated 
below by one critic, the wall is a “vivid demonstration of the 
moral bankruptcy of American politics,” and it is an offense 
against humanity by separating families and dividing those who 
wish to be joined. 29      
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR ADDRESSING AND       
INCOPORATING IMMIGRANTS IN LATIN AMERICA:        
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA
Although the United States is often viewed as a model for 
incorporating diverse immigrants, it may lag behind other “less 
developed” countries in its strategies to address economic needs 
while maintaining humane and equitable treatment of immigrant 
populations. Historically, the United States has developed ad 
























































by federal legislation that limits equal access to programs that 
would speed up immigrant assimilation into American society.30
There has been no successful solution to address the competing 
political forces within the immigration debate, and there is 
growing alienation across constituent groups that could be        
disproportionately supported by the racist rhetorical discourse.31
When looking at other countries that still rely on immigrant 
labor, it is opportune to review Argentina in a comparative 
framework with the United States, as both nations share similar 
histories of European immigration in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century.32 However, there are clear divergences in        
immigration policy at the federal level in these two countries. 
For example, in Argentina, unlike the Unites States, popular 
racist rhetoric about immigrants has never overwhelmed its 
overall federal policy strategy of providing relatively easy 
mechanisms for immigration and citizenship for immigrants. 
This is demonstrated not only in the Argentinean Constitution, 
but also within the immigration laws sanctioned by Congress in 
2003, the implementation of the Patria Grande, and the          
economic influences of the MERCOSUR. 
ARGENTINA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMMIGRANTS
The Argentinean Constitution features three primary       
sections within the first articles that illustrate the foundational 
hegemony that influenced Argentinean immigration policy.33  In 
Article 25, the Argentinean Constitution states its desire to         
promote immigration from Europe.34  Many have chosen to look 
at this declaration as creating the foundational rhetoric to      
promote preferential treatment for European immigrants over 
the surrounding indigenous communities from other countries.35
Although it is impossible to deny that the mainstream            
Argentinean sentiments towards immigrants have been           
historically pro-European, the Argentinean political and social 
discourse did not historically produce xenophobia in the same 
infringing manner as was produced 
within the U.S. context.36 Additionally, 
unlike the Constitution of the United 
States, the Argentinean Constitution 
granted protection of basic rights to all 
the  inhabitants of the country, not only 
to its citizens, protecting immigrants’ 
basic rights.37
 In recent years, Argentina has 
expanded upon its legal foundation of immigrants’ rights 
through its Civil Code.38 This development of a pro-immigration 
policy came into full force during the Kirchner Administration. 
In 2003 President Nestor Kirchner introduced into legislation a 
law that reduced the restrictions on immigration from other 
South American countries and guaranteed access to public 
health and education for both documented and undocumented 
immigrants.39 By introducing La Ley de Migraciones 25.871 and 
creating El Programa Nacional de Normalización              
Documentaria Migratoria, the Kirchner Administration         
constructed a legal and political framework to support the basic 
human rights of immigrants and to complement the international 
framework asserted under the MERCOSUR and the pressures of           
globalization.40
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ARGENTINE AN
IMMIGRATION POLICY
Globalization and the effects of the MERCOSUR            
agreement have played a significant role in establishing both 
push and pull factors for migrants within Latin America.         
Although Argentinean economy is not comparable to that of the 
United States, it still provides an interesting vantage point to 
compare immigration policies, as both economies receive          
immigrants from geographically neighboring countries and       
feature relative wage differentials as strong pull factors. 
MERCOSUR is a regional integration organization in 
which Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay are member 
countries and Chile and Bolivia are associate countries.  It was 
established in the Southern Cone region in an attempt to              
generate intra-regional trade while encouraging the liberalization 
achievements needed to compete in a global market.41               
MERCOSUR has contributed to the significant flow of         
immigrants from neighboring countries such as Bolivia, Para-
guay, Uruguay and Chile.42  MERCOSUR has also managed to 
catalyze hundreds of cross-border investments within the       
Southern Cone region. This phenomenon was virtually unknown 
in the economic history of South America prior to the 1990s and 
was “necessary to create internationally competitive sub       
regional firms. Furthermore, MERCOSUR has widened the 
scope and deepened the level of intraregional relations through 
regional infrastructure initiatives, cooperative agendas in          
education and culture, and heightened interaction among          
political actors of the member states.”43
When Argentina signed MERCOSUR, it signed a trade 
agreement that acknowledged the need for residency on behalf 
of immigrants.44 The agreement 
establishes a manner in which 
temporary residents have access 
to residence for up to two years in 
the country that they desire.  This 
legal framework coincides well 
with the existing Argentinean 
immigration legal system. The 
agreement embraces a unified 
effort to deter employment of illegal immigrants by providing 
sanctions for those employing illegal workers and guaranteeing 
that such sanctions will not have repercussions on the rights of 
immigrant workers. 45
Argentina’s legislative history and case law enforces          
immigration in a manner that complements MERCOSUR’s        
economic goals.  Unlike other international trade agreements, 
MERCOSUR and the Argentinean legal system enforce an       
immigration framework that supports a humanitarian              
immigration doctrine.  By contrast, this was not the case when 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereafter NAFTA) 
Unlike other international trade
agreements, MERCOSUR and          
the  Argentinean legal system         
enforce an immigration framework 
that  supports a  humanitarian   
immigration doctrine.   














































was passed in the 1990s absent any easing of immigration     
restrictions for Mexican workers as a result of greater economic 
integration through trade among the three member countries. 
Unlike NAFTA, the Patria Grande furthered the intent of 
Argentina to enforce laws and employ its economic policies in a 
humanitarian manner.  The Patria Grande was created to      
address the widespread abuse of undocumented immigrants in 
response to a tragic fire in a Buenos Aires sweatshop that caused 
the deaths of several undocumented Bolivian immigrants.46  By 
giving undocumented immigrants within the Southern Cone 
region a legal avenue to obtain residency, the plan attempted to 
ease the bureaucratic process of documentation and was aimed 
at promoting human rights for the residents within the           
MERCOSUR region.  
As a result of the Argentinean government’s efforts, 
350,000 residence visas were issued to undocumented                 
immigrants in 2006 -- eight times the 2005 total.47  Currently, 
Argentina’s federal government 
is planning to offer amnesty to 
approximately one million un-
documented immigrants that 
work in the country.  The       
Patria Grande also set a legal 
course for an estimated 
700,000 to one million illegal 
immigrants to eventually seek 
citizenship.48 Legal scholars 
anticipate future legal discourse on how to construct legally  
immigrants’ citizenship after two years. Nevertheless, the     
Patria Grande should create an environment in which           
undocumented immigrants avoid victimization and will provide 
a vehicle for citizenship for undocumented workers in                 
Argentina. 
Although the historical Argentinean sentiment linked to             
immigration policies targeted preferred racial groups of            
immigrants, Argentina is currently moving forward with           
immigration policies that promote the political, social, and          
economic cohesion of the Southern Cone region. In order to 
fully appreciate the differences between United States and        
Argentinean immigration policies, it is critical to place these 
cultural differences within a comparative historical framework. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
In a United Nations Press Release announced on September 
15, 2006, in reference to Global Migration Policy, Vice-Minister 
for Latin American Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Argentina, Leonardo Franco, commented that policies similar to 
Patria Grande need to be used as an outline for immigration 
policy.  
Argentina had participated in this high-level session 
in the context of regional integration that addressed 
migration from a human rights perspective, he said. 
His country had also decided to promote the issue of 
migration multilaterally, and not on a vision based 
exclusively on sovereignty and the State. As proof of 
this, he cited the important agreements of                
MERCOSUR and the South American Conference of 
Migration that had already achieved advances. The 
search for better conditions of life in other countries 
must not be reproachable, much less criminalized, he 
continued. Countries should address the issue by 
searching for mechanisms of cooperation and            
integration. He noted that Argentina had sealed that 
spirit into its migration policies in the National Law 
of Migration in 2004. That had affirmed Argentina's 
commitment to guaranteeing the human rights of 
migrants, while establishing mechanisms to regulate 
migration, thereby minimizing discrimination and 
xenophobia.49
Franco eloquently echoes the Argentinean attitude towards 
immigration policy, which includes concern for the equitable 
treatment of undocumented immigrants. Franco states that      
immigration policy experts 
should recognize the basic      
desire that all individuals have 
to improve their economic 
well-being, which provides the       
underlying incentive for        
immigrant flows.  In addition, 
given his analysis of the 
broader economic problems, 
immigration solutions require 
cooperative partnerships across neighboring countries.  Multi-
lateralism in trade and immigration is a logical policy outcome 
from the MERCOSUR agreement. 
 Beyond the more balanced immigration approach          
supported by the MERCOSUR agreement, Argentina has         
continued to support a race-neutral and humane approach to 
addressing new immigrants -- both legal and undocumented. 
Argentina has refused to allow either hostile popular opinion 
about immigrants or cyclical crises to affect its federal policies. 
Thus, there is little legislative evidence of unilateral and/or       
hostile immigrant policies unlike the ones documented in the 
United States. Finally, Argentina has maintained its core cultural 
values for incorporating new immigrants within its social milieu.   
Although there are a handful of cases in which immigrants 
have struggled to receive residency, generally Argentina       
supports immigrants by maintaining a legal structure that        
theoretically guarantees their human and civil rights.50 This  
general structure has been realized in the recent implementation 
of the Patria Grande Agreement and the recently enacted        
immigration laws that value the human rights of undocumented 
immigrants.  As a result, on an international level, this         
agreement has become a model for how other countries should 
treat their immigration ‘problem.’ 
The United States, by contrast, continues to maintain a uni-
lateral and racialized policy with regard to immigration reform.  
Human rights issues are of secondary concern in light of recent 
terrorist attacks, and popular sentiment continues to view low-
Beyond the more balanced immigration  
approach supported by the MERCOSUR 
agreement, Argentina has continued to  
support a race-neutral and humane
approach to addressing new immigrants — 























































income Mexican immigrants as inferior, illegal, and therefore 
unworthy of any federal legal status.51  Furthermore, there are 
few attempts to address the challenge of a meaningful political 
and economic incorporation of these new immigrants into 
American society. 
The popular dialogue regarding immigration policy in the 
U.S. is easily captured within the news media, which often    
report on smuggling, interception, or raids of undocumented 
workers in the key employment sectors of the U.S. economy.  
This manner of portraying “The Immigration Debate” not only 
infringes upon the everyday struggle of undocumented          
immigrants, but upon all Latinos as well.  Press coverage of 
federal immigration raids in 
Georgia during September 2006 
is one clear example.  In these 
illegal raids, federal immigra-
tion agents swept through 
towns in southeastern Georgia, 
relying heavily on racial and 
ethnic profiling.52   A lawsuit 
brought forth by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center states that 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents 
illegally detained and unlawfully searched documented Latinos, 
violating their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.  Illegal     
immigration raids reinforce the narrow, nationalistic perspective 
that unilateral solutions form the appropriate response to        
immigration reform.  This manner of approaching immigration 
reform not only hampers the basic rights of undocumented    
immigrants, but also effects the entire Latino community.   
CONCLUSION
Economic globalization requires states to move from ad 
hoc, self-interested and racist immigration policies to a          
balanced, multilateral and mutually beneficial policy that       
protects human rights and individual economic security.               
Historically, the United States has lagged in developing a      
forward thinking, multinational immigration policy.  Argentina, 
however, has provided an interesting template for addressing 
immigration that supports both economic success for employers 
and immigrant employees as well as a process for rapid             
normalization of legal and undocumented immigrants.  Unlike 
the case of NAFTA, the MERCOSUR agreement included       
specific labor market policies that were mutually beneficial for 
participating countries.  
Thus, although both countries may be motivated by self 
interest and a degree of popular support with regard to           
immigration policy, the U.S. has lagged in its ability to handle 
meaningful reform that  addresses 
key economic domestic interests 
and is placed within the context of 
meeting minimum human rights 
needs. The United States’          
immigration policy response may 
be seen as a protectionist strategy 
that undermines its position within 
a  g lobal  and  f ree  t rade                
environment.  Within the context 
of greater economic and political cooperation across the          
Americas, U.S. policymakers can learn some important lessons 
from its sister nations about humane, competitive immigration 
policies.  
It is the responsibility of lawyers and policy analysts in the 
Latino community to encourage a political shift toward         
developing meaningful immigration reform and to create       
immigration legislation that values the maintenance of our       
communities.  As the cultural makeup of the United States     
continues to evolve, policies and laws are still constructed 
within a racist rhetoric from the past.  There is a huge political 
cleavage in this country regarding how the immigration 
‘problem’ will affect our future. It is important to realize that at 
the core of this problem is the protection of our communities.  
It is the responsibility of lawyers and      
policy analysts in the Latino community
to encourage a political shift toward           
developing meaningful immigration
reform and to create immigration
legislation that values the maintenance
of our communities.
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The process for establishing the Latina/o Alumni Association of the Washington College of Law (“LAAW”) began in the same way I suspect many 
great organizations got their start, over a few beers in a         
Washington, D.C. bar.  Eight alumni (Maryam Ahranjani, Luis 
Clavijo, John Evanoff, Paul Figueroa, Juan Garcia, Manuel   
Garcia, Eric Garduno, and Carlos Quintana), first been             
introduced to each other as part of the Latina/o Law Students 
Association at the Washington College of Law (“WCL”) from 
2000 to 2002, met in the summer of 2005 to discuss an idea first 
conceived by Manuel Garcia (2000).  The idea was part of a 
larger discussion with members of WCL's Diversity Committee 
earlier in the year. 
 Specifically, the idea was to find a way for Latina/o alumni 
to help incoming Latina/o students at WCL avoid some of the 
pitfalls that awaited them as law students, and that frankly, 
many of us had fallen into during our years of study at WCL.  
We wanted to provide law students with practical advice on 
study and exam-taking techniques that worked well for us, as 
well as those that did not work so well.  We also felt it was         
important to speak about other aspects of our law school           
experiences as Latina/o students, such as how we dealt with      
personal relationships (i.e., family, community, and partners), 
time management, financial hardships, and career choices.  At 
its most basic, we wanted to share information about the things 
we wish someone had told us about law school before we started 
our law school careers.   
THE MOTIVATION
The potential impact of a Latina/o alumni association was 
crystallized for us after reading a report prepared by the          
American Bar Association (“ABA”) as part of a National       
Conference entitled, Collaborating to Expand the Pipeline.  The 
conference took place in Houston, TX on November 3-5, 2005.  
Statistics in the report provided clear evidence of the challenges 
faced by minorities along the "pipeline" into the legal            
profession.  Focusing on Latinas/os, the report found that in the 
fall of 2004, Latinas/os made up only 7.9% of all applicants to 
ABA-accredited law schools, compared with 65% for whites, 
10.6% for blacks, and 8.6% for Asians.  The report also showed 
that despite the fact that Latinas/os make up nearly 14% of the 
U.S. population, only about 4% of attorneys are Latinas/os.  
Finally, the report indicated that Latinas/os posted lower bar 
passage rates and higher law school attrition rates than their 
white counterparts. 
These numbers were not surprising when you looked at 
conditions further back in the pipeline.  For example, a 2004 
study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard found that high 
school graduation rates for Latina/o students were only 53.2%, 
compared to 74.9% for whites.   For Latinas/os that did go to 
college, only 6.3% received Bachelor of Science degrees con-
ferred in Title IV degree-granting institutions, while 70% of 
whites received such degrees. 
THE MISSION
Upon reading the ABA's report, we decided that LAAW 
could positively affect the pipeline at many levels.  For example, 
LAAW could provide motivational speakers to elementary, high 
school, and college students and provide useful information 
about law school and legal careers.  While recognizing the long 
term potential of the association, LAAW also realized that       
initially, our most valuable contribution would be assisting       
incoming students, current students, and alumni.  However, we 
agreed that unlike typical alumni associations whose primary 
goal was to advance the careers and professional development of 
its alumni, mostly by creating networking opportunities, our 
primary focus was to give back to those who were following in 
our footsteps. 
Therefore, as a first step in affecting the pipeline, we      
decided to devote our energies to creating a support network for 
Latina/o students that had succeeded in becoming law school 
applicants and/or students.  Specifically, we decided that our 
mission would include improving the recruitment of Latina/o 
students and their retention and academic performance once they 
enrolled at WCL.  We also determined that an effective support 
network would be made stronger by the presence of Latina/o 
faculty, so we decided to include recruitment of Latina/o         
professors into our mission. 
Our guiding principle to help Latino/a law students at WCL 
was memorialized in the organization’s mission statement: 
The Latina/o Alumni Association of the Washington 
College of Law (WCL) seeks to improve the        
academic performance of Latina/o students, 
strengthen and enhance recruitment and retention of 
Latina/o law students and faculty, and advocate for 
policies to achieve these goals at WCL.  The Alumni 
Association also seeks to establish and maintain a 
sense of community and strong network for students 
and alumni. 
PUTTING THOUGHTS INTO ACTION: THE CREATION
OF THE LATINA/O ALUMNI ASSOCIATION OF THE
WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
























































Having decided on our mission, we began discussing what 
would be the best mechanism for us to share our experiences 
and best practices with the incoming students.  Initially, we 
talked about a summer program over the course of several 
weeks, a pre-law school boot camp, modeled on programs at UC 
Davis' King Hall Outreach Program, Charles Hamilton Houston 
Law School Preparatory Institute, the Sutherland Scholars       
training program administered by Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 
LLP in Atlanta, and Council on Legal Education Opportunity's 
College Scholars Program.  Those programs were all intended to 
help improve the academic performance of minority students in 
law school, were at least six weeks long, and included intensive 
legal writing and exam taking preparation. 
Although we liked the comprehensive nature of these        
programs, it soon became clear that they presented some real 
obstacles.  For example, we would need to provide room and 
board for most of the students coming to Washington D.C.  The 
program might limit students' ability to earn much needed       
income in preparation for law school.  Having a comprehensive 
program also ran the risk of burning students out before they 
even began their law school careers.  Furthermore, LAAW was 
concerned about possible overlap with existing WCL programs 
that provided incoming students with workshops on legal       
writing and analysis, such as the "Legal Analysis Study Group."  
Taking these realities into account, as well as the limited time 
availability of alumni, we decided in April 2006 that our best 
option would be to offer the students a one-day prep course that 
would focus strictly on providing practical advice.  We titled the 
prep, "What I Wish I Would Have Known." 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
In addition to developing our mission statement and        
selecting the format for our introduction to incoming students, 
the association wrestled with the decision of whether to establish 
itself as non-profit 501(c)(3) association, versus a sub-division 
of WCL.  At first, the idea of a non-profit organization affiliated 
with WCL had a lot of appeal; primarily, because it seemed to 
provide the most autonomy in developing what we considered to 
be a non-traditional alumni association. Consequently, we        
contacted the Black Alumni Association of WCL, which we 
learned was established as and remains a 501(c)(3), that mainly 
provides scholarships to black students at WCL.  Jackie Jackson, 
the association's treasurer, provided some useful context as to 
their establishment and current activities, and provided us with a 
copy of their bylaws. 
In February 2006, LAAW met with Trishana Bowden, 
Associate Dean of Development and Alumni Relations at WCL, 
to discuss the establishment of the association and potential  
affiliation with WCL.  At the meeting, Trishana made clear that 
WCL was very excited about the establishment of the            
association and committed to supporting our mission.  WCL 
also made clear their preference that the association exist within 
the structure of the law school.  To our surprise, the law school, 
currently, does not have an umbrella alumni association.  WCL 
also expressed concern that as an independent organization, 
there could be a lack of coordination in fundraising efforts      
undertaken by LAAW and WCL.  As a way to better assess how 
a potential affiliation with WCL might work in practice, WCL 
offered to support LAAW's efforts to put on a prep course for 
incoming students in the fall.  The prep course was scheduled 
for August 16, 2006, and WCL suggested that we view this as a 
trial run for a possible partnership.  The idea seemed reasonable 
to the alumni, and we agreed to proceed according to WCL's 
suggestion. 
In August, WCL proved to be true to their word, providing 
not only classroom space and other logistical support for the 
prep course, but also agreeing to provide lunch for the students.  
In addition, prior to the prep course, WCL distributed LAAW's 
invitation to all incoming Latina/o students.  As a result of our 
collaboration, the prep course was a great success, with twenty-
eight incoming Latina/o 1Ls attending.  During the prep course, 
alumni provided students with information about test taking 
skills, speaking with professors, dealing with family                
responsibilities, adjusting to life in Washington, D.C., and       
setting priorities.  In addition, Professor Tony Varona, one of 
three Latino professors at WCL, provided the students with   
invaluable information about professor's expectations and      
participated in a mock professor-student dialogue.  After the 
event, students filled out a survey of the prep course in which 
they unanimously praised the LAAW's effort and indicated that 
it was extremely useful. 
By January 2007, although we had avoided discussion of a 
governing structure, the decision could not be put off any 
longer.  As a practical matter, we needed to have a formal        
decision-making body and people to identify as representatives 
of the association for purposes of communicating with WCL, 
students, and the general public.  Since in practice we had        
operated as an executive committee, consisting mostly of a core 
group of six alumni, we settled on an Executive Committee 
model.  Via email, LAAW asked for volunteers to participate in 
the Committee and received responses from Maryam Ahranjani 
(2000), Manuel Garcia (2000), Eric Garduno, Juan Henao 
(2005), and Carlos Quintana (2000).  One of the first items on 
the Committee agenda was to make a final decision on whether 
to affiliate within the structure of WCL or establish itself as a 
nonprofit.  On January 12, 2007, the Executive Committee voted 
unanimously to affiliate with WCL.  Based on the support     
provided by WCL in preparing the prep course, the decision to 
affiliate within the law school now seemed to be the obvious 
choice.   Further, the experience made clear the advantage of 
having built-in access to WCL's facilities, communication net-
work, and staff, among other valuable resources. 
THE INTRODUCTION
With the affiliation decision behind us, it was now time to 
plan a party as a means of celebrating the new partnership      














































between WCL and its Latina/o alumni, as well as provide a tool 
to recruit new alumni members.  The big event was scheduled to 
take place on April 12, 2007, at PepsiCo, Inc., a space secured 
by one of our members, Omar Vargas. 
In the meantime, on March 6, 2007, at WCL's 10th Annual 
Hispanic Law Conference, LAAW formally announced its    
establishment.  It was an especially proud moment for the     
association because it had recruited Professor Margaret Montoya 
to be the keynote speaker at the Conference. Professor Montoya, 
who is currently a professor at the University of New Mexico 
School Of Law, and has the distinction of being the first Latina 
admitted to Harvard Law School, had been a supporter of the 
association since we began discussing its creation.  During her 
presentation, she reminded us of why we consider her a great 
inspiration.  She praised our efforts to establish the association.  
However, Professor Montoya also challenged the legal         
community to do more to improve diversity in the legal          
profession and to incorporate discussions of race, ethnicity,  
gender, and language into law school curriculums. 
THE FUTURE
Looking ahead, LAAW is committed to becoming an            
integral part of WCL, including becoming an active participant 
in student and faculty recruitment processes and all aspects of 
alumni relations. LAAW will also continue to provide           
programmatic support for incoming and current Latina/o       
students by institutionalizing its prep course as an annual event 
in the fall, along with a spring follow-up.  In addition, LAAW 
will collaborate with WCL in developing programs and              
activities for 2 and 3Ls, focusing on providing advice about the 
bar exam, networking, and career opportunities. 
Furthermore, LAAW will soon begin fundraising efforts to 
provide book scholarships to incoming Latina/o 1Ls.  Finally, 
LAAW will work with local Washington, D.C. organizations, 
including the Hispanic Bar of D.C., to encourage and facilitate 
opportunities for WCL Latina/o alumni and students to volun-
teer their time and skills to assisting underserved members of 
the Latino community.  Activities like these will allow students 
and alumni the opportunity to give back to those that may be 
awaiting their turn in the pipeline to successful legal careers. 
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ALL IN A DAY’S WORK: ADVOCATING THE EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS OF DAY LABORERS
By Liza Zamd *  
In December 2005, House Bill H.R. 4437 brought the      immigration debate to the forefront of national politics.1  In homes and in public forums across the country, people 
debated the advisability of allowing an estimated 12 million 
undocumented immigrants the right to obtain legal status.        
Further complicating the issue, advocates highlighted human 
rights and homeland security problems resulting from millions 
of people living outside health, educational, and law                
enforcement  systems.2
          In the spring and summer of 2007, Congress came its 
closest in years to passing legislation to address a system that all 
sides agree is currently non-functional.  In late June, however, 
the Senate could not foreclose a filibuster threat, and the         
immigration bill died without a vote.  With focus now on the 
impending presidential elections, immigration reform has been 
put on the proverbial back burner — but the issue continues to 
smolder.  Outside the immigration controversy, there are myriad 
legal and arguably moral problems surrounding immigrants that 
are unrelated to documentation status. 
This article deviates from the common focus on how a      
person arrives in the United States by concentrating on what 
happens to these newcomers as workers who have critical roles 
in our daily lives.4  By taking jobs in construction, restaurants, 
and agricultural work3, immigrant Latinos make up a significant 
percentage of the American workforce. Yet in immigrant      
communities in Maryland, and across the nation, wage theft  
occurs with alarming frequency.5  Furthermore, the need for 
legal advocacy in this area goes largely unmet because Legal 
Aid and other government-funded organizations are not allowed 
to represent undocumented workers in most circumstances.6
This article focuses on a piece of the immigration issue 
from the perspective of a practitioner at a non-profit that assists 
the most controversial figures in the heart of the debate — un-
documented workers.  First, I will discuss the demographic       
realities of my clients and the nature of the cases I litigate.  
Then, I will explain the legal employment issues my clients face 
and how I deal with challenges from employers who refuse to 
pay their workers.  Finally, I will detail some possible solutions 
to worker exploitation. 
I
My experience with day laborers stems from my work as a 
staff attorney at CASA of Maryland (“CASA”).7  CASA is a 
non-profit organization that provides health, education,            
employment, community organizing, and legal services to      
predominantly low-income immigrants.  I am the sole attorney 
in CASA's Baltimore office, though there are other attorneys in 
CASA's Silver Spring location. In Baltimore, the Latino        
population has increased significantly in the last ten years,     
reflecting the overall growth in the state.8  Although I strive to 
provide basic legal advice to whomever walks through the door, 
I prioritize wage and hour cases, almost to the exclusion of any 
other issue.  The general advice I give often pertains to the many 
poverty problems that confront citizens and immigrants alike: 
landlord-tenant disputes, low-level criminal issues, access to 
health care, and access to education.  Depending on other      
commitments within my job, I have between 75 to 100 (or more) 
open cases at any given time.  Outside of client contact, I have 
continuous and frequent interaction with immigrants -- speaking 
to between ten and fifty Latino (and sometimes African)        
immigrants per day.  
My clients run the gamut of low-wage temporary workers, 
and although I sometimes encounter restaurant employees, the 
bulk of my cases involve construction and house rehabilitation.  
My clients are drywall hangers, painters, framers, carpenters, 
and demolitionists.  Not surprisingly, they are predominately 
male; only about five percent of my clients are women.9  Most 
are in their twenties or thirties, though their ages range from 
eighteen to fifty-five.  The majority of my clients are Mexican, 
Salvadoran, and Honduran.  In addition, some are from other 
Latin-American countries, and even a few are native-born, non-
Latino Americans. 
Day laborers’ wage and hour cases have a common      
structure.  A worker usually comes into CASA after not having 
been paid by the employer for weeks, months, or sometimes 
even years,10 and our conversation usually begins after they have 
uttered the same six words “Mi patron no me quiere pagar.”11
For whatever reason, whether it is miscommunication, resent-
ment, or downright malicious thievery, an employer has not paid 
the day laborer after work was completed.  During client intake, 
which lasts about an hour, I try to elicit the basic factual points 
that will help inform the case against the employer.  What days 
did you work?  What was your wage?  Where did you work?  
These may seem rudimentary, almost banal questions, but often 
my clients respond with a sheepish look and tell me they don’t 
know.  It is often challenging to piece together basic facts from a 
worker who, for any number of reasons, waited some months 
before coming to see me.  With few exceptions, however, each 
client is resolute in his idea of how much he is owed even if he 
does not recall how many hours of wages went into that dollar 
amount.  
The calculation of the wages problem is complicated by the 
fact that employers often give their workers random sums of 
money at various times during the term of service.  For         
example, one client, Pablo,12 did intermittent construction over 
the course of a few months for a prominent Latino business 














































owner in the area.  Pablo was absolutely certain he was owed 
$700 and had even kept track of his hours in a notebook — a 
lawyer’s dream.  Pablo and I met with the employer, a man I 
was already frustrated with because he had failed to pay an    
additional six people in the previous weeks.  During the meeting 
it became clear that while Pablo had meticulously recorded his 
work schedule, he had neglected to note when he had received 
small partial payments that occurred at random times.  In a rare 
turn of events, the employer had actually kept written receipts of 
the wages he paid — an often-neglected requirement under      
federal law.13  Upon review, it appeared that Pablo was probably 
owed about $100, although there was some possible ambiguity 
concerning an $80 payment.  At most, Pablo should have         
received another $180 for work he performed.  The employer 
was annoyed with my initial position that Pablo was owed $700, 
but I was frustrated with the employer because his irregular   
payments caused the confusion.14
Unfortunately, the great majority of day laborers do not  
write down their hours, nor do they gather other                     
necessary information about their employer due to their fear that 
if they ask too many questions, the employer will just hire some-
one else.  This often puts me in a position of weakness when I 
call an employer, because it may be obvious that I am missing 
crucial information. 15  For this reason, it is helpful to make the 
initial employer phone call with my client sitting next to me, 
enabling me to ask my client for clarifications depending on 
how the employer responds to the unpaid wage allegations.  
Most clients have at least a cell phone number and first name of 
an employer, and calling is usually my best means to recover 
wages.16  If phone calls are not fruitful, however, I then write a 
demand letter to the employer detailing the laws that have been 
violated and my client’s potential recourses.17  If the demand 
letter fail to resolve the issue, I take the case to court if my client 
performs and provides the requisite requirements.18
II
Of the three-step process by which I interact with employers 
-- the phone calls, the demand letter, and litigation -- most of the 
amusement, frustration, and shock I experience comes from my 
phone interactions.  Sometimes, perhaps five percent of the 
time, the wage non-payment arises from a true mis-
understanding, and the employer wants to settle the matter as 
quickly as possible.  Usually, however, my client is not that for-
tunate, and the employer proffers several reasons as to why the 
worker should not be paid.  These excuses often make 
me almost laugh out loud,19 pull at my hair in frustration,20 or 
lay down the phone, stunned.21
 Although there are employers who give outlandish  
responses, some of the most popular non-payment excuses I 
encounter are the following: 
“The worker did a bad job.” 
“The worker is ‘illegal’” (i.e. is undocumented and 
not permitted to work in the United States). 
“I’ve never heard of this worker. How do you know 
he even worked for me?” 
“I haven’t been paid for the job.” 
“The worker did a bad job” is the most common complaint 
among employers, and usually they are livid that I am requesting 
wages for work that was allegedly poorly performed.  There are, 
of course, instances when a day laborer has done sub-par work, 
and even lied about his level of skill or training for a particular 
job.  The law is quite clear on the matter; unless there is a bona 
fide disagreement about wages, an employer must pay            
employees for work performed within two weeks. 22  If an              
employee is doing a poor job, then the employee should be fired.  
All workers should be supervised, and just as it would be unfair 
for a receptionist who cannot handle phone calls to be fired 
without having been paid for the work already performed, it is 
similarly unfair for a painter who leaves unsightly streaks on the 
walls to leave a 12-hour day with no money in hand. 
Recently, I had an unsatisfied subcontractor case where 
three of his employees came to CASA after waiting four months 
for their wages.  Juan, Mario, and Alex were good-humored, 
respectful men.  They felt bad for resorting to legal devices      
because they honestly believed the subcontractor would pay 
them their $6,500 wage debt, even though he had strung them 
along, week after week, promising money at future dates that 
passed without payment.  The men finally grew suspicious when 
the subcontractor stopped answering their calls, so they came to 
me almost apologetically but also desperately needing the wages 
they were owed. 
The men showed up on a Thursday, having come from work 
with plaster and paint splattered on their clothing.  Their stories 
were similar to most of my other clients.  Mario is 33 and has a 
wife and a few young children waiting for him in Honduras.  He 
moved to the States last year so that he could finance his        
children’s for his/her own books and uniforms.  Alex is 34 and 
one of the savvier workers I have met.  He demanded that his 
employer sign an itemization of the work that would be             
performed and the agreed-upon wages. Unfortunately, Alex 
never received or kept a copy of the contract, so his foresight did 
not pay off.  Finally, Juan is32 and hailed from Mexico.  Juan is 
supporting all his siblings -- and their children — with his $300 
per week average salary.  With the exception of that first day, he 
dressed up when he came to see me, even though it probably 
meant having to bring a change of clothing with him to work.  
He had a very developed sense of formality and took pride in 
doing things properly.  I believe that it was also this sense of 
propriety that made him and the other men wait so long to try to 
claim their wages through legal means. 
The employer, who turned out to be a very reasonable man, 
suggested my clients and I do a walk-through of the house so we 
could see how the work was performed.  I was mindful of the 























































giant “X” on a wall and called it a day — they were to be paid 
for whatever work they did.  I thought, however, that if I could 
meet the employer face-to-face, I would have better success at        
convincing him of the legal realities. After walking through the 
house with the men and hearing from them the different work 
that was accomplished, I could tell the employer was having a 
change of heart.  He ended up offering a settlement of 75% of 
the debt.  After some deliberation, the men agreed to the settle-
ment, provided that I promise to go out to lunch with them. 
While the unsatisfied employer situation is probably the 
most frequent, it is often coupled with the “worker is illegal” 
excuse.  This argument is a little more complicated because it is 
sometimes accompanied with threats of calling immigration, but 
it is not all that difficult to rebut.  Each employer has three days 
from the date of hire to check an employee’s work eligibility.23
Absent any mitigating fraud on the employee’s behalf, an        
employer has violated federal law by not obtaining verification 
of any employee’s ability to work.24  The significant fines for 
violating the law make it all the more remarkable that employers 
protest workers’ undocumented status, since they are basically 
admitting that they knowingly hired a person without work       
authorization. 
Given that legal status does not pertain to wage and hour 
law, I inform employers that bringing it up is pointless and that 
I do not even collect that information from my clients.  If the 
employer continues to argue, I phrase my rebuttal in these terms: 
“You violated federal law when you did not collect my client’s 
information regarding his ability to work, and you violated 
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law when you refused 
to give him his wages.  There is nothing you can do about the 
first legal violation, but you are now in a position to ameliorate 
the second.  You should 
also know that the        
Departments of Labor and 
Homeland Security have 
an agreement whereby       
Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement25 will not 
involve itself in labor        
disputes.”26 Usually,             
employers have no counter to that argument and, depending on 
the employer’s original inclination to pay, I am often able to 
collect the due wages or at least   settle for a portion of them. 
The third excuse is one of my favorites and can be disposed 
of rather quickly. Amazingly, each employer provides such a 
similar  argument that I wonder if there is a common script 
handed out for subcontractors to read whenever they are called 
with unpaid wage claims.  This is usually the gist of what I 
hear: “I don’t know [insert client's name].  How do you know he 
even worked for me? Hell, why don’t I just come into your    
office and tell you that I worked for him and he owed me for 
[insert number of days owed]!  Any guy can just walk into your 
office, claim that he has worked for me, and you’ll go represent-
ing him?  That’s ridiculous.”  In response to this argument, I 
usually have ready specific details about the worksite, the em-
ployer, the type of work performed, or other factual information 
that would be known only by someone who had performed the 
labor.27  The employer usually grumbles and may move on to 
the first or second excuses for not having paid, but sometimes 
the details are enough to induce a settlement agreement. 
Although I have never had such a case, I have often thought 
about the possibility in which a worker comes in, pretends to 
have worked at a site where his friend or family member has 
been employed, and tries to get payment by giving me a       
completely falsified story.  While it is theoretically possible for 
that to occur, CASA requires workers to perform 30 hours of 
community service for me to take their case to court -- a strong 
disincentive for people who would otherwise just be fishing for 
easy money.  Further, there is a safety net of sorts in 
that employers often do not pay people they have actually      
employed, much less some worker they legitimately never hired.  
Additionally, in the 13 months that I have been at CASA, I have 
done intakes with hundreds of clients and can usually tell quite 
easily when people are lying.28
The fourth employer excuse, “I haven’t been paid for the 
job,” is the most difficult one I deal with, even though there is 
no legal ambiguity.  Under Maryland law, every worker must be 
paid within fifteen days of performing work.29  It is therefore 
immaterial whether or not the employer received, or was denied, 
expected income.  This excuse is the most challenging because 
the employer, usually a contractor or a subcontractor, literally 
has no money to pay workers.  His revenue sources are so          
tenuous that if one job does not pay, the employer does not have 
enough capital to cover other costs, such as labor. 
There are no perfect solutions for this problem, although I 
have found that requesting a payment plan is a 
good way to    determine whether the employer, in 
good faith, wants to pay off the wage debt.  With 
my client’s permission I often settle for a lower 
amount of wages contingent on the employer        
providing between $100 and $300 per week,      
depending on the amount of money owed, in order 
to make the wage repayment less onerous.  This is 
often a successful way to avoid court, save time, 
and prevent us from trying to obtain a judgment against an em-
ployer who may be judgment-proof. 
Ultimately, irrespective of what reasons an employer gives 
for not paying a worker, I am convinced that the only relevant 
factors in whether a day laborer will be paid are the               
employer’s integrity, and the employer’s aversion to being 
sued.30  The most financially compromised employer will try 
hard to settle a wage claim if he or she fears the moral or legal 
consequences of an unpaid wage. In contrast, the most              
financially solvent employer will hang up on me without             
compunction if he or she cares little about the difficult life of a 
day laborer or is indifferent to landing in court. 
the only relevant factors     
in whether a day laborer will
be paid are the employer’s    
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Regardless of how many employers I call, write, or sue, 
there will always be some who will try different ways to take 
advantage of their workers.  At CASA, we try to implement 
three strategies to prevent or mitigate the likelihood that workers 
will be exploited.  First, we provide a brief but comprehensive 
“Know Your Rights” talk, or charla, to educate workers.        
Second, we have created worker centers where employers and 
employees meet in an organized fashion.  Third, we try to      
employ legislative fixes to common problems that plague the 
day laborer community. 
I believe that one of the more important elements of my job 
is to give “Know Your Rights” talks to the community.  I have a 
five minute workers’ rights charla and an accompanying booklet 
simply written and illustrated so that uneducated or illiterate 
workers can understand the bulk of the material.  The charla 
involves wage and hour, employment discrimination, and work-
man’s compensation laws.  Although CASA takes only wage 
cases, workman’s compensation is a huge issue among day     
laborers: Latinos are hurt and killed on the job at an alarming 
rate.31  Additionally, there is a limited window in which an       
employee can submit a discrimination claim with the Equal    
Employment Opportunity Commission, so I feel it is important 
for workers to understand that issue as well. 
The education component of my job is also critical because 
one way to assist exploited workers is to ensure they have         
sufficient level of proof to win a civil wage judgment or a  
criminal theft of services claim.  One of the best forms of 
proof is business records, which for an employee are                
contemporaneous notes that include one or more of the         
following: the days and hours worked, the address of the work-
site, and the type of work performed. This information is       
powerful evidence in court since employers often do not have 
any rebuttal records of their own, even though they are required 
by law to keep them. 
I give my worker’s right charla to every client after intake, 
in the hopes that if my clients are ever owed wages again, they 
will have a notebook of proof the next time they walk through 
the door.  The charla is an imperfect solution to a much larger 
problem.  Workers understand why the information is important 
but are often too discouraged by their plight in life to bother 
noting the information every day. After experiencing              
exploitation at work for months and years at a time, many day 
laborers have a fatalistic viewpoint and believe that even the 
best records in the world will not force employers to pay and 
therefore do not bother keeping them. 
As a practitioner interested in motivating day laborers to 
play a role in the advocacy of their rights, I am torn as to 
whether I should require information-keeping as a condition for 
taking a case to court.  Many good claims would fall by the 
wayside if CASA were to initiate that policy, but I also believe 
that some workers know they can go to CASA with little or no 
written proof of their hours.  Because of this, some workers may 
feel no incentive to keep those records.  I ultimately want        
workers to feel a sense of agency and power over their lives, 
which can be partially accomplished by keeping records.  There 
is one reason, however, that keeps me from suggesting that 
CASA implement a written-record policy: lack 
of basic education.  Many day laborers are barely able to write 
or are completely illiterate, so it would be a huge burden -- if not 
impossibility -- for them to keep track of their hours.  These 
people already feel deep shame about their illiteracy,32 and I 
would hate to create yet another barrier in their already         
difficult lives. 
The second method CASA uses to prevent exploitation of 
workers is to organize day laborers and create worker centers.  A 
worker center is a place where day laborers congregate in an 
orderly fashion so that employers can pick up employees who 
are qualified in the needed areas without the chaotic clustering 
occurring on street corners and in Home Depot parking lots 
around the country.  Currently, CASA has four centers around 
Maryland.  These centers provide workers with a safe                
environment, restrooms, and a barrier from the elements, which 
is critical during the hot summer and cold winter months.            
Additionally, employers must give their identification to CASA 
staff and list their names, addresses, and telephone numbers.  
The employers write a description of the work to be done, the 
proffered wage, and a rough approximation of the length of the 
job.  This ensures that unpaid workers are already one step 
ahead of their unorganized counterparts, for CASA has           
employer contact information in addition to proof that the      
employer hired the worker. 
Worker centers are also useful tools to organize day            
laborers; CASA’s community organizers have a captive         
audience in the mornings when workers are waiting for            
employers to come.  During these times workers are also given 
charlas about health and labor issues, so the centers provide an 
opportunity to protect workers, organize them, and educate them 
as well. It is also   important to note that worker centers have set 
wage rates, so there is no race to the bottom.  This also            
empowers workers to decide for themselves important          
employment priorities. Unfortunately, there is currently no 
worker  center in Baltimore, although we are working hard to 
open one by the end of 2007. 
Arguably, the broadest yet most difficult method for        
protecting workers is to create legislative fixes. Currently, 
CASA is determining which laws need to be strengthened or 
created to ensure that workers will be paid their owed wages.  
Two of our top legislative goals are creating laws that allow for 
joint employer liability and strengthening the criminal penalties 
for non-payment of wages. 
At present, workers are often hampered in an unpaid wage 
claim by low-level subcontractors who, as explained above, may 
not have sufficient capital to cover expenses whenever a single 
client fails to pay for services rendered.  If, however, the law 
were to impose joint liability to contractors for non-payment of 























































employer, the subcontractor, or from the larger, often more       
solvent contractors. Currently, contractors can avoid wage        
payment claims if they did not directly supervise the work of the 
unpaid day laborer.   This creates an incentive for contractors to 
shield themselves from being sued by keeping a distance      
between themselves and the work performed by                            
sub-contractors.  If there was broader joint employer liability, 
contractors would take a greater interest in the work performed 
and would have incentive to ensure that all workers are paid, 
even those hired by subcontractors. 
Enhancing criminal penalties for wage theft would also be a 
useful weapon in combating the problem.33  Currently, under 
Maryland’s Theft of Services law, non-payment of wages is a 
felony, but the law is relatively weak and narrow compared to 
other state statutes.  The Maryland Theft of Services statute 
reads:
(e) A person may not obtain the services of another that 
are available only for compensation: 
(1) by deception; or 
(2) with knowledge that the services are provided 
without the consent of the person providing 
them.34
Given that the burden of proof is higher in criminal cases, and 
that Maryland’s statute does not shift the burden of proof to  
employers, many workers are unable to overcome evidentiary 
hurdles.35  If the burden of proof shifted to employers in the  
absence of federally-required record keeping, criminal         
prosecution of wage and hour cases would undoubtedly be more 
attractive to state attorneys. 
Ultimately, all legislative fixes take a great deal of time, 
money, and effort, especially when some state legislators are 
hostile to the idea that all workers, regardless of legal status, 
should be protected by the law.  CASA’s legal and organizing 
departments are joining with other groups to help pass statutory 
improvements, but the road may be a long one. 
IV
I am often asked why I, a seemingly white, middle-class 
American, have dedicated my career to low-wage worker issues.  
Clients also often ask where I learned my Spanish because I 
have a clear accent that gives away no hint of my American 
background.  The answer is surprising for both groups, for I, 
despite my pale skin, am a first-generation American of immi-
grant Mexican parents.  My older sisters were born in Mexico 
and my family moved to California a few weeks before I was 
born.  There I was educated about the finer points of stereotypes 
and racism — not by my parents, but by my classmates and   
fellow citizens. Although there are many Latinos in San Diego, I 
witnessed significant bigotry, yet I never experienced any of it.  
In school, people bad-mouthed Latinos but would turn to me and 
say that I was exempt from their diatribe because I was 
“different,” but they could not explain how.  I learned Spanish 
before I learned English, but that made me cute and exotic, 
while darker-skinned schoolmates were weird and regarded with 
contempt for speaking another language in public. These      
experiences convinced me of the necessity of my work, and each 
eyebrow raised in surprise when I disclose that I am Latina feels 
like a small victory.  Now...if only I could convince all the day 
laborers to write down their hours.
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write or sign their names. 
33 For a comprehensive discussion on the use of theft of services laws in unpaid 
wage claims, see, Rita J. Verga, An Advocates Toolkit: Using Criminal “Theft of 
Service” Laws to Enforce Workers’ Right to be Paid, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283 
(2005). 
34 MD CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 7-104, et. seq. (1999).  
35 Additionally, former Governor Robert Ehrlich defunded Maryland’s office of 
Wage and Hour, which was charged with investigating and prosecuting unpaid 

























































“WHITE LATINO” LEADERS: A FOREGONE CONCLUSION OR
A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF LATINO SOCIETY
By Eric M. Gutierrez * 
Am I white?  My personal inquiry into race begins with a school picture of a six-year-old boy.  My dark brown hair, parted to one side, falls impishly over half-cocked 
eyebrows.  My eyes, more almond-shaped than oval, are a murky 
blue with green speckles.  
My nose, a thicker      
version of the traditional 
aquiline Roman contour, 
fades into a tiny bulbous 
tip. My smile, close-
mouthed and askance.  
My skin, white, even with 
a faded summer tan. 
 If I am white, 
whether I have claimed it 
or not, has it afforded me 
the privileges of a racial 
hierarchy skewed towards 
the dominant white culture?  Moreover, has my apparent skin 
color placed me in a leadership role in the Latino community 
based merely on society’s perception of what that race is?  Will 
that perception imply that I will turn my back on the Latino  
community that raised me, opting instead for the spoils of an 
influential white power structure? 
 In this article I consider the arguments presented by Ian 
Haney López in his essay entitled, “White Latinos”1 and analyze 
the validity of his statements on white Latino community      
leaders. I examine and challenge López’s assertions regarding 
the characterization of Latino leaders, generally; and his          
description of an emerging Latino culture identified as “Mexican 
Americans,” the “Brown Race,” and the “New Whites,”          
specifically.
 The most crucial assertion by López is that white Latino 
leaders are the most prevalent and influential in Latino society 
and that by emphasizing their whiteness as a key component of 
their identity, they facilitate the mistreatment of Latinos and  
buttress social inequality.  Although I agree with many of 
López’s assertions about white Latino leaders, I believe the 
aforementioned assertion is a mischaracterization of Latino  
leadership and neglects to consider the cultural values from 
which these leaders arise. 
WHITE LATINO LEADERS
López initiates his argument by sidestepping the contentious 
issues of what constitutes a leader and what Latino identity     
entails.  By way of hyperbole, he states that “most of those who 
see themselves as leaders of Latino communities accept or assert 
whiteness as a key component of their identity.”2  Further, he 
argues that this assertion of whiteness “facilitates the               
mistreatment of Latinos and buttresses social inequality.”3
 Conceding that race is not easily fixed or ascertained, López 
contends, “Latino leaders are often white in terms of how they 
see themselves and how they are regarded 
by others within and outside of their         
community.”4  Because the concept of race 
is a social construct, López outlines the key 
criteria for determining “whiteness,”          
including: 1) class; 2) education; 3) physical 
features; 4) accent; 5) acculturation; 6) self-
conception; and 7) social consensus.5  The 
amalgam of  racial criteria that equates a 
Latino leader with “whiteness” is made 
more insidious because the existence of 
such criteria is not dispositive: many Latino 
leaders are considered white because they 
believe themselves to be or are understood 
to be.6
 Ironically, López’s analysis of race theory in America does 
not address the historical context of Latino identity. By            
omission, he denies the preexistence of the Spanish caste system, 
its influence on the Latino community and its leaders, and how 
the racially mixed learned to thrive amid social, racial and     
cultural ambiguity. 
 The Spaniards reinforced their cultural ideals by applying a 
“white veneer” to the ancient Aztec goddess, Tonantzin, and the 
legend of the Virgin of Guadalupe.7  The fact that the Spaniards 
historically were using skin color or the minutia of sanguinity 
analysis to keep themselves at the top of the “racial food chain” 
years before the advent of slavery in America does not discredit 
López’s theory of society’s premium on “whiteness.”  It does, 
however, raise the question of whether current Latino leaders 
identify their whiteness on the majority template that López     
posits or whether they are merely acting on internal cultural 
mandates cast centuries ago. 
 Some scholars point to the plight of the multi-cultural Moors 
as the touchstone for Spain’s denigration of all non--white       
peoples: 
The fact is, racism grew out of a system that was       
established in England and parts of Europe during the 
Middle Ages, when Africans/Black Moors began to 
fall out of favor from being a highly respected and         
accomplished people, to being reduced to slavery 
after Ferdinand and Isabella retook Spain from the 
Black Moors and Arabs.8
 López never dissects the patchwork of racial criteria that he 
claims most Latino leaders emerge from, as a means of claiming 
Ironically, López’s analysis of race      
theory in America does not address       
the historical context of Latino identity.  
By omission, he denies the     
preexistence  of the Spanish caste
system, its influence on the Latino
community and its leaders, and how the 
racially mixed learned to thrive amid 
social, racial and cultural ambiguity.   














































whiteness and privilege.  He offers no analysis, for example, of 
the effects of wealth or social status in conjunction with racial 
identity (a key element of Spanish-American culture) or of the 
cultural stratification of indigenous groups that may have      
mirrored that of the Spanish or white Americans.  In short, 
López arrives at a sense of “whiteness” born out of almost no 
connection to our past and no attempt to correlate its         
prominence to the evolution of our culture 
MEXICAN-AMERICANS
After addressing the “white dilemma,” López pursues a 
deconstruction of the Mexican-American polity that historically 
attempted to integrate itself into the white mainstream and      
legitimize its place in American society.  López’s argument    
focuses on several points: 1) Mexican immigrants, after resisting 
assimilation into white American society, forge a new social 
identity (Mexican-American), galvanizing their ranks by       
claiming “quintessential” American membership; 2) Mexican-
Americans employ the “other white strategy,” and insist that 
they are racially white; 3) Mexican-Americans are polarized by 
their claims of whiteness into two distinct groups; “white” 
Mexican-Americans reap the benefits of the dominant class 
while “darker” Mexican-Americans are relegated to the lowest 
rung on the racial ladder; 4) Mexican-American community 
leaders tend to be white; and 5) Mexican-American leaders that 
claim a white identity also hold a  corollary belief that non--
citizens and non--whites are beyond the realm of social concern 
or responsibility.9
 The real evil, according to López, is not that a few          
Mexican-American leaders, regardless of their loyalty to the 
culture, claimed a white identity and exploited themselves at the 
detriment of other Mexican-Americans, but that in principle, 
“the assertion of white identity is at root an attempt to locate 
oneself at or near the top of the racial hierarchy that forms an 
intrinsic part of U.S. society.”10  López asserts that “selling out” 
adds legitimacy to the doctrine of white superiority and turns 
Mexican-Americans on each other.11
López cites the overemphasis on citizenship (tantamount to 
societal acceptance) and complicity with white supremacist 
ideas regarding black inferiority, as the invidious fallout of 
Mexican-American leaders’ continual claims of whiteness as a 
means of belonging to society’s dominant class.12 López       
categorizes this kind of behavior as a “Faustian bargain.”13
 A modern example of López’s observation of Mexican-
American leaders claiming whiteness to exploit their social 
dominance and avoid discrimination is the emergence of “white 
Latino” organizations, like the National Association for the      
Advancement of Caucasian Latinos (NAACL). NAACL          
identifies itself as an organization “dedicated to reversing the 
harmful effects of governmental and media stereotyping of     
Latinos.”14  According to their website, they “especially         
represent the interests of the at least 16,907,850 Caucasian      
Hispanics in America as measured by the 2000 Census.”15
NAACL’s website outlines the organization’s rationale: 
Hispanics are not a racial group.  The word Hispanic 
refers to national origin.  Hispanics can be of any 
race.  Many millions of Hispanic Americans are      
descended from Spain and other European countries.  
Like their ancestors, these Hispanics are white. 
The common surnames and language of Hispanics do 
not make them “all the same” any more than the      
Anglo last names of Bill Clinton and Jesse Jackson, 
make them members of the same race, ethnicity, or 
socioeconomic class.16
The NAACL website further delineates the group’s political 
agenda and voices its dissatisfaction with Latino community 
leaders:
The NAACL fills a void left empty by other 
“Hispanic” organizations and leadership who, despite 
their pretenses, do not and never have represented our 
interest. Our rights have not been advanced by our 
journey from the white-majority to the “Hispanic-
minority.” To the contrary, the polarization created 
by the “black, white, or Hispanic” myth has        
sabotaged our assimilation into mainstream socio-
economic prosperity.17
 López’s point regarding the ineffectual legal strategy       
Mexican-Americans employed to have themselves declared  
legally white is well-taken, but its true effect on the Latino     
experience or Latino leadership is never explored.18  In fact, 
some scholars suggest that although Mexican- Americans were 
considered legally white, they were socially non--white; thus, 
the law made little difference because it established only empty 
formal categories filled in by discriminatory practice.19
THE BROWN RACE
After López’s next argument focuses on the rise and 
fall of the Chicano Movement and its emphasis on challenging 
the notion of a white Latino identity and replacing it with a new 
“brown identity.”20  As López observes, during the Chicano 
movement, broad sectors of the Mexican community came to 
accept and assert the idea that they were proud members of a 
brown race.  In the intervening years, this [movement] waned, 
[and] today members of the [Latino] community in the United 
States are evenly split, with roughly half claiming they are 
white, and the other half insisting otherwise.21
López arrives at a sense of “whiteness”      
born out of almost no connection to our past 
and no attempt to correlate its prominence to 























































 The downfall of the Chicano Movement, according to 
López, was the tendency to define brown identity in terms of 
nineteenth-century ideas that tied race to ancestry, culture, group 
destiny, and patriarchal gender roles.22  In addition, Chicano 
Movement leaders struggled with how to reconcile its Marxist 
ideological undercurrents at a time when socialism was seen as 
an aberration.   
 Some scholars even argue that characterizing the Chicano 
Movement as problematic, as López implies, does nothing but 
denigrate its cultural and social importance to the Latino      
struggle: 
 By misrepresenting the multiple ideologies that informed 
the Chicano movement as a single current of reactionary cultural 
nationalism or “identity politics” riddled by sexism, internal 
dissension, “anti-Americanism,” and even “reverse racism,” 
revisionist historians (some of Mexican-American descent) have 
deprived future generations of a complete portrayal of Chicano/a 
activism in one of the more revolutionary periods in American 
history.  The reality of the movimiento between the crucial years 
of 1965 and 1975 was one of great intellectual ferment in which 
competing political agendas vied for the attention of ethnic 
Mexican youth.23
Contrary to López’s characterization of the Chicano       
Movement’s defining brown identity in terms of anachronistic 
“patriarchal gender roles,” some scholars have viewed the     
ideology as carving the way for a new form of women’s libera-
tion: Chicana feminism.24  Faced with the difficult task of nego-
tiating these various ideological    
currents and  challenging traditional 
patriarchal structures, an emergent 
Chicana feminism incorporated 
analysis of political economy, impe-
rialism, and class relations as they 
related to issues of gender and race.25
Throughout the late 1960s and early 
1970s,  Chicana feminists developed 
sophisticated critiques of sexism and patriarchy, often linking 
their agendas to those of women in other countries.26
 One criticism of López’s “brown race” analysis is that it 
relies too heavily on his reading of assimilationist strategies 
used by middle-class associations from the 1940s and 1950s.  
López’s analysis also ignores the impact of labor history from 
the 1880s through the 1950s, fueled by Mexico’s national       
imagery of the indigenous/mestizo identity, and not the white 
Spaniard.27  López assumes that Latino claims to whiteness were 
some sort of cruel Hobson’s choice or worse, a form of cultural 
ennui; when in fact they may have been a sign of the group’s 
coming to terms with the American legal landscape: 
 The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) 
has been the primary organization employed by historians, 
Mario García (1989) in particular, to portray the acceptance of 
assimilationist and integrationist agendas within the Mexican-
American community. However, as a middle-class organization, 
LULAC has represented the political and economic interests of a 
very thin slice of the Mexican-American population…. [f]aced 
with two racial choices (and all the legal, political, and              
economic consequences attached to each), to interpret the claim 
of being “white” rather than “black” in a courtroom is not     
evidence that a local community of Mexican-Americans thought 
of themselves as white but rather that they understood how the 
system worked.28
THE NEW WHITES
In López’s final section, “The New Whites,” he echoes the 
sentiments of popular, African-American comedian Chris 
Rock’s musing on the premium society places on being white: 
There ain’t no white man in this room that will 
change places with me --- and I’m rich. That’s how 
good it is to be white.  There’s a one-legged      
busboy in here right now that’s going: “I don’t 
want to change.  I’m gonna ride this white thing 
out and see where it takes me.”29
         López paints an idyllic picture for the “growing numbers 
of minority individuals — those with fair skin, wealth, political 
connections, or high athletic, artistic, or professional                
accomplishments — [that] can virtually achieve a white         
identity”; while whole populations of people categorized as non-
white “remain beyond the care of the rest, impoverished and 
incarcerated, disdained and despised, feared and forsaken.”30
According to López, “the closer one comes to  being white, the 
less susceptible one is to the gross mistreatment and disregard 
accorded minorities, and the more 
access one has to the material      
rewards and positive presumptions 
reserved for our nation’s racial 
elite.”31 “As a result,” he writes, 
“two-thirds of all recent immigrants 
— the vast majority of them from 
Asia and Latin America — identify 
themselves as white.”32  Half of the 
Latino population does the same.33 Claiming to be white 
achieves measurable advantages for some individuals and com-
munities, but these advantages come at a steep price for others.34
 López’s answer to this cultural polemic is for Latinos to 
claim a “non--white identity as a means of fostering political 
opposition to racial status inequality…. [and] not pine for the 
privileges of whiteness, but [  ] embrace a political commitment 
to end racial hierarchy.”35
 The difficulty with López’s normative statement is not that 
it lacks vision, but that it lacks concrete instructions on how to 
achieve it.  For example, how can a Latino, light or dark 
skinned, subvert the majority’s premium placed on white       
identity?  How feasible is it to assume that by eschewing a white 
identity, Latinos will necessarily embrace a political                
commitment to end racial hierarchy?  Finally, how reasonable is 
it to think that by simply cutting out race considerations            
altogether, Latinos will be able to forge a new identity as “non-
whites” in a racially polarized society? 
The difficulty with López’s          
normative statement is not that it 
lacks vision, but that it lacks
concrete instructions on how to 
achieve it.















































It is no secret that the Latino culture, like most cultures born 
out of a mixture of races, ethnicities, classes, and social          
identities, has struggled with the predominance of a “white” 
hierarchy and the degrada-
tion of an oppressed in-
digenous heritage.  This 
scenario has played itself 
multiple times in nearly 
every Latin-American 
country and still resonates 
in the modern struggles of 
indigenous peoples around 
the world. 
 The attempt by certain 
Latino leaders to use this cultural paradigm to their advantage is 
not a new phenomenon nor is it particularly American.  Many of 
the ruling families of Mexico are descendants from white      
Spaniards, and their lineage is not happenstance; it is the result 
of strict adherence to intermarriage with other whites, and the 
promulgation of a “white superiority” complex etched out           
centuries ago when the Spaniards conquered the Aztecs. 
 López’s assertion, that the preeminence of white Latino 
leaders facilitates the mistreatment of Latinos and buttresses 
social inequality, may be the consequence of social rigging, but 
it overlooks a key cultural mandate handed down from            
generation to generation: the primary importance of family      
loyalty and the welfare of the collective community. I maintain 
that it is this value, the foundation of 
Latino society in the United States, 
which takes precedence over any 
individual gain that might be had at 
the expense of the community. 
Whether future Latino leaders can 
make that cultural connection or 
assert their leadership without        
necessarily oppressing other         
community members as “white     
Latinos” is yet to be seen. 
We are a product of our past — but our future is still at 
hand.  As the Latino community increases in numbers and politi-
cal power, its leaders will continue to face difficult struggles 
such as the temptation to use that power for self-
aggrandizement.  Perhaps the demise of the white Latino leader 
can come only at the restructuring of a social power base that 
makes room for all Latinos, white or otherwise. 
We are a product of our past — but our   
  future is still at hand.  As the Latino
community increases in numbers and          
political power, its leaders will continue      
to face difficult struggles such as
the temptation to use that power for
self-aggrandizement.
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By Parker Theoni* 
The prevailing view on marriage is premised on a binary conceptualization of the sexual characteristics of the two adults involved.  This approach is typified by the 
Defense of Marriage Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996, 
which limits marriage to the legal union of one man and one 
woman for the purposes of federal law.1  Considering the        
medical facts about this topic, however, it becomes apparent that 
there are a plethora of scenarios where two consenting adults 
who wish to be married do not fit into the categorically binary 
definition of marriage between a man and a woman.2  Just as in 
the 2004 case Deane v. Conaway, where nine same-sex couples 
and a man whose partner had recently passed away un-
successfully challenged a Maryland law which denied same-sex 
couples the right to marry,3 transsexual or transgendered        
individuals could take issue with being precluded from marriage 
on the basis of sex. The scarcity of these challenges most likely 
stems from the unfortunate consequences of a history of social 
and official discrimination and isolation severe enough to keep 
citizens from coming out of the woodwork.4 This article analyzes 
the Maryland Family Law’s restriction on the marriage rights to 
transgendered individuals. 
SEX AND GENDER
For the purposes of this article, the term “transgender” 
means having personal characteristics that transcend traditional 
gender boundaries and 
corresponding sexual 
norms.5 The traditional 
binary model of sex and  
gender, emerging from 
the Middle Ages, shoe-
horns individuals into the 
categorical role of “male” 
or “female.” During those 
early times, intersex        
individuals were forced to 
choose one of the two 
established gender roles, with the penalties for transgression  
being as serious as death.6
Medical experts today recognize that many factors                
contribute to the determination of an individual’s sex, including 
the presence of sexual organs, facial and chest hair or breasts, 
“sexual identity (one’s own sense of one’s sexual identity),          
gender identity (the gender society would attribute to an           
individual), and gender role (the extent to which one chooses to 
live in one’s self-identified sex).”7  While most individuals do 
not find any inconsistencies between these factors in their          
identification as a male or female, there is some ambiguity       
between these factors for transgendered individuals and others.8
The relationship between sex and gender is thus not always a 
binary concept limited to all male or all female.9  Neither are the 
terms “sex” and “gender” always synonymous; “sex” refers to 
one’s anatomy and biological function in reproduction whereas 
“‘gender’ refers to psychosexual individuality or identity.”10
NON-CONGRUENT SEX CHARACTERISTICS
The initial development of a fetus is asexual, followed by 
the formation of rudimentary sexual organs based on the pres-
ence or absence of a Y chromosome.11  When the sexual devel-
opment of the fetus is changed or interrupted, people are born 
with sexual features that are either ambiguous (inconsistent with 
either “male” or “female” characteristics) or incongruent 
(inconsistent with their assigned sex).12  Doctors in the past com-
monly believed that a person was psychosexually neutral at birth 
and that the development after birth was dependent on the ap-
pearance of the person’s genitals.13  The medical community no 
longer accepts this view, and many researchers believe that a 
person’s brain differentiates in utero to one gender or the other.14
This offers a “biological explanation for transsexualism - the 
brain has differentiated to one sex while the body has differenti-
ated to another.”15
At ages as young as three or four years old, many            
transsexual individuals may begin to believe they have grown up 
with the wrong genitalia and 
proceed to rebel against the 
social order imposed upon 
them, refusing to wear 
“appropriate” clothes or      
participate in activities        
associated with their gen-
der.16  Even so, “the official 
designation of a person as 
male or female usually        
occurs at or immediately 
after birth, and is  often based 
on the appearance of the  external genitalia.”17
        Transgendered individuals who wish to bring their sex 
characteristics into alignment with either the male or female 
categories have limited options. These include psychotherapy, 
living as a person of the assigned sex, hormonal treatment, and 
sex reassignment surgery.18  “Estimates of the number of inter-
sexed individuals vary considerably, from 1 per 37,000 people to 
as high as 1 per 2,000 people.”19
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s inconsistent or 
ambiguous sex characteristics, and regardless of the treatment 
they may undergo, a transgendered individual may one day wish 
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s              
inconsistent or ambiguous sex characteristics, 
and regardless of the treatment they may undergo, 
a transgendered individual may one day wish to 
make a lifelong commitment to another
consenting adult and  enter into the union of
marriage with that adult.
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to make a lifelong commitment to another consenting adult and 
enter into the union of marriage with that adult.  Although the 
Maryland Family Law currently burdens, arguably to the point 
of preclusion, transgendered individuals’ marriage rights, legal 
discrimination based on sex is forbidden by Maryland’s state 
constitution.20
FAMILY LAW AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN MARYLAND
 While states have approached marriage issues in a variety of 
ways, from banning same-sex marriages by constitutional 
amendment to finding prohibitions on same-sex marriage to 
violate a number of constitutional provisions, the best analysis 
of transgender marriage rights in Maryland rests on the            
application of the state’s Equal Rights Amendment (hereinafter 
“ERA”).  By avoiding the issue of fundamental due process 
rights to marriage and privacy,21 and by avoiding application of 
the rational basis standard of review, courts in Maryland leave 
the decision to usurp the ERA to the people through a           
constitutional amendment.  Such actions have failed to pass 
through the legislative branch.22
 The ERA, passed by the legislature and ratified by voters in 
1972, became Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
and states that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be 
abridged or denied because of sex.”23  The historical denial of 
equal rights for women preceding the ERA reveals the basic 
principle of the ERA; sex is 
not a permissible factor in 
determining legal rights.24
The ERA recognized that 
preserving the status quo 
could mean stigmatizing a 
class of people based on 
mistaken reliance on        
internalized stereotypes 
rather than on medical facts.25 Maryland’s ERA may have      
mistakenly internalized the binary notion that sex is limited to 
“male” and “female.”26  But without a doubt, the concept of sex 
incorporates, if not turns on, gender identity.27
 Under the ERA, sex- and gender-based classifications are 
considered suspect, subject to strict scrutiny.28  The Maryland 
Court of Appeals initially interpreted the language of Article 46 
as clear and unambiguous.29  Since that point, the court has 
stated, “because of [Article 46], classifications based on gender 
are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.”30  While this standard 
“flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, absent substantial 
justification,”31 the court has clarified that the ERA forbids the 
determination of rights solely on the basis of one’s sex.32
 Maryland Family Law § 2-201, however, states that “[o]nly 
a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.”33
To the extent that § 2-201 is intended to benefit men and 
women, and in effect primarily benefits only men and women, it 
imposes some additional burden, inconvenience and expense to 
transgendered individuals by forcing them to “pass” as a man or 
a woman in order to reap the benefits of marriage.  The ERA, 
however, mandates that transgendered individuals be granted the 
right to marry a consenting individual of their choice because 
classifications based on sex are considered suspect and thus  
subject to strict scrutiny, and because § 2-201 is a sex-based 
classification on its face.  Section 2-201 is a sex-based           
classification on its face because it grants different rights to men 
and women, and it burdens the marriage rights of transgendered 
individuals. In addition, laws precluding transgendered         
individuals from marrying a consenting adult are not narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.  Just as a 
statute that benefits males at the expense of everyone else     
violates the ERA, a statute that benefits males and females at the 
expense of everyone else violates the ERA. 
 The government may make a gender-based classification 
only when it can show that the classification is narrowly tailored 
to achieve compelling state goals.34  Whenever a law refers to an 
individual’s gender on its face, the state must have a compelling 
reason for doing so; the theory of “equal application” has been 
rejected in Maryland.35  Application of the strict scrutiny      
standard of review inevitably leads to the conclusion that trans-
gendered individuals are eligible to enjoy the same benefits of 
marriage as all other individuals in Maryland. 
REJECTION OF THE “EQUAL APPLICATION” THEORY
 Even though both men and women have the right to marry 
someone of the opposite sex, § 2-
201 is a sex-based classification 
because Maryland has rejected the 
“equal application” theory as     
unpersuasive. Article 24, the due 
process clause of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights,36 does not 
contain an express equal protection 
clause, but Maryland courts have 
long recognized that the due process clause implicitly guaran-
tees equal protection similar to the equal  protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution in both 
manner and  extent.37
 Because it could not realistically be contended that the peo-
ple, in adding the ERA, intended to repeat what was already 
contained in Article 24, Maryland courts have interpreted Arti-
cle 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as developing one 
of those differences: “segregation based upon sex, absent sub-
stantial justification, violates the [ERA], just as segregation 
based upon race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”38  The 
divergence here from the federal notion of equal protection is 
the treatment of sex as a suspect class, not the manner in which 
equal protection is applied to a suspect class.39  Thus, Mary-
land’s strict scrutiny standard likely incorporates federal stan-
dards that rejected the “equal application” and “separate but 
equal” theories with respect to suspect classes.40  Indeed, the 
rejection of the “separate but equal” theory, limiting the term 
“marriage” to a relationship between a man and a woman, would 
be a sex-based classification.   
Application of the strict scrutiny standard      
of review inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that transgendered individuals are eligible      
to enjoy the same benefits of marriage
as all other individuals in Maryland. 
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 Even if Maryland accepted the theories of “equal             
application” and “separate but equal,” limiting the definition of 
sex to the binary categories of “all male” and “all female,” the 
resulting scheme would inherently exclude people from          
marriage on the basis of sex.  As race is more than just black or 
white, so is sex more than just male or female.  The “equal        
application”  argument that all individuals are free to marry 
someone of the “opposite sex,”41 is just as faulty and non-
sensical as an argument that all individuals are free to marry 
someone of the “opposite race.”  To avoid a discriminatory      
classification, the word “opposite” must be replaced with the 
word “any.”   
By assuming that all people are either purely male or purely 
female, proponents of the equal       
application theory attempt to force a 
square peg into a round hole. Just as a 
law defining  marriage as only between 
two white people would  burden some 
white people (those wishing to marry 
someone non-white) and all non-white 
people, a law defining marriage as only between a man and a 
woman burdens some men and women, and all trans-gendered 
individuals who do not fit those categories.  Thus, even if the 
equal application theory were accepted, it does not apply.  
A SUSPECT CLASS OF TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS
 Those who fall outside the male/female dichotomy and are 
therefore left without marriage rights should be considered a 
suspect class.42 Under Maryland equal protection, a “suspect 
class is a category of people who have experienced a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique      
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly 
indicative of their abilities.”43  The long history of purposeful 
unequal treatment of transgendered people is unquestionable.44
Transgendered individuals are thus a suspect class, and the 
Maryland Family Law should be reviewed under strict scrutiny 
instead of rational basis review.45  Because § 2-201 makes a 
gender-based classification on its face, it must be narrowly      
tailored to achieve compelling state interests.46
 There are no compelling government interests furthered by 
narrowly tailored means when marriage is limited as between a 
man and a woman.  Thus, the best way to define marriage is 
between two individuals, rather than conditioning marriage 
rights on any sexual characteristics. 
 Though the government in Deane failed to assert a            
compelling interest in restricting marriage rights on the basis of 
sex, the true legislative intent of § 2-201 of prohibiting same-sex 
marriages can easily be derived from the face of the statute.47
Any attempt to justify this government interest as compelling 
should fail, and a marriage statute that defines marriage on the 
basis of sex is not narrowly tailored to meet any government 
interest that is valid under the ERA.  In Deane, the government 
asserted an interest in promoting traditional family units and 
preserving traditional societal values.48
 Promoting a traditional family unit that encourages         
procreation is neither compelling nor narrowly tailored because 
it is based on the presumption that 
people who do not fit into the 
traditional binary sex system, 
even to the extent that only their 
sexual orientation differs, are not 
similarly situated to those who do 
so with respect to raising a child.  
However, the ERA does not allow the presumption that a man or 
a woman is better suited to raise a child of a certain sex, so it 
likewise bars the presumption that a man or a woman is better 
suited to raise any child.49  Therefore, ERA also bars the            
presumption that a male-female couple is better suited to raise a 
child than any other  ouple, without respect to sex. 
 To the extent that procreation is argued to be natural, such 
an argument is based on internalized stereotypes that fail to  
recognize that individuals are born with sex characteristics that 
do not fit the binary mold.50  Regardless, §2-201 is not narrowly 
tailored to meet that goal because it does not claim to invalidate 
marriages because the couple cannot or has not chosen to      
procreate.
 Any argument that these conclusions are counter to societal 
values and tradition is misplaced.  The traditional notion of  
marriage is a thorn in the foot of Maryland’s overarching tradi-
tions of tolerance and protection of minorities.  One instance in 
which the state may permissibly grant benefits on the basis of 
sex arises where women seek remedies to past wrongs.  Such        
remedies are similar to those allowed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in instances of racial classifications.51  The long 
denial of equal rights to women that prompted the ERA has  
indeed applied to women’s marriage rights, and those inequities 
have since been equalized.52  For example, there may very well 
be compelling government interests in providing women with a 
remedy for past discrimination from male sports.53  Of course, if 
the classification included anyone other than women, and lasted 
longer than necessary to remedy the past wrongs, it would not 
be narrowly tailored to the class of individuals discriminated.      
Even if the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage were a 
compelling interest, marriage, as defined between a man and a 
woman, is not narrowly tailored because it is under-inclusive 
and over-inclusive.  Maryland’s marriage statute does not pass 
muster in limiting marriage rights to men and women because 
Maryland’s marriage statute does not       
pass muster in limiting marriage rights
to men and women because the means by 
which  people are identified as men or 
women are not made clear enough to be
considered narrowly tailored. 
As race is more than just black 
or white, so is sex more than  
just male or female.
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the means by which people are identified as men or women are 
not made clear enough to be considered narrowly tailored.  
While § 2-201 uses the words “man” and “woman,” it fails to 
offer a definition of either.  Section 2-201 does not require any 
showing of sex.  Section 2-402 of the Maryland Family Law 
requires details such as name, address, prior relationship, social 
security number, and age, leaving it to the clerk to withhold  
licenses if he or she feels that there may be legal reasons why 
applicants for a marriage license should not be married under 
the Maryland Family Law.54  By granting marriage rights to 
“men” and to “women” without offering a sufficient mechanism 
with which to define a “man” or a “woman,” § 2-201 at least 
burdens, and potentially precludes, transgendered individuals 
from getting married because of their gender identity              
differences, and more specifically, because of sex.55
 The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that           
individuals must be allowed to change their birth certificates to 
reflect their sex identity; however, it first required evidence of a 
“permanent and irreversible change” from male to female.56
The court in In re Heilig required a showing based on medical 
facts, but carefully avoided concluding that surgery would be 
the only permissible medical fact.57  Requiring any showing of 
sex, sex change or congruency between sex and gender            
characteristics as a condition to marriage, shows that any 
mechanism by which an individual’s sex is defined for the         
purposes of marriage, is overbroad. 
 The court in In re Heilig
found that a change in sex de-
noted on an individual’s birth 
certificate was permissible, but it 
left open the question of what 
would need to be shown to estab-
lish such a change and whether 
this change on the birth certificate 
would mean a change in sex for 
the purposes of marriage.  The 
methods used to determine some-
one’s sex for the purposes of marriage are presently unclear, but 
presumably  either the sex on a person’s birth certificate at birth, 
or as amended, or in a driver’s license, would be determinative.   
 Therefore, the first question regarding the determination of 
an individual’s sex for the purposes of marriage is whether         
individuals are defined as a man or a woman based on the sex 
denoted on their original birth certificates, or whether            
individuals may change their sex for the purpose of marriage.  
The second question then is what criteria should be used if an 
individual’s sex may be changed for the purposes of marriage.  
If the determination of sex does not hinge on sex as recorded at 
birth, the method of determination of sex cannot simply lead to 
the categories of male and female.   
 Marriage defined as between a man and a woman does not 
pass muster under the ERA because the relevant characteristic - 
gender identity - may be male, female, or neither, without      
respect to the physical characteristics of an individual.  Reliance 
on the original birth certificate, or the genitals an individual has 
at birth, is not narrowly tailored because it focuses on mutable 
characteristics.58  Requiring a medical showing of sex change is 
not narrowly tailored because it burdens transgendered           
individuals more than others on the basis of sex by requiring a 
showing based on genitals at birth; an individual’s gender does 
not change with medical procedures.59   
 If the government does not recognize a change in sex, then 
it relies on the sex assigned at birth, which is most commonly 
based solely on the appearance of the external genitalia.  By 
failing to recognize a change in gender, the government         
implicitly allows an individual who, for example, was born with 
male sex characteristics that have since been changed to female 
sex characteristics, to marry a woman.  However, it does not 
allow an individual who was born with female sex                
characteristics, which have since been changed to male sex     
characteristics, to marry a woman.  Therefore, physical sex        
characteristics are not relevant to marriage between a man and a 
woman to the extent that the genitals with which an individual is 
born define sex. 
 If the government does recognize a change in sex, then it 
allows a person born with male sex characteristics that have 
since been changed to female sex characteristics to marry a 
woman upon a showing that such a change has in fact occurred.  
However, that change must occur prior to the marriage.  A     
person born with male sex characteristics could marry a woman, 
and after the marriage, transi-
tion to female sex  characteris-
tics.  Because the individual’s 
sex is not changed except upon 
a showing to a court, the       
marriage remains valid.  If a 
showing is not required after 
marriage, it cannot be required 
prior to marriage.  Therefore, 
whether a change in sex is 
allowed or not, two individuals 
with the same sex characteristics may end up together in       
marriage if the government considers sex characteristics to be 
mutable and not locked at birth.   
 For the purposes of limiting marriage as between a man and 
a woman, an individual’s sex must be defined by gender iden-
tity.  However, the government does not require a showing that 
two individuals getting married have one partner who identifies 
as a male and one who identifies as a female.60
 Requiring congruency between a person’s sex and gender 
characteristics lacks narrow tailoring as well.  The presence or 
absence of surgery or hormonal treatment cannot be the basis 
upon which the decision is made, because not only is gender an 
immutable characteristic, but furthermore the cost-prohibitive 
nature of surgery conditions marriage rights on the ability to pay 
for a medical procedure.  Indeed, requiring congruency is not a 
narrowly tailored test because it is easily evaded by delaying 
any medical procedures.61 If consistency is to be required, then 
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently  
held that  individuals must be allowed to 
change their birth certificates to reflect      
their sex identity; however, it first required        
evidence  of a “permanent and irreversible 
change” from male to female. 
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everyone must bear the same burden of proof, and the             
government must require from 
everyone a showing that their 
gender identity is consistent 
with their physical sex                  
characteristics.  This places the 
focus on the irreversible       
gender identity rather than the 
changeable physical sex      
characteristics. Requiring a 
showing of sex prior to mar-
riage based on genitals at birth is not narrowly tailored.   
The government lacks a narrowly tailored definition of  
marriage by defining it as between a man and a woman, even as 
defined by gender identity alone, because it is inherently either 
under-inclusive or over-inclusive.  Because defining a person’s 
sex focuses on gender identity, and because individuals can have 
ambiguous gender identities,62 the scope of marriage rights must 
be expanded to include those people.  However, when marriage 
is recognized as between a man and a woman, it becomes clear 
that accommodation of those individuals provides them with a 
pool of suitable spouses that grants them a choice of whether to 
marry a man or a woman. Because this choice may not be   lim-
ited to those individuals on the basis of sex, it must also be 
granted to individuals who identify themselves as men and 
women. Thus, marriage rights must be blind as to a person’s sex 
characteristics at birth as well as an individual’s gender identity, 
and should be defined as between two individuals, not between a 
man and a woman, in order to comply with the equal protection 
mandates of the ERA. 
Physical sex characteristics are not immutable, but gender 
identity is.  A focus on physical sex characteristics is therefore 
more easily evaded than a focus on gender identity and cannot 
be considered narrowly tailored.  Once the focus has shifted to 
the relevant characteristic, it becomes apparent that individuals 
whose identity does not fit within the binary sex categories do 
not have marriage rights at all, and individuals who were born 
with inconsistent sex characteristics are more burdened than 
those who were not, solely because they are a minority sex class. 
Requiring any showing of sex produces nonsensical results, and  
reliance on physical sex characteristics is not narrowly tailored 
either.  Because the asserted interests inherently cannot be        
furthered by narrowly tailored means, they are revealed as       
falling short of being compelling.  If a showing has not been 
required of course, Maryland has not concerned itself with two 
people of the same gender marrying one another.  The benefits 
of marriage may not fall solely on men and women, no matter 
how they are defined, because sex is more complex than simply 
“male” and “female.”  
PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE AS A LEGITIMATE BASIS ON
WHICH TO MAKE SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Maryland has recognized physical differences as legitimate 
bases on which to make sex classifications.63  During isolated 
personal interactions, physical sex characteristics are most      
noticeable in the context of one-
time contacts.  Since marriage in-
volves every day contact with a 
person, not just a one-time run in 
with the body of a person, and      
because the marriage contact is  
consensual, gender identification -  
not physical sex characteristics - 
are relevant. Physical sex                
characteristics may be relevant to 
the extent that those characteristics are usually not revealed to 
the public (e.g., e.g. external genitals revealed to or forced upon 
an unconsenting individual).  Thus, for the purpose of sexual 
assault or bathroom designations, physical sex characteristics 
may be the most appropriate criteria on which to base different 
treatment.64
The court in In re Heilig noted that many courts find, for 
purposes of marriage, that an individual’s biological sexual  
constitution is fixed at birth and cannot be changed unless a  
mistake has been made at birth and later revealed by medical               
investigation.65  As the facts make clear, and because the law in 
this field should depend upon medical facts,66 when an             
individual is born, that individual’s gender identity has been 
decided.67  Thus, while basing a classification system on an  
individual’s genitals at birth may often lead to the appropriate 
classification, sometimes it will lead to a mistake, mis-
identifying an individual as a male or female based on that     
individual’s genitalia.68
Because they are “universally recognized as inherent, rather 
than chosen,” attempts to change a person’s gender identity to 
conform to physical sex characteristics have consistently 
failed.69  In addition, although they are noticeable, physical sex 
characteristics are reversible because they can be altered by way 
of hormone treatment or sex reassignment surgery, but are likely 
to be altered only to conform to gender identity, which is           
immutable.70 Indeed, sexual reassignment surgery “merely   
harmonizes a person’s physical characteristics with that        
identity.”71  Therefore, a person whose sex characteristics fit the 
binary categories and who feels that physical sex characteristics 
are immutable is correct with respect to himself or herself      
because it would counter the dictates of his or her gender          
identity to alter their already congruent sex characteristics.  
However, this is not the case for transgendered individuals.   
If the government is interested in defining sex for the     
If the government is interested in defining sex 
for the purpose of  marriage on a basis other 
than gender identity, it should do so by stating 
precisely what   sex characteristics it feels are 
relevant to marriage.  
Because defining a person’s sex focuses 
on gender identity, and because  
individuals can have ambiguous
gender identities, the scope of
marriage rights must be expanded to         
include those people.
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purpose of marriage on a basis other than gender identity, it 
should do so by stating precisely what sex characteristics it feels 
are relevant to marriage.  It would not be unreasonable to expect 
the legislature to do this.  Indeed, Maryland reconstructed its 
rape statute to define the crime based on the physical sex charac-
teristics it found, to be most naturally vulnerable.72  However, if 
sex can be said to be relevant to marriage, then the relevant 
characteristic is gender identity, not physical sex characteristics.  
To the extent that a person’s sex is defined by physical sex char-
acteristics, for the purposes of marriage, the definition does not 
fit under a “unique characteristics” exception. .  
CONCLUSION
Marriage may not be limited as between a man and a 
woman, and there is no narrowly tailored definition of man and 
woman that does not exclude a class of people based on sex.  
Because requiring any showing of sex prior to marriage, or lim-
iting marriage based on genitals at birth, is not narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling government interest, defining marriage 
as between a man and a woman violates the ERA. To comply 
with the ERA, marriage should be defined as between two     
individuals, rather than as between a man and a woman.  
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BOOK REVIEW 
LESBIAN AND TRANSGENDER ISSUES IN EDUCATION:
PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Edited By James T. Sears, PhD .  Publisher (Year). ISBN # 
Reviewed by Justin K. Teres * 
“Queer and faggot were common taunts back in the 1960s – just as they often are today.  If one wore green to school on Thursdays, then one was surely queer and everyone 
mercilessly harassed the person.  I avoided green on Thursdays,”
1 recounts Rani Sonno, Director of the University of California 
at Los Angeles LGBT Campus Resource Center.  
 For members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
intersexed (LGBTI) community, who grew up as sexual and 
gender minorities, memories like this are an unfortunately       
common experience.  In Gay, Lesbian and Transgender Issues 
in Education: Programs, Policies and Practices, an anthology 
of scholarly articles edited by James T. Sears, PhD, authors  
examine policies affecting 
LGBTI youths within academic  
communities. They reflect upon 
their own experiences as youths 
in the LGBTI community and 
address areas of law and society 
that impacted whether or not 
they had comfortable environ-
ment in which to learn.  Authors also contend that children 
should be exposed to controversial topics, such as a societal  
construct of gender and the normality of homosexuality, as early 
as elementary school.  
 The anthology makes clear that many members of the 
LGBTI community confront similar experiences involving  
negative sentiment from classmates in insensitive and           
homophobic environments.  However, the articles also convey 
that segments of the LGBTI community encounter differing 
struggles.  For instance, some articles explain that transgendered 
students have shown a higher level of attempted and actual     
suicide at the high school level than other LGBTI students.2
Another piece recognizes the distinct challenges faced by      
transgendered college students and offers suggestions for      
promoting inclusion, such as training of university                   
administrators on transgender topics, the use of trans-inclusive 
language in university documents, and the addition of “gender 
identity” to university non-discrimination policies.3
 Sears makes clear that LGBTI students run into similar       
educational problems on a global scale, without a regard to        
cultural or political boundaries.  This is demonstrated through a 
series of letters from Japanese LGBTI high school students, who 
felt a sense of isolation, expressed embarrassment in their        
sexuality and/or gender identity, and found solace only in Japa-
nese LGBTI magazines such as Buddy and Fabulous, which 
indicate to them that there are others out there who feel the 
same.  Sears also includes the memoirs of three lesbians from, 
New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, who reflect on 
their common educational experiences, which included hiding 
their true identities but feeling a strong independence from    
feminist stereotypes. 
Gay, Lesbian and Transgender Issues in Education also 
addresses legal aspects of problems in LGBTI education.       
Examining efforts made to curtail homophobic and anti-
transgendered behavior within schools, 
Sears investigates the issue of bullying 
when manifested as homophobia.  Through 
the lens of a Canadian experience, Gerald 
Walton states that some school districts 
have modified mission statements to be  
inclusive of all students’ safety by          
criminalizing bullying against those under 
the age of eighteen.4 However, bullying that targets LGBTI  
students in particular remains largely un-addressed by the law 
and school officials, as does the societal question of why homo-
phobia becomes a source of bullying in the first place.  
 The book also covers the area of school-sponsored         
programs addressing issues such as gay-straight alliance groups 
and LGBTI-inclusive educational materials.  Articles identified 
school-sanctioned gay-straight alliances as influential in creating 
LGBTI awareness and in developing supportive ‘safe spaces’ 
for LGBTI students, but to be successful, such groups require a 
significant level of support from school administrators, which is 
harmfully lacking.  Discussing other roadblocks, Patti Capel 
Schwartz describes her experience with an educational program 
entitled It’s Elementary, which advocates the  teaching of same-
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sex relationships, the normality of LGBTI individuals, and other 
relevant issues within classroom educational aids.5 Un-
fortunately, when integrating these      
controversial standpoints into lesson 
plans, schools encounter difficulties 
such as hesitancy of teachers and 
the necessity of permission slips 
from parents, both of which signify               
a sense that the material is            
objectionable.  
 Overall, Gay, Lesbian and 
Transgender Issues in Education provides a broad picture of the 
state of LGBTI education policy, not only in the United States, 
but around the world.  Sears’ article selection also attempts to 
encompass these issues from every education level, from      
elementary school through the completion of graduate programs.  
The compilation of articles unfies a vast array of issues, but the 
broad scope of articles can be overwhelming at times.  However, 
the content demonstrates an       
important LGBTI theme: every 
segment of the community, 
whether gay men, lesbians, or a 
transgendered individuals, who 
faces a world that  refuses to      
acknowledge their most basic 
identity, faces unique problems in 
their own right. These differences 
add to the  complexity of LGBTI education policy. This       
complexity, intertwined with a heterosexist majority in most 
schools, leaves LGBTI students with many challenges left to 
face.
* Justin Teres is a second-year law student at American University Washington 
College of Law, where he serves as Executive Director of the Lambda Law 
Society, WCL’s affinity group of LGBTI students and allies. 
1 James T. Sears, PhD., ed. Gay, Lesbian and Transgender Issues in Education: 
Programs, Policies and Practices, New York: Harrington Park Press, 2005, p. 
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2 P. Jayne Bopp, A School-Based Program to Improve Life Skills and to Prevent 
HIV Infection in Multicultural Transgendered Youth in Hawaii, in Gay, Lesbian 
and Transgender Issues in Education: Programs, Policies and Practices 147, 155 
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RAISING THE SPECTOR OF DISCRIMINATION:
THE CASE FOR DISREGARDING “FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE”
IN THE APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
TO CRUISE SHIPS
By Paul T. Hinckley * 
In June 2005, the United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict between two lower courts and ruled that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to foreign-
flagged cruise ship,. in the case of Spector v. Norwegian Cruise 
Lines.1  Though enlightening and constructive, many issues re-
garding the application of U.S. laws to entities located outside 
U.S. territorial boundaries were 
unresolved by the Supreme Court 
decision, especially with regard to 
cruise vessels operating in the 
United States.2  Many of these 
problematic legal questions arise 
from the pervasive practice in the 
maritime industry of flying “flags 
of convenience” (“FOC”s).3  Flags 
of convenience can be defined as “the flag of any country        
allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-
controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the      
reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are 
registering the vessels.”4
 A cruise vessel’s internal operations and management are 
presumed to be under the jurisdiction of the host state whose flag 
the vessel flies.  Therefore it is out of the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts (absent expressed congressional intent to the contrary).  
As a result, courts have found that many U.S. regulations, most 
notably labor and employment protections, do not apply to cruise 
ships and other maritime vessels flying foreign flags.  This        
article explores the current situation and argues for extra-         
territorial availability of additional protections to workers aboard 
ships ultimately owned and controlled by U.S. interests.  
FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE AND OPEN REGISTRIES -        
HISTORY AND PRACTICE
A ship flying under the flag of a sovereign state, under most 
circumstances, is operating under the laws and jurisdiction of 
that host state.5  That state is also responsible for the enforcement 
of both domestic and international laws against the ships that sail 
its flag.6  However, when there is little to no actual relationship 
between the ship (its crew and its owner) and the host state, the 
ship is often referred to as flying a “flag of convenience.”7
Among the reasons for “flagging out” are: fewer to no taxes  
imposed on earnings, lower safety standards, and reduced       
operating costs.8  In response to the adverse effects on the 
American maritime workforce caused by U.S. ships’ “flagging 
out” and hiring cheap foreign labor, U.S. maritime trade unions 
have long sought international support against open-registry 
countries.  They hope to further restrict the registration of ships 
by requiring a “genuine link” between the vessel and the country 
registering the vessel.9
 Since the 1920s, the percentage of the world’s maritime  
vessels FOCs increased.10   A recent United  
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), entitled Review of Maritime  
Transport, declared that over half of the gross 
ship tonnage owned by the three biggest      
shipping nations (Greece, Japan, and the United 
States) were flying FOCs.11  Similarly, in 2001, 
a study by the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation concluded that FOC ships accounted 
for 53% of the world’s gross tonnage.12
 The United States has played an integral part in both the 
development of the open-registry concept and in the increasing 
popularity of FOCs.13  Indeed, “the creation of open-registries 
was largely masterminded by the entrepreneurs of developed 
countries.”14  However, union pressure on the legislature in the 
United States in the early and middle twentieth century resulted 
in strict crew mandates and registry requirements for ships        
seeking to fly the U.S. flag, in addition to increased safety       
requirements and wage protections for U.S. laborers.15  Because 
the costs of maintaining a crew can account for half of operating 
expenses,16 economic concerns drove the maritime industry in 
the United States to seek alternatives to the high-priced U.S.  
labor force.  
 In the 1920s, the United States became involved in the       
creation of the Panamanian registry.17   During that period, U.S. 
Consulars actually represented Panamanian interests abroad in 
countries without a Panamanian Consulate.18  Panama currently 
has approximately 1700 registered vessels and is considered the 
oldest open-registry.19  Further illustrating U.S. involvement, 
Panama’s registry is administered from an office in New York.20 
The registry fees it receives account for five percent of Panama’s 
annual budget.21  The country advertises that “any person or 
company, irrespective of nationality and corporation,” with any 
sized ship, can register in a ‘straightforward’ and ‘expedient’ 
manner.22  The Panamanian Registry also claims to be “one of 
the most responsible in the world in reference to the concern of 
the Administration for the safety of life at sea of its vessels and 
the people embarked and for the economic well-being of the 
A ship flying under the flag of 
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owners/operators of these vessels [sic].”23  However, the              
Panamanian Registry’s simplified requirement system has 
proven to encourage substandard practice.  In fact, in 1999, the 
affluent British owners of a Panamanian registered vessel kept 
twenty percent of the wages meant for the crew.24  Furthermore, 
in 2001, the average vessel flying the Panamanian flag was built 
in 1985.  In that year alone, 15 Panama-registered vessels were 
lost, a number far greater than any other nation.25      
Not satisfied with just the open registry of Panama, former 
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and a group of leading U.S. 
entrepreneurs and multinationals spearheaded the creation of the 
Liberian registry.26 Liberia now has the world’s largest ship   
registry with approximately 1800 registered vessels.27 The         
Liberian registry is administered through International             
Registries, Inc., of Reston, Virginia, and is headquartered in New 
York.28   The  biggest obstacle to registering a vessel in Liberia is 
a requirement that vessels over 1600 tons may be registered only 
by  Liberian nationals.29  Under Liberian law, however, a          
corporation or partnership qualifies as a Liberian national.30
In 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard caught the Royal Caribbean 
ship Nordic Empress dumping oil in waters off the coast of the 
Bahamas as it made its way to Miami.31  The ship was flagged 
out of Liberia.32   During the course of 
the Coast Guard’s investigation, 
Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines 
(“RCCL”) denied charges that it had 
illegally dumped pollutants.33 The 
cruise line also claimed that it was 
immune from criminal prosecution in 
the United States because its ships fly 
foreign flags.34 RCCL argued that 
under international law, only Liberia 
had jurisdiction to prosecute because 
Nordic Empress flew the Liberian 
flag.35  The United States was forced to amend the charges to 
making false statements to the Coast Guard.36   The ship had 
omitted the discharge from its record books before submitting 
them to the Coast Guard, and it was this act which brought the 
cruise ship under U.S. jurisdiction.37
The business of maintaining ship registries is lucrative and 
provides substantial income for host states that are able to attract 
vessels to that country.38   Many countries, in order to lure and 
keep registry business in their states, fail either to adopt or to 
enforce laws against ships that may cause them financial          
difficulty.  The fear of losing the registry income provided by a 
fleet of fee-paying ships to another country with less rigorous 
regulations (or enforcement regulations) creates a virtual race to 
the bottom where states fail to enforce, among other things, labor 
and employment regulations and anti-discrimination laws.    
DISCRIMINATION IN THE CRUISE INDUSTRY
 Cruise ship operations are the fastest growing segment of 
the global maritime industry.39  Since 1980, cabin occupancy has 
increased almost 600 percent, from 1.5 million to more than 10 
million passengers worldwide.40  The number of North       
Americans taking cruises has doubled in the past ten years.   
Employment in the cruise industry has increased to meet the 
demands.  Royal Caribbean International, one of the largest 
cruise operators, estimated that it would need 12,000 new 
“hotel” employees for housekeeping and the dining room each 
year for the next five years to keep pace with expansion.41
The majority of these workers are recruited from countries 
in Eastern Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, and Central America.42
Workers must often pay recruiters and placement companies 
hundreds of dollars for their positions, gradually paying these 
fees from their paychecks.43  This arrangement creates a       
situation where the worker is an indentured servant by the time 
she or he steps onto the ship, greatly increasing the consequences 
of job loss.44  Ship operators exploit this situation by using the 
threat of termination (and often abandonment at foreign ports) to 
quell complaints and disputes.45
 Cruise ship crew-members generally work ten to twelve 
hours a day, seven days a week, for ten-month contracts.46  A 
shipboard waiter may work as many as 16 hours a day and often 
gets less than six hours of uninterrupted rest per night.47          
Collective agreements on cruise ships frequently require       
shipboard employees to 
work 80 hours per week.  
“In a survey  of shipboard 
employees conducted by 
the ITF in 2001, 95% of 
those surveyed reported 
working seven days a 
week.”48  They are not 
paid overtime and often 
work their entire contract 
without any break.49
Even working under an 
ITF collective  bargaining agreement, the lowest compensated 
employee may earn as low as $730 a month.50  Poor or unsafe 
living conditions, unpaid wages, long working hours, abusive 
employers, the fear of crew-members being abandoned in foreign 
ports, little or no job security, and the suppression of union      
activities frequently occur on FOC ships.51  This has resulted in 
an ever-increasing staff turnover rate in which the average term 
of hotel crew employment decreased from three years in 1970, to 
a year and a half in 1990, to nine months in 2000.52
 Despite the fact that they maintain internal operations       
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the cruising industry 
frequently lobbies Congress to pass favorable laws.53  By total 
spending, it is the fourth-largest lobbying industry in Florida.54
In fact, as an organization created to advance the interests of the 
cruising industry, the International Council of Cruise Lines 
spends about a million dollars annually on its lobbying efforts.55
 In addition to the aforementioned employment difficulties, 
gender and race-based discrimination aboard cruise vessels       
continues to be a serious problem.56  “The operation of the cruise 
ship is segregated by gender.  All the captains are men and few if 
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any women are found in the deck and engine departments.  
Women concentrate in hotel, catering, and other ‘non-technical’ 
sectors of the vessel.”57
 National origin discrimination also occurs.58  Women from 
industrial countries are far more likely to be found in a small 
number of management or administrative positions, and are also 
more likely to be employed as receptionists, nurses, entertainers, 
and beauticians; while, Asians and women from less developed 
countries are almost entirely employed in the “hotel” functions 
of the ship, which include catering, waiting, and cabin staff     
positions.59  Reports also suggest that women from industrial 
countries are paid more than those from less developed countries 
employed in the same job.60
THE INADEQUACY OF THE SPECTOR DECISION AND
OTHER CASELAW
The decision in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines dealt a 
blow to the longstanding practice of deferring to a host country 
in matters concerning the functioning of a ship.61   That decision 
declared that foreign-flagged cruise ships, which pick up     
American citizens at U.S. ports, must comply with Title III of the 
ADA because the cruise ships qualify as “public                      
accommodations” under the Act.62  The Court was unclear,       
however, about the extent to which the ADA would apply or 
what modifications would need to be made to accommodate 
handicapped individuals.63  In situations where compliance 
would not be “readily achievable” or would be a violation of an 
inter-national obligation, the Court declared the Act would not 
apply.64 Relying on precedent,65 the Court held that if               
compliance affected the “internal order of the ship” the Act 
would not apply, since the internal 
operation of the ship is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the host state.66
However, the Court’s decision in 
Spector did nothing to change the 
status quo as it relates to the         
jurisdictional situation which       
allows U.S. owned and operated 
cruise lines to discriminate on the 
basis of gender and nationality 
without fear of discrimination lawsuits, to blacklist employees 
for union activity, and to escape liability for dumping waste in 
inter-national waters. 
Under the Spector decision, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act may now apply to cruise ships, ending the practice of dis-
criminating against U.S. passengers who are disabled.  However, 
because crews are considered part of the “internal order of the 
ship” and thus subject to the laws of the host state, crews remain 
unprotected by U.S. employment laws. Thus, a cruise ship        
company may be required to make reasonable accommodations 
for a handicapped passenger, such as braille in an elevator or a 
handrail in a bathroom, but may not be required to make the 
same modification to an employee service elevator or to a crew 
member’s bathroom.  Furthermore, under Spector, the cruise 
company may not be able to charge more when selling a       
boarding ticket to a disabled person, yet may pay a disabled      
employee less.   
LIMITATIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
U.S. LAW
Historically, U.S. laws did not apply extraterritorially.  This 
was due to the principle set forth by the Supreme Court in Foley 
Brothers Inc. v. Filardo,67 which states that federal laws are  
presumed not to apply extra-territorially absent specific          
congressional intent.  The Supreme Court affirmed its approval 
of this rule in two consolidated cases, Equal Employment        
Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.,68 and 
Bourlesan v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco). 69  In those 
cases, the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 did not apply to employment outside the U.S. despite the 
fact that Aramco was an American corporation and its employees 
(the plaintiffs) were American citizens.  In its holding, the Court 
declared that the rule against extraterritorial application “serves 
to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those 
of other nations which could result in international discord.”70
Subsequently, in 1991, Congress declared its intent to apply 
the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to U.S.  citizens 
working abroad for U.S. companies.71  As a result, claims of  
discriminatory employment practices abroad against U.S.        
companies brought by American citizens no longer run the risk 
of dismissal on those grounds.  These changes are limited,       
however. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act applies 
only when the employee is a United States citizen, and the       
employee’s company is controlled by an American employer.72
The language of the statute       
specifies that overseas citizens are 
to be covered under the revised         
legislation, but neglects to mention 
whether or not foreign nationals 
working for U.S. corporations 
overseas fall are included.73  This 
exclusion of foreign nationals by 
the congressional revision has 
been the subject of at least two 
cases, Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., and Torrico v. IBM.74
In Shekoyan (2002), a foreign national sued his former       
employer claiming Title VII violations.75 Though born in          
Armenia, the plaintiff was a permanent resident of the United 
States.76  He was hired in the District of Columbia, but his job 
required him to work in the Republic of Georgia.77  Shekoyan 
claimed that his immediate supervisor, Jack Reynolds,               
discriminated against Shekoyan's on the basis of his national 
origin.78  Shekoyan claimed that his boss made statements that he 
was not a “real American,” mocked his accented English, and 
made racist comments about people from former Soviet states.79
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that, because 
Shekoyan was not a U.S. citizen and because of his employment 
was in the Republic of Georgia, he was outside of the protections 
as an organization created to advance 
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afforded by Title VII.  The court further found that it lacked     
subject-matter jurisdiction over his claim.80  Title VII did not 
apply to permanent U.S. residents or to U.S. “nationals” – only 
to citizens of the United States who may be working abroad.81
In Torrico v. International Business Machines, 82 the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York took 
a different approach.  Torrico dealt with an employee who, 
though not a U.S. citizen, was a U.S. resident prior to agreeing to 
take a three-year temporary rotational assignment in Chile.83  He 
was discharged while on medical leave84 and sued pursuant to 
the Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).85  In 
deciding whether or not ADA protections should apply in       
Torrico, the court borrowed a “center of gravity test” which New 
York courts normally used for employment contract disputes 
when choice of law was at issue.86  Here, however, they looked 
to see whether or not it could reasonably be argued that Torrico’s 
employment occurred in the United States, and whether the ADA 
should therefore apply.87  After a bench trial, the court found in 
favor of the defendants, but the case set a precedent for allowing 
claims to survive summary judgment  despite the plaintiff not 
being a U.S. citizen and being out of the country at the time the 
discrimination occurred.  “A non-resident employed in the 
United States who travels abroad on a business trip is not 
stripped of the protections of the ADA the moment he or she 
leaves U.S. territory.”88
 In EEOC v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc.,89 the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida was presented 
with the opportunity to consider application of Title VII90 to a 
cruise ship flying a foreign flag.  In that case, Susan Harman 
inquired into an entry-level position as a wiper or ordinary       
seaman in the deck or engine department of Bermuda Cruise line 
vessel S.S. Veracruz.91  The employment inquiry was made over 
the telephone to Captain Glidden, Bermuda Star’s port captain, 
whose office was in Miami.92  Harmon was told that, because she 
was a female, her application for employment would be denied.93
She was told that the ordinary seaman position required that the 
applicant be male.94  Despite the fact that the S.S. Veracruz was 
registered in Panama and flew the Panamanian flag, and that the 
corporation itself was organized under the laws of the Cayman 
Islands, the court held that the Title VII violations occurred 
within U.S. territorial boundaries and accordingly denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
U.S. courts were presented with a second opportunity to 
visit the issue of Title VII application to cruise ships when the 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered 
EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd. (d/b/a Norwegian Cruise Lines).95
That case began when two charges of employment                   
discrimination against Kloster were filed with the Equal          
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).96 Judy         
Corbeille, an assistant cruise director, alleged that she was fired 
as a result of her pregnancy.97  Fernando Watson, a bar manager, 
claimed that he had been forced to resign because he was       
discriminated against on the basis of his race and national        
origin.98  Pursuant to its statutory duty, the EEOC began its     
investigation by issuing two administrative subpoenas.99 It 
sought to discover evidence relating to Kloster’s corporate         
structure and employment practices.100 Kloster refused to         
comply with the subpoenas.  The EEOC requested judicial     
enforcement.101
 The District Court denied the EEOC’s request.  It held 
that “the application of Title VII to foreign flagged vessels 
owned by a foreign corporation, without clear congressional  
authorization, would “undermine the sovereignty of another 
country” and “violate principles of international law.”102 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the               
decision.103  In its decision, the court stated, “[a]lthough we do 
not decide the jurisdictional reach of Title VII with respect to 
owners of foreign flagged cruise ships, we reverse the district 
court's ruling because it was prematurely made in this subpoena         
enforcement action.”104  The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is 
worth noting: 
 In the instant case, many of the EEOC's requests for 
documents are attempts to discover information that 
would be relevant to jurisdiction. For example, although 
Kloster argues that the discharged employees were   
actually employed by Ivanhoe Catering International, 
Ltd. ("Ivanhoe"), a wholly owned Bahamian subsidiary 
of Kloster, the EEOC makes a colorable assertion that 
Ivanhoe is really a mere alter ego of Kloster. The EEOC 
subpoenae request information on the relationship   
between Kloster and Ivanhoe. The EEOC also seeks 
information relating to the nature and extent of Kloster's 
business operations in Miami, the extent to which the 
employment activities occurred in Miami, and whether 
the acts of alleged discrimination occurred in Miami. 
These and other facts may lead to information that will 
allow the EEOC to make an informed decision         
regarding its jurisdiction. The EEOC cannot be        
expected to ask only questions to which it already 
knows the answers.105
Because Title VII only applies extraterritorially to American 
citizens employed by U.S. companies, the EEOC sought infor-
mation regarding not only whether or not the employees filing 
the complaint were American citizens, but whether or not a case 
could be made that Kloster (Norwegian Cruise Lines) was a U.S. 
company.106  Such a determination would not have been the end 
of the inquiry since NCL had attempted to protect itself from 
liability by hiring its crew through a third-party employment 
company, a common strategy among cruise operators.107
The Eleventh Circuit, in its decision, also alluded to the  
conclusion that was reached in Lauritzen v. Larsen,108 which 
dealt with the application of the Jones Act to a foreign owned 
ship.  In that case, the Court considered seven factors,109 only 
one of which was the “law of the flag,” to guide its resolution of 
the issue regarding whether the Jones Act applied to a maritime 
tort action brought by a Danish seaman against a Danish owner 
of a Danish vessel.110  The Kloster court held that it could not 
“conclude at this early stage that the EEOC clearly lacks        
jurisdiction.”111
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The result of the decision in Kloster remains nonetheless 
unclear when combined with the Court’s ruling in Spector. 112
The courts appear to be more willing to look past the supposed 
sovereignty of ships flying FOCs to analyze other factors which 
may affect choice-of-law issue. 
CONCLUSION
Most cruise lines operating in the United States have           
significant ties to the United States.113 While most are                   
incorporated abroad, and register their ships under foreign flags, 
they are often headquartered in the United States.  Additionally, 
most passengers are U.S. citizens, and often the cruise lines are 
owned and largely controlled by U.S. interests.114  A rule which 
accounts for the beneficial ownership of the vessel and the 
owner’s nationality, as well as the relative protections to be     
expected from the host state, should guide courts toward          
determining whether extension of anti-employment dis-
crimination laws should be available, to both U.S. citizens and to 
aliens working aboard U.S. cruise ships.115
Thus far, legislative efforts by Congress have failed to bring 
about real change in the industry.116 To date, international       
efforts have also had limited success.117  Meanwhile, the current 
situation allows for the absurd result of protecting passengers 
from discrimination, but not workers.  Unlike the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, both ruled to be 
inapplicable to foreign crews aboard foreign flagged ships due to 
their potential for conflict with other legal obligations, U.S. anti-
discrimination statutes are unlikely to provoke international      
discord of the kind discussed in Benz and McCulloch, the            
respective cases deciding those matters.118
American corporations should not be permitted to shirk the 
laws of the United States by transferring non-citizen employees 
to foreign offices or by simply hiring foreign workers.  Title VII 
must be re-written in order to conform to its original purpose - 
the deterrence of discriminatory behavior by employers.119  If a 
protected U.S. trademark were being used improperly aboard a 
cruise ship and compensation denied, the U.S. would un-
doubtedly assert jurisdiction.  Therefore, courts should consider 
showing the same courtesy to the people employed aboard the 
same ships. 
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The First Cuban-born President of the Florida Bar  
Association: Spotlight on Francisco Angones* 
By Juan Fernandez-Barquin ** 
CUBA AND YOUR FAMILY
I read that you arrived from Cuba in 1961.  How old 
were you?  Did your whole family come with you?  How was 
their voyage to the United States? I was a month short of being 
11.  I arrived in the United States on Tuesday, June 13, 1961, by 
myself, through a program called Pedro Pan.1  As it just so hap-
pens, there were two other unaccompanied children on the flight 
whom I befriended.  The son of one of the two other unaccompa-
nied children has since become an attorney. 
My family flew over here 4 ½ months after I arrived.  It was 
a very difficult 4 ½ months because I had no idea when they 
were arriving.  If anything, I was very lucky.  Some children did 
not reunite with their parents until years after they arrived in the 
United States.  And some other children never saw their parents 
again.
Do you have any vivid memories of Cuba?  If so, what is 
your most vivid memory?  Why do you think you remember 
that the most?
I have some wonderful memories with my father, and with 
friends from the neighborhood riding horses and going to school.  
But I also have some very sad, heart-wrenching memories, for 
instance the day I left my father, mother, and sister behind in 
Cuba to come to the United States.  I was just eleven years old, 
and to this day, I still remember how much I was hoping and 
how hard I was praying that I would one day be       reunited with 
them. 
As for the rest of my family, my 
grandparents joined us much later.  My 
grandmother on my mother’s side came 
about five years after I arrived.  My 
grandmother and aunt on my father’s 
side arrived almost exactly 10 years 
after I arrived. 
Fidel financially crippled the vast majority of the upper 
and middle class Cubans after his arrival to power.  Many 
families had to leave everything they owned and only take 
what they could each fit into one suitcase.  What did your 
parents do for a living in Cuba?  What did they do to make 
ends after your arrival in the United States?  What sort of 
impression did this change in lifestyle leave upon you?
In Cuba, my father was a lawyer and my mother, a school 
teacher.  In the United States, my parents had several jobs.  I 
remember that they once cleaned the floors in the bathrooms of 
Miami International Airport.  My father also worked selling      
merchandise and other products in Hialeah.  Ultimately, my    
parents were able to find employment with the Catholic Welfare 
Bureau in Florida City.  Later, my mother was able to get a job 
teaching there.  This was largely because she spoke English.  My 
father, on the other hand, did not speak English.  He also had to 
work odd jobs to make ends meet. 
The change in lifestyle was drastic.  Upon arriving in 1961, I 
lived in Hialeah.  After my parents arrived, we moved to Florida 
City, a small city in South Miami-Dade County, next to       
Homestead.  At Florida City my parents and I lived at a camp, 
where my parents were placed in charge of some seven or eight 
other children who had arrived from Cuba via Pedro Pan and had 
no guardians here in the United States.  While at Florida City, I 
felt like I was leading a double life.  At school there were only 
two Cuban kids and four Puerto Rican kids, the rest were white.  
We were the only children who spoke Spanish there.  While at 
the camp all the children were Cuban and spoke Spanish.  Aside 
from school and basketball, I only socialized and played with 
other children from the camp.  We were at this camp for about 
four years. 
I noticed several differences between Cuba and the United 
States – for instance, the difference in the abundance of food 
between the local grocery store in Hialeah and the one we used 
to frequent in Cuba.  The grocery store in Hialeah, was full of 
food and nicely presented.  The store in Cuba was almost     
completely bare.  Another difference was with the channels on 
the television sets.  In the U.S. we could watch several channels, 
and in Cuba there were just a handful.  The newspapers and the 
media were tightly controlled in Cuba.  The Revolutionary     
Defense Committee had a tight grip over all things that were 
published and televised.  Here one could pick up the newspaper 
and read the real news. 
Was there a sense of disadvantage amongst you in the 
camp?
Among us, not really.  I did not feel a sense of disadvantage 
since all my friends and I were in the 
same situation.  Overall, all of us were 
on the same boat.  None of us had any 
money, and we were all trying to get 
ahead.  Our parents got the jobs they 
could just to make a living, and hoped 
for their kids to do better.  Even when 
it came to sports, we would take     
advantage of what we had.  Whether it was just a baseball, some 
gloves, and a bat, or simply a basketball, we would use them, 
have fun, and enjoy it.  We kept originally to our group.  But 
then through high school and then the university we became 
more integrated.   Looking back it probably wasn’t as hard as we 
probably thought it was.  Yes, we worked hard and had tunnel 
vision composed of: we had to work hard and get ahead, and 
work hard and get ahead.  But that was the example our parents 
gave us.  They sometimes held two jobs.  Even working after 
school wasn’t that bad. 
Tell me about your present family?  How did you meet 
your wife?
I met my wife, because I danced in her fifteenth birthday 
party.  I did not know her very well at the time, but we became 
friends, and I became part of her social circle.  The year before I 
met her I had moved with my family to Miami from Florida City, 
and did not know anyone in Miami.  We also attended high 
school very close to one another.  She attended the sister school 
of my high school.  Three years after meeting her, during my 
senior year, I asked her out, and that was the beginning of our 
At school there were only two 
Cuban kids and four Puerto
Rican kids, the rest were white. 
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relationship.  On September 16, 1967 we started dating, and then 
we got married on August 25, 1972.  We had our only child 
about ten years later, Francisco Angones, Jr. who recently com-
pleted his Bachelors at Columbia University, and has begun his 
Masters degree in Fine Arts at Columbia University. 
THE PROFESSION
Why the law?  Did you always know you wanted to be an 
attorney?  Did anything trigger your decision to become a 
lawyer?
I was always fascinated with the law.  At 12 years old I  
remember I wanted to be a lawyer.  I told my father this, and he 
told me that I was too introverted, not out-going enough, and not 
tough enough.  I was greatly impacted when I started my under-
graduate degree at the University of Miami.  I studied            
Philosophy of Political Systems and History.  In History I       
concentrated on Revolutions, in particular the American, French, 
Mexican, Soviet, and Cuban Revolutions.  From there I learned 
to appreciate and admire our system of government and the      
Constitution. 
What I admire about our Constitution the most is how it is 
able to evolve and how we can still 
resolve our problems using it.  You 
must keep in mind that when our       
government was started, women, 
blacks, and even some white males 
who didn’t own real property couldn’t 
vote or serve in juries.  You cannot 
deny the fact that our system has been 
able to evolve over time.  The only 
great misfortune we’ve had as a       
country was our Civil War, which      
pitted brother against brother, and    
father against son.  And I am certain 
nothing like that will ever happen again 
because of the great suffering it caused. 
Women received their right to vote in 1920.  Blacks in some 
parts of the country weren’t allowed to vote until the 1960’s.  
The Civil Rights Act, and Brown v. Board provided avenues of 
great change.  Most recently, in 2000 with the voting dispute 
between Bush and Gore, in some other countries a General 
would have declared war, martial law, and decided the victor.  In 
the United States the parties did go to war, but in the courtroom.  
They each filed suits all over the State of Florida, and in some 
other parts of the United States.  Then, a final arbiter, the courts, 
an independent branch of government, determined the victor.  
And even though many thought it wasn’t right, the court’s     
decision was ultimately accepted and democracy continued. 
After I earned my undergraduate degree I attended Univer-
sity of Miami School of Law, and graduated from there in 1976. 
I understand you served as President of the Cuban-
American Bar Association in 1982.  How do you feel the    
minority bar associations contribute to meet the needs of 
minorities?
All minority bar associations are great training grounds for 
leadership and future involvement in state bar associations.     
Minority bar associations, such as the Cuban American Bar       
Association, are particularly suited for groups such as Cuban 
Americans to learn to work together and learn how the Florida 
Bar and American Bar Association function.  Overall, through 
minority bar associations members are able to achieve greater 
leadership roles in their respective state bars and the American 
Bar Association. 
The Brothers to the Rescue is an organization composed 
of volunteers who organize fly-bys over the Straits of Florida 
to look out for rafters.  On February 24, 1996, three U.S.  
citizens and a resident of Florida were shot down over      
international waters by Cuban MiGs while flying a           
humanitarian mission for the Brothers to the Rescue.  You 
sued the Cuban government on behalf of the families and 
collected on the judgment.  It is very difficult and some 
would claim almost impossible to collect from the Cuban 
government.  Can you speak of the difficulties you             
encountered in attaining the judgment and in collecting?
  We were lucky that shortly after the unfortunate tragedy 
and murder of four human beings, Congress passed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death penalty Act, which essentially 
removed immunity from the sovereign nations who were listed 
on the Justice Department’s list of terrorist government.  Cuba 
was on this list.  This Act allowed us to file suit against the    
Cuban Government and provided a method of service process.  
However, there was no method of collection.  Even though the 
Cuban government failed to appear in court, we were still      
required to present our case.  When you 
sue a foreign country, even though they 
fail to appear in court and you file a  
default judgment, you still have to show 
some proof of their guilt. This               
requirement to show proof of their guilt 
is for the protection of their sovereignty. 
So we presented our case, with several 
witnesses in front of the Honorable 
Lawrence King in the United States  
District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida.  Judge King came out with an 
excellent human rights opinion awarding 
our party $187 Million in compensatory 
damages.  From there to collection was a difficult task. 
Although the Cuban government did not appear at trial, they 
did hire lawyers when we tried to collect from their frozen        
assets.  They hired a New York law firm to oppose us.  The U.S. 
Justice Department also opposed the collection since they had an 
interest in preserving the assets of sovereign nations, including 
frozen assets. 
Judge King’s opinion came out in late 1996, and it took us 
until late 2001 to collect.  Congress had to pass legislation to 
enable us to collect from the frozen assets.  Passage of this act 
required lobbying.  At about the same time we were lobbying a 
young woman was murdered in the Middle East by a terrorist 
group financially supported by Iran.  This incident assisted in the 
passage of the act.  Through a bipartisan effort led by Senator 
Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Senator Connie Mack (R-FL), 
the act passed in early 2001 and we were able to partially collect 
on the judgment. 
FLORIDA BAR ASSOCIATION
How does it feel to be the first Cuban born President of 
the Florida Bar?
It’s a wonderful honor and humbling experience.  It is      
difficult to describe the joy I have in representing the lawyers of 
Florida and the citizens of Florida as the Pres of the Fl Bar. 
What goals do you have as President?
I have a couple of things I hope to accomplish.  For one 
thing, I would like to seek the participation of all lawyers in the 
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bar association, particularly minority lawyers- blacks, Hispanics, 
and women.  I plan to accomplish this by asking them to get 
more involved in the bar associations events, and asking for their 
participation within the organization, such as participating in 
committees.  Besides greater minority involvement, I also plan to 
reach out to lawyers who feel disenfranchised by the Florida Bar. 
Another initiative is to increase funding to the state            
judiciary.  To keep an independent judiciary there must be     
adequate funding so the justice system can perform properly.  
The justices of the Supreme Court of Florida have not received a 
standard of living raise in the last four years.  We are also       
seeking funds to make a support staff for the judiciary from the 
Supreme Court to the lowest courts.  Other arms of government 
are luring away competent members of the judiciary staff with 
higher pay for essentially the same type of work.  Even though 
the members of the judiciary staff may be of the same category 
as the other state employees, the other state employees get paid 
more than those on the judiciary staff.  Lastly, another initiative 
of mine is to  create a task force to assist in the preservation of 
attorney client privilege.  This is in response to the Justice     
Department recent attacks on the privilege. 
You discussed minority attorneys.  Do you feel there is 
there a strong representation of minorities within the Florida 
Bar?
If we were to take the totality of all the lawyers in Florida 
with an accurate statistic of the blacks, Hispanics, and women 
represented in the bar, and I can only say this anecdotally, I     
believe we are beginning to be represented in adequate numbers.  
Believe it or not, the problem is that the questionnaires asking 
your race, gender, ethnicity, are voluntary.  Consequently, we 
only have partial numbers because reporting is not required. 
This year we have the greatest amount of minorities in our 
52-member Board of Governors than we have ever had in the 
past.  For the first time ever we have five black members of the 
Board of Governors, the highest ever, three Hispanic members – 
this figure has remained consistent over the last couple of years – 
and 11 women, another highest ever.  Representation of women 
and minorities in the committees is also higher than it has ever 
been in the past.  Perhaps we are not completely there yet, but we 
are surely making the in roads to getting there. 
How do you plan to bolster minority attorney participa-
tion in the Florida Bar?
The Florida Bar, with the assistance of a law firm has set up 
a program to study the effect of lawyers and minorities.  The law 
firm will fund a member of the Florida Bar with a two-year   
fellowship to conduct these studies.  And, we may also revamp 
our annual diversity symposium.  For the last four years we have 
had an annual diversity symposium.  We have set up a              
committee to study the symposium from top to bottom to see 
whether it needs improvement to accomplish its goal of          
attracting more minority attorneys. 
Does the Florida Bar have some sort of a big brother-big 
sister organization to assist minorities becoming attorneys?
There are a couple of projects that involve mentoring      
currently taking place, and some being considered.  There is a 
cooperation between student branches of the bar association in 
different universities throughout Florida, and particular sections 
of the bar.  For instance, the real property and probate division of 
the Florida Bar has set up a minority outreach program for future 
and new members of the bar.  Through this program, the        
attorneys of this division will introduce students and new        
graduates to the real property and probate sections of the Florida 
Bar.
The Young Lawyers Division of the Florida Bar also 
reaches out to the student associations to bolster interest for the 
students’ participation after graduation.  We have been doing this 
for some time.  The present President of the Young Lawyers 
Division has followed through on this, and I know the incoming 
President plans to continue with this same plan. 
The professionalism committee of the Florida Supreme 
Court along with the Florida Bar will be considering the               
possibility of a mentoring program for young lawyers who have 
just graduated from law school.  This program would be intended 
for graduates who are neither in big firms nor working for a big 
government agency, and in general need of some necessary            
training to become better attorneys.  Learning to be an attorney 
does not end with law school.  This program would get these 
individuals more involved in the profession and further instruct 
them on their professional responsibilities, including quite          
possibly the most important one of all, ethics. 
ENDNOTES
* See Mr. Angones’s biography on page 87.  
**Juan Fernandez-Barquin is a third-year law student at the American Univer-
sity Washington College of Law.  Mr. Fernandez-Barquin is also the Managing  
Editor of The Modern American.
1 Pedro Pan was a program created by the Catholic Welfare  
Bureau of Miami in December 1960 at the request of parents in 
Cuba to provide an opportunity for them to send their children to 
Miami to avoid Marxist-Leninist indoctrination.  From           
December 1960 to October 1962, more than 14,000 Cuban 
youths arrived alone in the United States.  What is now known 
as Operation Pedro Pan was the largest recorded exodus of     
unaccompanied minors in the Western Hemisphere.  While the 
majority was Catholic, several hundred were Protestant, Jewish 
or non-believers. Very few were from wealthy backgrounds.  
Most were of the middle class or lower middle class and        
included children of different racial background, Black and  
Chinese.  Family reunions began shortly after the first arrivals of 
the children.  About 50% were united with family members at 
the airport.  http://www.pedropan.org/history.html.
85
THE MODERN AMERICAN
H.RES. 526 “WHEREAS HOME OWNERSHIP IS AN IMPORTANT
PART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM”
This resolution finds that home ownership levels were at a 
near record high in 2006, although still lower among minorities.  
The House recognizes that the sub-prime market created home 
ownership opportunities for lower income families and that sub-
prime mortgages are most prevalent in neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of minorities.  In recent months the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis has caused a sharp increase in home foreclosures 
and has had a disparate impact on minority communities.  The 
resolution was proposed by Representative Elijah E. Cummings 
(MD) and was passed in the House on July 11, 2007. 
 The House recognizes a need to protect borrowers from 
unscrupulous practices by lenders and mortgage brokers.  This 
resolution calls for rules to eliminate unfair practices, to               
encourage lenders to evaluate a borrower’s ability to repay a 
mortgage, to require lenders to clearly communicate information 
about mortgage loans, to reduce or eliminate prepayment          
penalties, and to increase opportunities for loan counseling, 
among other things. 
The House and the Senate have proposed many bills in 
response to the current crisis.  The Foreclosure Protection and 
Home Ownership Protection Act (H. R. 3666) was introduced in 
the House on September 25, 2007 by Representative Betty       
Sutton (OH).  The bill recognizes the great effect this crisis has 
had on the world economy and that the number of foreclosures 
will likely increase.  The purpose of this bill is to establish a 
commission to examine the crisis, its causes, and legislative 
changes that could prevent such a problem in the future. 
The Fair Mortgage Practices Act of 2007 (H.R. 3012) 
would require loan originators to obtain a mortgage license or 
registration in order to engage in the business of loan              
origination.  This bill was introduced by Representative Spencer 
Bachus (AL) and was referred to house committee on July 12, 
2007. 
The Fairness for Homeowners Act of 2007 (H.R. 3081) 
would require lenders to verify borrowers’ ability to repay loans 
secured by a principal dwelling.  This bill was introduced by 
Representative Keith Ellison (MN) and was referred to a House 
committee on July 18, 2007. 
Other bills call for transparency in lending (H.R. 3296), 
leniency in bankruptcy proceedings (S 2136), and a requirement 
of mitigation activities as an alternative to foreclosure (S. 
AMDT. 2832 to H.R. 3074). 
H.R. 3685 “EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT OF
2007” 
This bill would prohibit employment discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and create meaningful remedies for victims 
of such discrimination.  The bill is sponsored by Representative 
Barney Frank (MA) and has nine co-sponsors.  It was referred to 
House committee and to the Committee on Education and Labor 
on September 27, 2007.   
The bill resembles the Title VII protections that currently 
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender.  The bill would prohibit failing or refusing to hire,       
discharging, and discriminating in wages, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment based on sexual orientation or       
perceived sexual orientation.  It would also prohibit segregating 
or classifying applicants or employees in a way that would        
deprive, tend to deprive, or otherwise adversely affect an          
individual based on sexual orientation or perceived sexual         
orientation.  The bill would not apply to members of the military 
or religious organizations. 
Representative Barney Frank introduced another bill, H.R. 
2015, in April 2007.  That bill would have prohibited employ-
ment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identification.  H.R. 2015 had 171 co-sponsors.  The current bill 
has been criticized for failing to extend protection against       
employment discrimination to transsexuals. 
H.R. 2965 “GROWTH ACT OF 2007” 
This bill would direct the Secretary of State to establish the 
Global Resources and Opportunities for Women to Thrive 
(GROWTH) Fund by amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961. First introduced in 2006, the amendments target             
underprivileged women in developing nations and focus on “(1) 
increasing women-owned enterprise development; (2) increasing 
property rights for women; (3) increasing women's access to 
financial services; (4) increasing women in leadership in            
implementing organizations, such as indigenous non-
governmental organizations, community-based organizations, 
and regulated financial intermediaries; (5) improving women's 
employment benefits and conditions; and (6) increasing 
women's ability to benefit from global trade.” 
The bill recognizes that women are more vulnerable to       
economic instability than men in developing nations.  The bill 
also finds that because women often invest extra income in their 
families, supporting underprivileged women in enterprises 
would have a positive impact on child nutrition, health, and  
education. 
The bill was introduced in the House in July by                
Representative Nita M. Lowley (NY) and has fourteen co-
sponsors. The bill was also introduced in the Senate in              
September by Senator Richard Durban (IL) and currently has 
one co-sponsor.    
H.RES. 535 “COMMENDING DAVID RAY RITCHESON, A SURVI-
VOR OF ONE OF THE MOST HORRIFIC HATE CRIMES IN THE
HISTORY OF TEXAS, AND RECOGNIZING HIS EFFORTS IN PRO-
MOTING FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO COMBAT HATE CRIMES”
With this resolution Congress mourns the passing of David 
Ray Ritcheson and commends his activism against hate crimes.  
Ritcheson was a Mexican-American high school student in 
Spring, Texas.  On April 23, 2006 he was brutally assaulted  
because of his race.  The former high school running back and 
Homecoming Prince spent several months in the hospital, where 
he underwent 30 surgeries.  Ritcheson became an advocate 
against hate crimes because of his personal experience. 
Ritcheson testified in front of a committee of the House of 
Representatives and urged the Federal Government to take      
LEGISLATIVE UPDATES  
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action to prevent hate crimes.  The David Ray Hate Crimes         
Prevention Act of 2007 – “David’s Law” – was incorporated into 
the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2007.  The legislation provides Federal grants to state and local 
programs to combat hate crimes committed by juveniles.  
David Ray Ritcheson died on July 1, 2007.  He was eighteen 
years old.
H.R. 3014 “HEALTH EQUITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF
2007” 
This bill would amend the Public Health Services Act to 
provide “culturally and linguistically appropriate health care.”  
The amendments include provisions that would improve access 
to federally funded medical care for patients with limited English 
proficiency.  The bill would also require non-discrimination in 
healthcare, create national standards in health care, and establish 
the Robert T. Matsui Center for Cultural and Linguistic          
Competence in Health Care.  
Representative Hilda L. Solis (CA) introduced this bill on 
July 12, 2007. It is co-sponsored by eighty-three Representatives.  
On September 11, 2007 it was referred to a House subcommittee. 
H.R. 2221 “UNITING AMERICAN FAMILIES ACT OF 2007” 
The purpose of this bill is to amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) to permit permanent partners of United 
States citizens and lawful permanent residents to obtain lawful 
permanent resident status in the same manner as spouses of      
citizens and lawful permanent residents obtain that status.  This 
bill would eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation 
in the INA by extending privileges to permanent partners.  The 
limitations imposed by the INA on married couples would also 
apply to permanent partners.  Children of citizens or lawful        
permanent residents that have permanent partners would not be 
eligible for lawful permanent resident status. 
The bill was introduced in May 2007 by Representative 
Jerrold Nadler (NY) and is co-sponsored by eighty-seven           
Representatives.  The bill was referred to the Sub-Committee on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and          
International Law on June 25, 2007.  Senator Patrick J. Leahy 
(VT), with nine co-sponsors, introduced a companion bill 
(S.1328) in the Senate in May. 
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